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Abstract
Inspired by the announcement of the hberalisation of the Thai Gas Industry 
in 1997, with the prime objective of improving efficiency in the energy sec­
tor, this thesis aims to assess the performance of the Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand (PTT)—a state-owned integrated gas monopoly in Thailand during 
1984/85-1996/97, Given that PTT  is a national integrated gas monopoly, 
an international comparison is required for evaluating the company’s per­
formance. Therefore, in this thesis, P T T ’s performance is compared to 
three other integrated gas companies operating in three different countries: 
Petronas, Osaka Gas and British Gas (operating in Malaysia, Japan and the 
UK, respectively).
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) 
are used to measure technical efficiency. Both are carried out under input 
and output orientations. Bootstrapping is also applied to the DEA to provide 
more statistical information. In addition, the change in PT T ’s productivity 
over the estimation period is also estimated. The results show that in general 
PTT performed relatively well over the period; although this is due partially 
to the high concentration of gas utilisation, given the high proportion of gas 
consumed for power generation in Thailand. Some counter-factual experi­
ments are undertaken to confirm the effect of the concentration of the gas 
market on P T T ’s technical efficiency. There is also evidence of an improve­
ment in productivity, due primarily to technical change. In sum, the results
imply that despite the drop in technical efficiency at the end of the esti­
mated period, PTT was already relatively efficient, even before the proposed 
changes by the Thai government. Nonetheless, given the high efficiency of 
PTT  was partially influenced by the highly concentrated gas market, the re­
sult also provides a caution for PTT for future investment, if there is a shift 
in the pattern of gas utilisation towards the residential or commercial sector 
and the company would like to remain relatively efficient.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 In troduction
In general, gas supply industries are made up of five businesses: gas procure­
ment, which can be from domestic production and imports, high-pressured 
gas transmission, low-pressured gas distribution and supply. This is true in 
Thailand, where the majority of natural gas is domestically produced by a 
few petroleum companies, with the rest imported from Myanmar through 
the international pipeline system. The Thai Gas Supply Industry (GSI) ef­
fectively began in 1981 and since then natural gas has become one of the 
main primary energy sources for the country. Apart from production, the 
industry has been under the control of the vertically integrated state-owned 
monopoly company entitled the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT). 
Such integrated monopolies used to be the traditional structure in the gas 
supply industries across the world. However, it has been argued that the 
market power that arises from such a structure can cause inefficiency. In
1
1997, with the prime aim of improving efficiency in the energy sector, the 
Thai Government announced the policy to deregulate, liberalise and privatise 
the Thai GSI and the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI)(NEPO, 1999). In 
order to examine whether the Thai policy is appropriate the level of efficiency 
needs to be measured.
However, efficiency in economics can be defined in many aspects. One 
of them is Hechnical efficiency'. Following Koopmans (1951), technical effi­
ciency refers to the ability of a company to minimise its bundles of inputs for 
producing a certain amount of output (input orientation) or to the ability of 
the company to produce the maximum possible output from a given combi­
nation of inputs (output orientation) at a particular technology. Technical 
efficiency is the simplest type of efficiency since it can be measured without 
information on prices of the inputs. However, if the prices of inputs can 
be observed, ‘economic efficiency'—involving for instance the ability of the 
company to minimise its cost at the given prices of inputs (also referred to as 
cost efficiency) or to maximise its profit given prices of outputs (also referred 
to as profit efficiency) (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000)—can be examined.
1.2 R esearch Q uestion
Inspired by the prime objective of the 1997 liberalisation policy to improve 
efficiency in the Thai GSI, this thesis aims to investigate the efficiency of 
the Thai GSI. Given that the industry was almost vertically integrated and 
monopolised by PTT, at the time, the level of efficiency of PTT can be used 
as a proxy for evaluating the appropriateness of the policy. To be precise.
this thesis primarily aims to examine ‘how well P T T  performed before the 
proposed liberalisation programme in 1997\ In order to answer this overriding 
question, the following related issues need to be clarified.
Firstly, P T T ’s performance can be evaluated by several criteria. In this 
thesis, two are considered: one, efficiency and two, growth in productivity 
of the company. Focussing on efficiency, which is the main interest of this 
thesis, as mentioned earlier, in economics, the term ‘efficiency' can be de­
fined in many aspects^: for example, technical efficiency and cost efficiency. 
However here it should be noted that only technical efficiency will be studied. 
Furthermore, measuring the technical efficiency and the growth in productiv­
ity of PTT can be done by several techniques. Two main techniques: Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), which 
have been widely adopted by academics and regulators across the globe, will 
be employed in this thesis.
Finally, given the monopoly status of PTT in Thailand, an international 
comparison is required for measuring technical efficiency and productivity 
growth of PTT. In this study, P T T ’s performance is compared to the perfor­
mance of three integrated gas companies operating in three different coun­
tries over the thirteen years 1984/85 thru 1996/97: Petronas (operating in 
Malaysia), Osaka Gas (operating in Japan) and British Gas (operating in the 
UK). These three gas companies are chosen as P T T ’s yardstick, since they 
had a similar structure to P T T ’s during the sample period in that they were
all vertically integrated monopolies with responsibility for gas transmission, 
S^ee more detail on the definitions of efficiency in Chapter 5.
gas distribution and gas supply.
1.3 T hesis O utline
In order to answer to the research question stated in the previous section, 
this thesis begins by reviewing the background of the Energy Sector in Thai­
land (Chapter 2). The overview of the Thai Energy Sector as well as the 
structures and characteristics of the main energy industries in Thailand, in­
cluding the gas supply industry, are described aiming to provide a general 
background of the energy situation in Thailand. After this review, the the­
sis focusses on the gas supply industry, inefficiency in the industry and how 
efficiency—technical efficiency in particular—can be measured, which leads 
to the efficiency analyses in the later chapters. In chapter 3, characteristics 
of gas supply industries in general are discussed. Besides the possibilities 
of inefficiency and how efficiency can be promoted in the gas supply indus­
tries are also considered. Finally, it presents a literature survey of efficiency 
studies in the gas supply industries. The survey shows that the previous 
studies on efficiency in the gas supply industries vary upon the data sets, 
and techniques used for measuring efficiency.
Following the literature survey, the data required for the analyses are dis­
cussed and described in Chapter 4. Then given the interest of the thesis in 
technical efficiency and productivity change, techniques for measuring tech­
nical efficiency and the change in productivity are reviewed (Chapter 5). The 
strengths and limitations of the techniques are compared. In consequence, 
two techniques, widely used in many previous studies on efficiency; Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA), are 
chosen and utilised in the analyses in this thesis.
The next three chapters (Chapter 6 -  Chapter 8) present the substan­
tive analyses of the technical efficiency and productivity change in the Thai 
CSI. In Chapter 6 , technical efficiency of PTT during 1984/85-1996/97 is 
measured against the efficiency of the other three gas companies using the 
output-oriented approach of SFA and DEA. Then, the comparative technical 
efficiency of PTT is re-considered (in Chapter 7) by both DEA and SFA, 
but, the input-oriented approach is adopted.
Extending from the efficiency analysis. Chapter 8 contains further ex­
tensions to the analysis. The first extension aims to measure the change in 
productivity of the gas companies over the period 1984/85-1996/97, using 
a parametric technique. The other extension is counter-factual experiments 
on the effect of the concentration of a gas market on P T T ’s technical effi­
ciency. The first experiment is based on the fact that most of the natural 
gas in Thailand is consumed by a few power plants and large industrial con­
sumers, [see Chapter 2]. It is argued that in terms of technical efficiency 
PTT might therefore have an advantage, since it is required to invest rela­
tively less on inputs (i.e. length of pipehne and employees) compared with a 
company serving numerous small customers in a residential and commercial 
sector, with both companies producing the same amount of output. Hence, 
the analysis intends to investigate how P T T ’s technical efficiency might have 
been affected, if during the period 1984/85-1996/97 the company faced a less 
concentrated gas market. The other counter-factual experiment, in contrast.
examines how technically efficient PTT might have been relative to the other 
three companies, when it is assumed that British Gas and Osaka Gas faced 
the industrialised gas market, as PTT and Petronas actually did. Finally, 
Chapter 9 summaries all the results and concludes, with some discussion of 
the policy imphcations.
Chapter 2
Background of the Thai Energy 
Sector
2.1 Introduction
Generally speaking, energy consumed in Thailand is primarily supplied from 
four main sources: (1) coal, (2) crude oil and petroleum products, (3) nat­
ural gas and (4) renewable energy^ Some energy is procured by domestic 
production but the rest is imported, which has been successively increased. 
Within a decade, the share of imported energy in total primary energy supply 
jumped from around 27 percent in 1991 to 45 percent in 2000. The increase 
has been clearly driven by the demand for crude oil, as shown in Figure 
2.1. The amount of imported crude oil was around 10 thousand tonnes of 
oil equivalent in 1991, or 57 percent of total imported energy in that year.
“^Renewable energy” in Thailand is mostly referred to fuel wood, paddy, husk and 
bagass (DEDP, 2000).
However by 2000 the amount increased to more than 33 thousand tonnes of 
oil equivalent, which accounted for about 85 percent of imported energy. In 
addition, focussing on the domestic production. Figure 2.2 shows that ma­
jority of the domestically produced energy was from three sources—natural 
gas, renewable energy and coal at around 40, 31 and 13 percent respectively 
in 2001.
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Figure 2.1: Total imported primary energy Vs. Imported crude oil from 
1991 to 2001 (Source: Thailand’s Energy Balances)
On the demand side, as shown in Figure 2.3, it is apparent that trans­
portation was the largest energy consuming sector in the Thai economy, as it 
accounted for 37 percent of the total final energy consumption in 2001. From 
the national energy balances, it can be found that the demand in transporta­
tion is clearly driven by the demand on petroleum products, particularly
Diesel Engined Road Vehicle Fuel (DERY)^. The same situation can also 
be found in the agricultural sector, where the final consumption is again 
dominated by the demand on DERY—around 94 percent of the sectoral con­
sumption in 2001. On contrary to the first two sectors, in the manufacturing 
and the residential and commercial sector (R&C), the energy is supplied from 
various sources. Specifically, in the R&C, energy used for cooking cooling 
and heating, is mainly supplied from renewable energy, electricity and LPG. 
In manufacturing, energy was supplied from coal, petroleum products and 
renewable energy.
Renewable
Energy
31%
Others
3%
Crude oil 
7%
Condensate 
6%
Natural Gas 
40%
Total Domestic Production 2001: 42,543 thousands tonnes of oil equivalent
Figure 2.2: Domestic Production of Primary Energy 2001 (DEDP, 2001b)
In Thailand, the energy sector consists of four main energy industries 
based on the main energy sources. These are (1) coal industry, (2) crude 
oil and petroleum product industry, (3) gas supply industry (GSI) and (4)
^DERV is the automative diesel fuel for use in high speed compression ignition engines 
in vehicle subject to Vehicle Excise Duty. DERV is referred to in Thailand’s Energy 
Balance as high-speed diesel (HSD)
3.1%
8 .8%
15.9%
Natural Gas 
Coal
Electricity
By Fuel
17.0% Renewable Energy
55.1% Petroleum Products
By Sector
Mining 0 .2 %
Construction 0.3%
Agriculture 5.7%
R&C 10.9%
Manufactur ing 34.1%
Transportation 37.6%
Total Final Energy Consumption 2001: 49,542 thousands tonnes of oil equivalent
Note: (1) R&C is Residential and Commercial Sector 
(2) Source: DEDP(2001)
Figure 2.3; Final energy consumption by sources and sector in 2001
electricity supply industry (ESI). Following this brief introduction, the re­
mainder of this chapter aims to provide a broad review on the energy sector 
in Thailand as a background underlying this thesis. In the next four sections, 
the four main energy industries will be presented industry-by-industry. Their 
characteristics will be described. Finally Section 2.7 summaries main char­
acteristics of these industries.
2.2 The Thai Coal Industry
Coal is a fossil fuel, which for decades has been an important fuel for power 
generation in Thailand. The history of the coal industry in Thailand dates 
back to the 1950s, when “Mae Moh”, the largest open-pit coalmine in South
10
East Asia located in the North of the country, started to operate (DMR, 
2001). In Thailand, coal reserves have been found in several parts of the 
country, as their locations shown in Figure 2.4. Unfortunately most of them 
are lignite—a type of coal that is low in heating value but high in ash and 
sometimes in sulphur. By 2001, Thailand had 1,354 million tonnes of coal 
reserves (DMR, 2001).
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Figure 2.4: Map of major coal reserves in Thailand
The coal industry in Thailand generally consists of two main activities— 
coal procurements and consumption, as shown in Figure 2.5. Coal consumed 
in the country is supplied from two sources: indigenous production and im­
port. Nonetheless, the majority of coal, around 64 percent of the total supply 
in 2001, is domestically produced. In addition, by this amount, almost 80
11
Production _ (M%)
EGAT 78%
Ban Pu 15%
Lanna Lignite 5%
Others 2%
ralLtll
7 Power 
Generation'
50.4%....
Import 136%)
Mamfâcturmg
49.6%
■ Procurement • Coal Utilisation
Note: (1) Data based on 2001
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Figure 2.5: Structure of coal industry in Thailand
percent was produced by a state-owned company, called Electricity Gener­
ating Authority if Thailand (EGAT)^. Besides EG AT, coal was also pro­
duced from other coal mines operated by some private-owned companies— 
accumulatively around 22 percent of the total coal production in 2001.
Given that most of the coal found in Thailand are lignite, due to their 
low heating value but high in sulphur and ash, they are not suitable for man­
ufacturing, like the cement industry. Therefore, most of the locally produced 
coal (both from EGAT’s coalmines and other private-owned coalmines) are 
consumed in coal-fired power plants, while the rest are sold to manufacturing 
consumers (around 33 percent of total production (DEDP, 2001b) in 2001). 
Nonetheless, given that up until 2001, the company owned all of the coal- 
fired power plants, it can be observed that EG AT is not only the main coal
^EGAT was established in 1969, as a result of the merging of three state companies— 
Yanhee Electricity Authority, Lignite Authority and the Northeast Electricity Authority, 
with main missions to produce and sell coal, to generate and supply electricity.
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producer, it is also the largest coal consumer in Thailand.
As mentioned earlier, besides the demand for coal from power genera­
tion, there is also a demand from manufacturing i.e. cement, textile and 
tobacco industries. In 2001, the coal consumed in manufacturing accounted 
for around half of the total consumption but with the poor quality of the 
local coal, most of the coal consumed in these industries was imported— 
in 2001 it accounted for more than 80 percent of the coal consumed in the 
manufacturing sector. The coal are imported directly by the manufacturing 
companies and from many countries, for instance, neighbouring countries, 
China, and Australia (DMR, 2001). Most of the imported coal are in better 
quality, such as bituminus—higher in heating value but lower in sulphur and 
ash—compared with the local lignite. The share of the imports in total coal 
supply was around 36 percent of the total coal procurement in 2001.
In summmary, it can be observed that the Thai Coal Industry is dom­
inated by EGAT—the integrated state-owned company which acts as both 
the largest coal producer and the largest consumer. Moreover, it is apparent 
that the transactions in the Thai coal industry—either in the import sector 
or the relationship between coal producers and the consumers—are bilateral. 
Furthermore, the industry is clearly linked with power generation through 
EGAT, since EGAT is also the key player in power generation as well, [see 
Section 2.5 for detial in Thai ESI].
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2.3 T he T hai Crude Oil and P etroleum  P rod ­
ucts Industry
The second main energy industry in Thailand is the Crude Oil and Petroleum 
Products Industry. As discussed earher, in terms of petroleum, Thailand is 
a heavily importing country, even though some crude oil reserves have been 
found in the Gulf of Thailand. By 2001, the reserves of 272 million barrels 
of crude oil and another 243 millions barrels of condensate were provable 
(DMR, 2001).
In general, the Thai Petroleum Industry involves transformation of crude 
oil and sale of petroleum products. In particular, as shown in Figure 2.6, the 
industry can be divided into four main parts—(1) petroleum procurements, 
(2) transformation, (3) petroleum products and (4) final consumption. As 
mentioned earlier, regarding petroleum, Thailand is heavily reliant on the 
imports. More than 95 percent of the total supply in 2001 was imported by 
refineries. In the past, before 1991 in particular, the imports were controlled 
by a quota system. Moreover, the refining capacities and the players were also 
restricted (NEPO, 1995). Nonetheless, in 1991, the industry was liberalised 
and since then, the import control has been abolished and new refineries 
have been encouraged to come into the business. In consequence, there are 
seven refineries—(1) ThaiOil, (2) Rayong Refinery, (3) Star Petroleum, (4) 
Bangchak, (5) Rayong Purifier, (6) ESSO and (7) TPI—and one condensate 
splitter, which is ATC, operating in Thailand. In addition to the imports, 
crude oil is supplied from the indigenous production. That is according to
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the Petroleum Act 1971 and PTT Act (1978), all produced petroleum has to 
be offered to the Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PTT)^—a state-owned 
company, as the first buyer before the petroleum can be offered to other 
parties.
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Figure 2.6: Structure of crude oil and petroleum products in Thailand
For the refining part of the industry, there are several refineries but the 
business is not competitive. This is because of the dominance of the four main 
refineries (i.e. ThaiOil, Rayong Refinery, Star Petroleum, and Bangchak), 
which are all partially owned by PTT. In 2001, the accumulated capacity
4pTT was established in 1978 by the Petroleum Authority Act B E. 2521 (1978) to be 
the national oil company.
15
of these four dominant companies was around 74 percents of total refining 
capacity, whereas the rest capacity was shared between private-owned ESSO 
and TPI at 19 and 7.5 percent of the total refining capacity, respectively 
(DEDP, 2001a). Therefore, the first two parts of the industry (i.e petroleum 
procurements and refining), under the present circumstances, seem to be 
heavily influenced by PTT, like EGAT dominating the coal industry.
Bangchak
8%
Others
ESSO
Figure 2.7; Shares of Petroleum Product Sales 2001
After being transformed, some petroleum products are exported (only 
14 percent of the total supply in 2000), while the majority of them are do­
mestically consumed. Nevertheless, the supply of some petroleum products, 
particularly diesel and fuel oil is still in shortage and hence needs to be 
imported to meet the local demand. Most of the petroleum products are 
distributed through suppliers, which again before the liberalisation in 1991,
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were restricted to only four companies which had shares in refineries. Those 
were PTT, Shell, ESSO and Caltex. However, since the 1991 liberalisation, 
the business has been opened up for competition and there are new players 
come into the business, although it has not been fully competitive. By 2001, 
more than half of the market share were still owned by the first three largest 
distributors, as shown in Figure 2.7.
On the demand side, the largest petroleum consuming sector is trans­
portation, around 66 percent of the final petroleum products’ consumption 
in 2001. Most of it was made up of diesel and gasoline. The second largest 
consuming sector is manufacturing, about 14 percent of the total consump­
tion in 2001. Similarly, the majority of the demand in this sector is on diesel 
and fuel oil. The R&C was the third largest consuming sector and in contrast 
to the first two sectors, demand in R&C in 2001 was for LPG, as it was used 
for cooking in most of the households in Thailand.
2.4 T he T hai Gas Supply Industry (G SI)
Another main energy industry is Gas Supply Industry (GSI). Firstly, it 
should be noted that the term "pos” in this section refers only to ''natural 
gas''^, which is often exploited associatively with crude oil and condensate. 
However, unlike the petroleum industry, the delivery of gas to final con­
sumers requires a pipeline network. In addition, particularly in Thailand , in 
contrast to the petroleum industry, Thailand has been self-sufficient in the
^Natural gas is gaseous mixture of hydrocarbons, mainly methane {CH4 ) found trapped 
in the earth’s crust, where it can be extracted through wells (Tussing and Tippee, 1995).
17
supply of natural gas. Most of natural gas consumed in the country is sup­
plied from the many gas reserves found, particularly in the Gulf of Thailand, 
as shown in figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Locations of major crude oil and gas reserves in Thailand
In general, the Thai GSI consists of four main business: (1) Gas Produc­
tion, (2) Gas Transmission and Distribution through pipeline network, (3) 
Gas Supply and (4) Gas Market. Figure 2.9 shows the present structure of 
the industry. Firstly, the gas production in Thailand is oligopolistic. It has 
been dominated by a few integrated oil companies, such as Unocal, PTTEP 
and Chevron. Most of them are foreign companies, except PTTEP, which is 
a Thai petroleum exploration and production public company, partly owned
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by PTT. Most activities are undertaken in the Gulf of Thailand, where most 
of the gas reserves have been found. According to the Petroleum Act (1978) 
and the PTT Act (1981), all produced gas is obhged to offer to PTT, as 
the first-hand buyer. Although legally it is still possible for the producers 
to sell their gas to other parties after being declined by PTT, in practice, 
the producers tend to make a long-term contract with PTT, and produce on 
demand. All produced gas is sold to PTT at the wellhead prices, which are 
formulated on the cost-plus basis coving the producer’s exploration and/or 
production costs and also reflecting the competitiveness between natural gas 
and its alternative fuel; heavy-fuel oil. The contracts between the producers 
and PTT are long-term, take-or-pay contracts^, which have typically lasted 
for 25 years. After the sale, the natural gas is transported through P T T ’s 
pipeline to the shore. Under the present circumstances; the monopsony of 
PTT and the long-term, take-or-pay contract, there is no competition in the 
Thai gas production business.
In the past, the domestically produced natural gas served all the demand; 
however, since 2000, some natural gas has been imported from Myanmar— 
the neighbouring country—through an international pipeline. The imports 
were aimed to meet the increasing demand in gas expected in 1990s. Unfor­
tunately, due to the financial crisis in 1997, the demand in gas was not as 
expected. The imported gas is instead used to increase the security of gas
® “Take-or-pay contract” referred to a contract where the buyer is obligated to pay 
for a certain threshold quantity of gas (contract demand) whether or not he or she finds 
it possible (or beneficial) to take timely full delivery. Typically, the buyer still retains a 
right to take the volumes for which he or she has prepaid, but only after taking all the 
volumes he or she had a subsequent obligation to buy (Tussing and Tippee, 1995).
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supply and to prolong the exploitation of the gas in the Gulf of Thailand. 
Nevertheless, the indigenous gas is still the main supply source. In 2001, 
around 72 percent of gas supply was from domestic production. Moreover, 
about 93 percent of the production was from the Gulf of Thailand. Imported 
gas accounted for around 28 percent of total gas supply.
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Figure 2.9: Structure of Gas Supply Industry (GSI) in Thailand
The second and third parts of the GSI—the gas transportation (i.e. high- 
pressured gas transmission and low-pressured gas distribution) and the sup­
ply service are vertically integrated and monopolised by PTT; although, the­
oretically, they have different econmic characteristics. That is while the gas 
transmission and distribution characterise natural monopoly, gas supply is
2 0
potentially competitive [see Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 for dicussion on eco­
nomic characteristics of gas supply industries]. After buying gas from the 
producers, gas is transported to the coast via P T T ’s pipeline. At the coast, 
gas is treated in the gas separation plants (GSPs), where heavy hydrocarbons 
are separated from lighter hydrocarbon and sold to the petrochemical indus­
try. Gas that passes through the GSPs is mostly methane and sometimes 
referred to as "dry gas''. From the GSPs, the dry gas will be mixed with the 
bypass gas and delivered to final customers, through the national pipeline 
network, which is also owned by PTT. Most of the pipeline network consists 
of the high-pressured transmission pipelines, whereas there are only a small 
amount of distribution pipeline. It is because majority of gas is consumed 
by large consumers, such as for power generation; therefore, practically, the 
small low-pressured distribution pipes are not required.
On the demand side, during the last two decades, natural gas consumption 
in Thailand has grown rapidly. It increased by 32 times, from only about 60 
million standard cubic feet in 1981 to around 2,000 million standard cubic 
feet in 2001. A vast majority of the demand for natural gas is from power 
generation—more than 90 percent of total consumption in 2001. The rest 
is from large industrial consumers. This indicates strong interdependence 
between the Thai GSI and the Electricity Supply Industry (ESI). Morever, 
focussing on the gas demand in power generation, it can be observed that 
around 61 percent of the sectoral consumption was consumed by EGAT. That 
means from the GSI point of view, EGAT is the biggest consumer of the gas 
industry. In other words, it is argued that the relationship between the two
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industries is driven by the transaction between two state-owned enterprises: 
PT T  and EGAT.
The transactions between PTT and its customers, not only EGAT, are 
under long-term contracts. The prices charged to the consumers are on a 
netback basis'^. The prices reflect the cost of natural gas and the tariffs of 
transportation. Moreover, the prices also reahse the inter-fuel competition— 
the competition between natural gas and its substitutable fossil fuels like coal 
and heavy-fuel oil. In consequence, it is apparent that the prices charged to 
different groups of customer are discriminated. For instance, EGAT—a large 
consumer, whose elasticity of demand is high in that it can switch the type 
of fuel used when an alternative fuel is relatively cheaper to gas—tends to be 
charged a cheaper price. On the other hand, the smaller consumers—such as 
the industrial or private-owned power generators, whose elasticity of demand 
is lower—the cost for switching the fuel is relatively high compared with the 
amount of gas they consumed—tend to be charged a more expensive price.
In sum, the Thai GSI has been effectively vertically integrated and mo­
nopolised by Petroleum Authority of Thailand (PT T )-a state-owned com­
pany. More specifically, all activities except gas production (i.e.high-pressured 
gas transmission, low-pressured gas distribution and supply service) are inte­
grated and monopolised by PTT. Furthermore, the demand for natural gas 
in Thailand has been mainly driven by gas consumption in power generation, 
or in particular EGAT’s.
^netback pricing is a method of setting a pricing or imputing a value for goods in 
one place and/or condition from prices observed at a subsequent place and/or condition, 
by subtracting intervening transport and processing cost (Tussing and Tippee, 1995).
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2.5 T he T hai E lectricity  Supply Industry  (ESI)
The last energy industry in Thailand considered here is the Electricity Supply 
Industry (ESI). Electricity is the essential energy source for cooking, cooling 
and heating in the R&C Sector in Thailand, as more than 39 percent of 
energy consumed in the R&C Sector in 2001 was electricity. In addition, 
the demand for electricity has increased considerably during the last decade. 
The demand for electricity doubled from 42 thousands GWh® in 1990 to more 
than 85 thousands GWh in 2000.
Generally, the ESI and the GSI have a similar characteristic in the sense 
that to deliver electricity to the final consumers, transmission grids are re­
quired, like pipeline network is essential for gas delivery in the GSI. The 
industry, in general, consists of four main activities: 1) power generation, 
(2) high-voltage power transmission, (3) low-voltage distribution, and (4) 
final consumers, which is true in Thailand. Figure 2.10 shows the current 
structure of the Thai ESI.
Similar to the GSI, Thailand is self-sufficient in terms of the supply of 
electricity. Most of the electricity consumed in the country is domestically 
generated. In 2001, the amount accounted for more than 97 percent of the 
total electricity supply. In the past, electricity sent through the national 
grid was generated only by EGAT, who owned both power plants and na­
tional transmission grid. However, since 1997, the government has opened
the power generation for private participation. The private participants can 
8“GWh” =  Gigga Watt (10^  Watt).
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Figure 2.10: Structure of Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) in Thailand
come in terms of Independent Power Producers (IPP)^ or Small Power Pro­
ducers (SPP)^°. Under present regulation, these private-owned power pro­
ducers are allowed to sell their electricity to nearby consumers, using their 
own transmission grid but are not allowed to transmit through the national 
gird. Therefore, most of the capacities produced by these private-owned 
power plants are still sold to EGAT. As a result, despite the liberalisation in 
the power generation, EGAT is still the main power producer in Thailand.
^Independent Power Producer (IPP) refers to a large private power producer using 
commercial energy (such as natural gas, coal but not nuclear), as fuel (NEPO, 1999).
Small Power Producer (SPP) means a power producer, who use the co-generation 
system or using renewable energy (i.e. waste or residues from agriculture activities, bio­
gas, solar energy) as fuel, which will contribute to more efficient use of domestic energy 
resources (NEPO, 1999).
24
As shown in Figure 2.11, in 2000, more than 66 percent of generated power 
was from EGAT.
Diesel 0.16% 
Renewable Energy 1.73% 
Hydro 6% 
Fuel Oil 10.3%
Coal 18.74%
Natural Gas 63.07%
By Fuel By Producers
SPP 10.6% 
IPP 23.1%
EGAT 66.3%
Total Electricity Generation 95,783 GWh
Figure 2.11: Fuel Used and Players in Power Generation in Thailand 2000 
(DEDP, 2000)
Figure 2.11 also shows the proportion of fuels used in power generation 
in Thailand in 2000, which is similar the present. It can be seen that natural 
gas was the main fuel supply for power generation, as it accounted for more 
than 63 percent of consumed fuels in 2000. The dominance of natural gas in 
power generation probably results from the government’s policy to promote 
natural gas utilisation in order to ensure the growth of the GSI. In Thailand, 
natural gas is a domestic source of energy, and by using natural gas as fuel 
for power generation instead of other imported conventional fuel like crude 
oil, in some respect, it is believed that it might reduce the effect due to the 
fluctuation of crude oil prices in the global market.
The national transmission grid is effectively vertically integrated with
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generation. The whole national transmission grid belongs to EGAT and the 
power generation is dominated by EGAT. In addition to this, EGAT also 
acts as a service provider to very large industrial consumers, although, the 
proportion of their demand in the total consumption is very small—only 
around 2 percents of the total electricity consumption. The rest of electric­
ity is sold to the electricity distributors to serve the small customers mostly 
in the R&C. In Thailand, there are two electricity distributors; both are 
state-owned. One is Metropolitan Electricity Authority (MEA); the other is 
Provincial Electricity authority (PEA). MEA has responsibility for distribut­
ing electricity in Bangkok and the surrounding provinces, whereas PEA is 
responsible for electricity distribution in the rest of the country.
On the demand side, the R&G is the largest consuming sector. In 2001, 
its consumption accounted for 54 percent of final consumption. The second 
largest consuming sector is manufacturing, whose share was around 44 per­
cent to the final consumption. This statistic refiects the pattern of electricity 
utilisation in Thailand that it is mostly used for lighting, cooking and cooling 
in the household and factories.
2.6 Interdependence am ong Thai E nergy In­
dustries
Following the characteristics of Thai energy sector presented in this chapter, 
it can be observed that these four energy industries are interdependent of 
each other. Moreover, they are linked together by the transactions between
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the state-owned companies—PTT and EGAT in particular. For example, 
the relationship between the coal industry and the ESI is obviously driven 
by EGAT. As the main player both in the coal industry and power generation 
in the ESI, EGAT links both industries together. Secondly, the relationship 
between the petroleum industry and the ESI is shaped by the relationship 
between PTT and EGAT. As discussed, the petroleum industry is highly 
influenced by PTT, particularly in the petroleum product market. Not only 
that PT T  is the main petroleum products distributor in the country, it also 
has some shares in the other distributor’s ownership. On the contrary, in 
the ESI, as EGAT is the main power generator and some of its power plants 
need petroleum products, i.e. diesel or heavy fuel oil, as a fuel, in this case, 
it is obvious that PTT is a fuel supplier of EGAT.
The interdependence between the industries becomes stronger in the case 
of the GSI and the ESI. It is because, in the GSI, as discussed in Section 
2,4, the majority of natural gas is consumed in power generation, as well as 
the main fuel used for power generation is natural gas. Moreover, the GSI 
is effectively monopolised by PTT, while power generation is dominated by 
EGAT. That means, with regard to natural gas, PTT is the biggest supplier 
of EGAT, while EGAT is the largest customer of PTT. As mentioned earfler, 
in addition to being the only gas supplier in Thailand, PTT is also one of 
the main distributor of petroleum products, which are also the alternative 
fuels for power generation. Given these circumstances, it can be argued that 
PTT, as a monopoly in gas supply, has a control on its output, in the sense 
that it might be able to strategically force EGAT to switch the use of fuel in
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the way that maximise P T T ’s overall revenue. Such monopohstic power of 
PTT  might lead to inefficiency in the GSI. With the strong link between the 
GSI and ESI, if there is technical inefficiency in GSI, it can be argued that 
it would be passed on to the ESI. Since electricity is very essential utility in 
Thailand, as it is the main energy source for the households, the inefficiency 
in the ESI (either caused within the industry or passed on from the GSI) 
might have affected the people directly, for instance in terms of unnecessary 
high retail price.
2.7 Sum m ary
This chapter has illustrated that the energy sector in Thailand basically 
consists of four main energy industries based on the main primary energy 
sources—including oil and petroleum products, natural gas, coal and elec­
tricity industries. Furthermore, it has also shown that despite the different 
characteristics of these industries, they are effectively vertically integrated 
and dominated by either of the two key state-owned companies: EGAT or 
PTT. For instance, the coal industry is vertically integrated and dominated 
by EGAT. In the coal industry, EGAT is the main coal producer as well as 
the largest coal consumer. Most of the coal in the country is used in the coal- 
fired power plants, which also belong to EGAT. Similar to the coal industry, 
the GSI is also effectively vertically integrated but by another state-owned 
company—PTT. Every activity except the production has been integrated 
and monopolised by PTT. In addition, like coal, most of natural gas is con­
sumed in power generation, where again most of power plants are owned by
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EGAT, As for the oil and petroleum products industry, even though there 
are more players than the coal industry and the GSI, it is obvious that the 
industry is, similar to the GSI, highly influenced by PTT—both in refining  
or the petroleum products distribution, [see Section 2.3 for more details]. Fi­
nally, like the other industries, the Thai ESI is also effectively characterised 
vertical integration. The industry is dominated in power generation and mo­
nopolised in transmission by EGAT, while in the distribution, the industry 
was regionally monopolised by another two state-owned companies: MEA 
and PEA.
In addition, as discussed in the previous section, these industries are inter­
dependent upon each other and linked by PTT and EGAT. The relationship 
between the industries is particularly strong in the case of the GSI and the 
ESI, where GSI is the main fuel supplier of the ESI, as well as the ESI is the 
main consumer of the GSI. Given that P T T ’s monopoly in gas supply is also 
dominant in petroleum products’ distribution, the company has some power 
to influence the use of fuel for generating electricity. Hence it can be assumed 
that PTT, as the only gas suppher, has a control over its output and that 
the monopolistic power of PTT might lead to some technical inefficiency in 
the GSI, which is an issue explained in this thesis.
The next chapter will focus on gas supply industry in general. Economic 
characteristic of the industry will be presented. In addition, it will also 
show how the integration and monopoly in the gas supply industry may 
lead to inefficiency, as well as how liberahsation can promote efficiency in 
the industry. It will also present some results of the previous studies on
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(in)efficiency in gas industries.
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Chapter 3 
(In) Efficiency in Gas Supply 
Industries
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, the background on the Thai energy sector, includ­
ing the gas supply industry was presented. Given that the interest of this 
thesis is (in) efficiency of gas supply, this chapter aims to review the charac­
teristics of the gas supply industry in general and in particular the potential 
(in)efficiency in the industry. In the next section, the economic character­
istics of the gas supply industry are presented in detail. Then Section 3.3 
discusses how market power that arises from vertical integration and the 
monopoly structure in the gas supply, such as the Thai gas supply industry, 
can theoretically lead to inefficiency. Moreover it also presents how liberal­
isation can help toward promoting efficiency. Then evidence from previous 
empirical studies on (in)efficiency in a number of different gas industries,
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undertaken by both academics and regulators around the globe are reviewed 
in Section 3.4. Finally, Section 3.5 presents some concluding remarks.
3.2 G as Supply Industries
3.2.1 Characteristics of Gas Supply Industries
Natural gas is generally homogenous, which implies that it can be marketed 
anonymously in a bulk supply market. In other words, natural gas can be 
traded in terms of capacity and a unit of gas delivered to a customer does not 
have to be the same physical unit of gas he or she purchased from a producer. 
To deliver the gas to final consumers, it requires a pipeline system. Since 
the pipeline is a huge unmoveable infrastructure with significant economies 
of scale, it is normally characterised as a natural monopoly and therefore 
the gas supply industry is often referred to as a network utility industry. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, in general, gas supply industries require 
gas procurement (i.e. the exploration and production or import via liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) or international pipeline), high-pressured gas transmis­
sion, low-pressured gas distribution and supply. Each business has different 
characteristics and is discussed in more detail below.
Gas Exploration and Production
In the upstream, gas exploration and production sites are fixed and depen­
dent on geology. Therefore, they cannot be evenly distributed across coun­
tries (Newbery, 2000). In addition, they require up-front investment and
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have economies of scale and scope, which mean that the gas companies tends 
to prefer to carry out the whole series of operation. The marginal cost of gas 
extraction is also expected to increase over time, as the most accessible and 
hence cheap fields are likely to be exploited first (Armstrong et ah, 1994). 
Consequently, an integrated incumbent company normally has advantages 
over a new comer, in term of their costs. It is because the incumbent is 
likely to have already acquired most of the cheap gas fields and hence it can 
extract gas at the lower cost, comparing to the cost that the newcomer is 
faced with for extracting gas from relatively higher-cost fields. Nonetheless, 
despite these economies of scale and the advantages the incumbent might 
have over the new companies, Armstrong et al. (1994) argued that they are 
not relative large enough to eliminate competition at the industry level.
Gas Transportation
To deliver natural gas to final consumers, typically the natural gas is trans­
ported through a pipeline network. The gas transportation system can be 
divided into two types of pipeline network—high-pressured gas transmission 
and low-pressured gas distribution; both nonetheless characterise natural 
monopoly. It is because, the pipeline is generally immovable, durable, and 
requiring huge sunk costs. In addition the pipeline has significant economies 
of scale, which implies that it will be less expensive, for the whole market to 
be served by one large network, than by several duplicated networks com­
peting with each other.
Furthermore, the network is directly linked to consumers. This provides
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the network operator (pipeline owner) potentially large exploitative power 
over the consumers. In other words, once connected to the network, it can 
be argued the consumers have no choice and no exit from the industry.
In addition, as pointed out by Newbery (2000), the network operator 
faces two requirements, which are likely to conflict with each other. The 
first requirement concerns the ability of the company to finance their huge 
investments. On contrary, the other concerns the efficiency of the company’s 
performance. To meet the first requirement, one simply gives the utility a 
well protected monopoly. This is often also associated with vertical integra­
tion. Under vertical integrated gas transportation, the monopolist can enjoy 
the economies of scale and scope and therefore is able to afford their required 
investments. However, the problem of both price and cost inefficiencies might 
arise from its monopolistic behavior and hence vertically integrated monopoly 
tends to obstruct the achievement of the second requirement—efficient per­
formance. To promote efficiency, on the contrary, competition is ideally 
more preferable. To optimise between the two requirements, regulation is 
suggested as an alternative to competition to be applied on the integrated 
monopoly, aiming to prevent the company from the abuse of its monopohstic 
power and hence to limit the inefficiency in the company, [see Section 3.3 for 
more discussion on monopoly and (in)efficiency in GSI].
Gas Supply
Gas supply is labelled as potentially competitive business—a business that 
can be competitive if the market is allowed. Unlike the gas transmission
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and distribution, gas supply service requires relatively small sunk cost. The 
main assets are some workers, an office and the contracts with producers and 
consumers, which can be resold if the company decides to quit. Given that 
natural gas is generally physically homogenous, the gas suppliers can compete 
each other by offering different contracts to consumers and the variations of 
degree of cost passthrough (Armstrong et ah, 1994).
3.2.2 Gas Utilisation
Besides the four businesses, another characteristic that can be used to differ­
entiate one gas industry from others is gas utiHsation. Firstly, the pattern of 
gas utilisation varies from-country-to-country. For instance, while in coun­
tries like Thailand and Malaysia, most of their gas—more than 90 percent of 
total gas consumption in 1996 in both countries—is consumed by a few power 
plants and large industrial consumers. (Source: Thai and Malaysian Energy 
Balances). Similarly, in Argentina, almost 70 percent of gas consumption is 
used in industrial and power generation (lEA, 1999). In contrast, for Japan 
and the UK, more than half of natural gas is consumed by numerous small 
customers in residential and commercial sector for cooking, heating and cool­
ing.
Moreover, the demand for natural gas can be seasonal and stochastic—in 
some countries like the UK, the demand on very cold days can be up to 5 or 6 
times higher than on summer days (Armstrong et al., 1994; Newbery, 2000). 
Regardless how dramatic change in demand for the natural gas, the physical 
demand and supply are needed to be kept in balance. Furthermore, the de­
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grees of gas demand variation in each country are different. In a country like 
Thailand where gas demand is relatively stable, since most of natural gas is 
consumed in power generation, the pipeline operator can store some gas in 
the pipeline by increasing the line pressure during periods of low demand, 
then reducing the pressure to release the stored gas during the peak. How­
ever, for a country like the UK, with the high demand variation, additional 
storage facilities may be required. These storages can be in form of salt cav­
erns, depleted gas fields near the shore or LNG tankers (Tussing and Tippee, 
1995; lEA, 1998). In addition, the gas storages will become crucial in the 
gas-imported dependent countries, such as the Eastern European countries, 
for security of supply purpose (lEA, 1994).
Moreover, natural gas might also face inter-fuel competition with other 
conventional fossil fuels, i.e. coal, diesel, and heavy-fuel oil, in power gener­
ation and industrial customers. Partly it is because of the invention of the 
Gombined-Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) in the 1970s, as the CGGT has made 
the small power station becomes economic to stay in the business, when 
previously it was not. However, in switching from conventional fuels to gas, 
consumers need to invest in the installation of switching equipment. The cost 
of the equipment might be relatively less expensive compared with the size 
of a power plant, nevertheless, it is expensive to industrial consumers. In all, 
there might be the inter-fuel competition between gas and alternative fossil 
fuels in power generation; nonetheless in the industrial consumer’s level, the 
competition is weaker due to the costs of the switching equipment.
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3.2.3 Vertically Integrated Gas Supply Industries
Even though each part of a gas industry has different characteristic, they 
are all still interdependent of each other. That is, following Newbery (2000), 
firstly gas producers face the condition that gas at the field has no value 
unless it can be delivered to the market. Besides, to exploit gas, the up-front 
investments on exploration and production, are needed before the gas can 
flow. Similarly for a pipeline owner, the business requires a huge lump-sum 
investment in pipeline infrastructures. In consequence, the producers tend 
to be unwilling to invest, without the secured long-term contracts with the 
pipeline owner and consumers. This preference of the producers coincide 
with that of the pipeline operator, as they are likely to be reluctant to invest 
in the pipeline, unless long-term contracts with the consumers are obtained.
Moreover, failure in delivering gas can lead to danger—for instance the 
leak of the unburned gas may cause fire and there is also explosion risk. 
Therefore the continuity and integrity of supply are critical. To ensure a good 
service, both in terms of safety and reliability or less interrupted service, it 
can be argued that it is preferably for a supplier to be the same organisation 
as the pipeline owner (Armstrong et ah, 1994).
Taking everything into account, it is not surprising to find that, in the 
past, most gas industries have been traditionally vertically integrated and 
monopolised. The transactions between the players were likely to be secured 
under long-term contracts. Furthermore, as noted by Megginson and Netter 
(2001), in some countries the gas industries also involved nationalisation, 
since gas was concerned as an important utility. Besides, particularly in
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developing countries, the nationalisation was seen as a necessary condition 
to ensure the growth in the industry, as well as the expansion of the coverage 
of pipeline network for distributional purpose (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1988).
In the UK, for instance, before the reform in 1997, the gas industry 
was vertically integrated by British Gas, which had been state-owned un­
til 1986. The onshore gas transportation—including gas transmission and 
distribution—and supply service were integrated and monopolised by British 
Gas. The contracts between British Gas and the producers were long-termed 
take-or-pay contracts. Similarly, in Thailand, up to now, the gas industry has 
been effectively vertically integrated by PTT—a state-owned company. More 
specifically, gas transportation and supply service have been integrated and 
operated only by PTT. The transactions between PTT and gas producers 
and between PTT and gas consumers, are secured by the long-term take-or- 
pay contracts, which normally last for twenty five years. [See Section 2.4 of 
Chapter 2 for more detail on the Thai gas supply industry.]
Nonetheless, since the 1990s, the structure of many gas industries began 
to be changed. Following the lead of the US and the UK, many gas industries 
have been liberalised. The next section focusses on this wave of liberalisation, 
reviewing the liberalisation programmes of many countries.
3.2.4 Wave of Liberalisation
By definition, liberalisation means a programme for opening the market up 
for competition. As discussed in the previous section, the wave of liberali­
sation started in the 1990s, driven by what was seen as the good results of
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the liberahsation programmes in the UK and the US in the late 1980s. The 
experiences from both countries show that under private ownership (in the 
case of the UK) and competitive forces, the companies tend to have more 
incentive to cut their costs and reduce the prices. Therefore the companies 
under competition seem to perform more efficiently than when they were 
monopolies. Since then, liberalisation has been adopted in many countries 
throughout the world.
The motivation of the programmes varies from-country-to-country. In 
the US, for instance, it was argued that the tight supervision and constant 
intervention by the government, aiming to prevent the companies from abus­
ing their market power in 1970s (lEA, 1994; Juris, 1998a; Newbery, 2000), 
drove the liberalisation process in the 1980s. In Argentina and Mexico, the 
liberahsation and restructuring programmes were driven by the problem of 
underinvestment faced under the operation of the integrated state-owned 
companies (lEA, 1999; Roselldn and Halpem, 2001). On the other hand the 
liberalisation proposed for the Thai gas industry was partially encouraged 
by the financial crisis (NEPO, 1999) and the IMF.
Furthermore, the details in the liberalisation programmes also differ across 
countries—from a purely legal liberalisation (eg. open access) to a more ex­
treme form of removing entry barriers—often referred to as deregulation. 
Moreover, in some cases, they may also be associated with structural reform 
and privatisation. For example, in the US, the liberalisation programme 
involved deregulation of the gas market from the 1970s’ tight regulation. 
The pipeline transportion has been unbundled from the gas supply. The gas
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prices have been liberalised and the regulation are imposed only on the gas 
transportation (Juris, 1998a).
In the UK, the gas industry has been deintegrated. Firstly, British Gas 
was privatised in 1986 as an integrated monopoly but during the 1990s the 
company was gradually disintegrated. The gas production was separated 
from the core business followed by the unbundling of between gas trans­
portation and the gas supply service, in 1997. In addition, very recently, 
the pipeline owners are starting to sell off the low-pressured distribution 
pipes (Ofgem, 2005). Now, gas production and the supply service have been 
opened up for competition, while the gas transportation is still subject to reg­
ulation. [More detail on the development in UK Gas industry can be found 
in i.e. Vickers and Yarrow (1988), Armstrong et al. (1994), Juris (1998b), 
Newbery (2000), Marshall (2003).]
In Latin America, for instance Argentina, before the reform in 1990s, the 
gas industry was completely monopolised by a few state-owned companies— 
gas and oil production were monopolised by Yacimientos Petroliferos Fidcales 
(YPF), while gas transportation and gas supply were operated only by Gas 
del Estado (GdE). After the reform, YPF was privatised and gas production 
was opened up for competition. In addition, with the lesson learned from 
the UK, GdF was firstly reorganised, eventually privatised and finally split 
into two regional high-pressured gas transmission companies (the North and 
the South) and eight regional low-pressured gas distributors. Presently, open 
access is allowed in gas transmission and distribution. The gas supply service 
is also separated from the transmission and distribution and opened for com­
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petition. [See IE A (1999) for more details in Argentina’s natural gas reform.] 
On contrary, Mexico has taken a less extreme hberalisation programme com­
pared with Argentina. Similar to Argentina, before the reform in 1995, the 
Mexican gas industry was vertically integrated and monopolised—from gas 
production, gas transportation to gas sale—by a state-owned company called 
Pemex. After the reform, Pemex is still vertically integrated and dominated 
the industry; however gas production has been opened up to new private 
participants. Furthermore, the private participants are welcome to invest in 
new gas transmission and distribution projects, which seemed to solve the 
problem of underinvestment that the industry faced before the reform, [see 
Roselldn and Halpern (2001)].
In Asia such as Japan, the industry was divided into several regions. 
Each has been operated by the regional vertically integrated monopolies. 
For instance, Osaka Gas is a monopoly operating in Kansai Region, whose 
responsibilities range from gas import via LNG, transportation and distribu­
tion and the supply service. Nonetheless, since 1995, open access has been 
implemented in gas transportation. It means that gas monopolies can now 
serve the consumers across their regions. In Thailand, in 1997, a liberah­
sation programme for GSI was proposed. In the proposal the programme 
involved the unbundling, liberahsation and privatisation of PTT (NEPO, 
1999).
In spite of the differences in either their motivations or the components of 
the liberalisation programmes, one of their common objectives is to promote 
efficiency in the gas industries. The next section will discuss the (in)efficiency
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in gas industries and how liberalisation can promote efficiency.
3.3 (In)EfRciency in Gas Supply Industries
Efficiency in economics can be defined in many aspects. Firstly, regarding 
producers, at the elementary level, efficiency can simply involve seeking to 
avoid waste by either maximising output(s) from given a amount of input(s) 
or minimising input(s) use in the production of given a amount of output(s) 
(Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). This definition is consistent with Koopmans’s 
(1951) definition of technical efficiency referred to in Chapter 1. In addition, 
assuming the producer is technically efficient, economic efficiency might be 
associated with price efficiency or allocative efficiency, which involves first- 
best or second-best pricing^. Economic efficiency can be effectively promoted 
through a competitive market and on the other hand, its inefficiency is linked 
to the market power and monopoly, which is discussed below.
3.3.1 M onopoly and Economic Inefficiency
To examine the relationship between the market power and economic ineffi­
ciency, consider the extreme case of market power—when the market is mo­
nopolised by a company. Following the example in Armstrong et al. (1994),
^First-best pricing is referred to the marginal cost pricing—setting price equal the 
marginal cost. If the demand at this price is equal to output, it can be argued that 
marginal cost pricing is optimal, as marginal costs and benefits are equal. However, if 
the production requires a massive amount of fixed costs, like in gas transportation (the 
production faces increasing returns to scale), marginal cost will be below average cost and 
the company will make a loss. In that case, setting prices just to cover the average costs 
will allow the company to break even. Therefore, average cost pricing is referred to as 
second-best pricing (Black, 1997).
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suppose that the company is a profit maximiser. That means the company 
will maximise the profit by charging at price equal to consumer willingness 
to pay. W ith its monopolistic status, it is likely that the price is likely to 
be above marginal cost and results in a loss of social welfare and undesirable 
rent for the monopolist. This problem of price diverging from marginal cost 
obviously leads to allocative inefficiency. Moreover, the problem of allocative 
inefficiency tends to be worsen when it occurs in utility industries (e.g. gas 
supply industries, electricity supply industries and water industries), where 
consumer elasticities of demand are low and consumers prepare to buy a 
great deal of commodities. Besides the allocative inefficiency, it can be ar­
gued that the monopolist might not have sufficient incentives to cut its cost 
where possible, nor responds to improve technology in production as quick as 
the companies under competitive market, which is therefore likely to cause 
productive inefficiency.
Armstrong et al. (1994) suggested that two different approaches for solv­
ing the problems that arise from market power. First is introducing compe­
tition to the market. Theoretically, under perfect competition, where there 
is no market power, prices will be set equal to marginal costs of the produc­
tion, and the only way the companies can raise their profit is by cutting their 
costs, where possible.
Alternative to competition, some forms of regulation can be implemented 
to prevent the monopolist from over-charging. Comparing these two ap­
proaches, competition is arguably superior to regulation in the sense that 
effective competition is likely to provide the company stronger incentives for
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their cost reduction. Moreover, regulation appears to be inevitably ineffi­
cient, due to the informational asymmetries between the regulator and his 
or her regulated companies. The inefficiency in regulation can be explained 
by the Armstrong et al. (1994)’s principal-agent model between a regulator 
and a regulated monopolist under asymmetric information, as follows.
Assum ptions
1. The profit-maximising monopolist (Company M) has no fixed cost but 
has marginal cost 9, which is distributed as F (6).
2. The regulator cannot observe 6 but he or she knows prior F {6).
3. If the company chooses price P{9), the company will earn revenues 
P{9)Q[P{6)] and will be given a lump-transfer T[P{9)] by the regulator.
4. Hence the company’s profit will be 7t{6) = [P{6)— 6]Q[P{9)]-hT[P(6)]i 
7T =  -Q [P(^)], 7T(â) == 0.
5. The company’s expected profit can be written as J  tt{9) f  (9)d9 = f  QlP(9)jF(9)d9.
6. The regulator’s objective is to maximise social welfare, which is a 
weighted sum of consumer surplus and company’s profit;
W[P(6))] =  V[P{9)] -I- a7r[P(6>)], p < a < 1  
where
V[P{9)] = consumer surplus,
7t{P{9)] = company’s profit.
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The social-maximising regulator solves,
max.TT[P(^)] =  V[P(6)] -\-a7r[P(9)] s.t. 0 <  a  <  1 (3.1)
Where the social welfare: W[P{9)] can be written as,
W  =  J  [{V[p(e)] + [P(g) -  0]Q[P{e) ] }m -  (1 -  a)Q[p{e)]F{e)]de
If the regulator’s lump-sum transfer is possible, optimal regulation implies.
Equation 3.2 shows that the optimal price under regulation, P*{9), is 
greater than marginal cost of the monopolist (9) and that leads to allocative 
inefficiency. In other words, this suggests that the regulator has to trade 
off some efficiency with monopolist’s informational rents. Therefore, under 
asymmetric information, the regulator has to compromise between allocative 
efficiency—involving keeping price with marginal cost—and distributional ef­
ficiency—involving limiting monopolist’s informational rents, which implies 
inevitable inefficiency under regulation. Hence competition tends to be more 
preferable where promoting efficiency is concerned.
3.3.2 Liberalisation and Efficiency
This section aims to discuss how liberalisation can promote efficiency in the 
industry. As discussed in Section 3.2.4, opening up the market for compe­
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tition (or liberalisation) practically can be done in various ways. However, 
again following the discussion in Armstrong et al. (1994), suppose that the 
market is opened up to new participants and price regulation is removed (or 
deregulated). It is expected that if there are new entrants, the new com­
ers are likely to face price competition with the incumbent at their entry. 
Furthermore, if the competition is effective, the monopolist’s overcharged 
price tends to be driven back to the marginal cost and ultimately all rents of 
the incumbent will be exploited and transfered to the consumers—which re­
sults in improving both allocative and distributional efficiency in the market. 
Nonetheless, it is essential to note that the benefit of liberalisation will be 
obtained if  and only if  there are new entrants and more importantly there 
is effective competition. In other words, if there is no entrant, there will be 
no competition; therefore the removal of the price regulation will lead the 
industry to the unregulated monopoly, where the monopolist can charge at 
any price he or she would like. That is likely to worsen the efficiency even 
compared with the regulated monopoly.
So far, the discussion has shown that generally effective competition is 
more preferable than regulation in term of efficiency promotion. However, 
competition may not always be effective neither desirable—particularly, in 
naturally monopolistic business like gas pipeline systems or electricity trans­
mission grids. Natural monopoly is the activity that is capital intensive and 
possess significant economies of scale. It involves a situation where a single 
company can satisfy the entire market demand for the range of goods or ser­
vices at lower total cost than any other combination of companies (Newbery,
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2000) and competition will only lead to the duplication of the companies’ 
costs. If the degree of natural monopoly, say the size of sunk costs, is small 
related to the monopolist’s informational rents, liberalisation and competi­
tion will be desirable. In contrast, if the size of sunk costs and economies of 
scale is large compared with the rent, the cost of the whole market demand 
being served by one company will be less expensive than being served by 
any other combinations of companies. Therefore, in that case, a regulated 
monopoly might be more preferable. In the next section, the discussion will 
focus on how gas supply industries might be liberalised.
3.3.3 Liberalisation in Gas Supply Industries
For a network industry like gas supply, which has a mix of characteristics 
(both natural monopoly and potentially competitive businesses), liberalisa­
tion and promoting competition can be complicated. In addition, the purely 
legal liberalisation, eg. the removal of price control removal, open access, 
might not be sufficient to guarantee or sustain effective competition. In par­
ticular, it has been suggested that liberalisation of gas suppliy industries 
should focus only on those potentially competitive business like gas produc­
tion and the supply service and leaves the core gas transportation under 
regulation (Newbery, 2000), rather than on the whole industry.
Following that suggestion, firstly the potentially competitive parts of gas 
supply industries need to be clarified. Hence some structural reforms— 
which are normally in the form of unbundling or separating the core natural 
monopoly business from those potentially competitive—might be required.
47
Furthermore, as in the past, many gas supply industries were publicly owned. 
Therefore, in order to create a level playing field in a liberalised gas market, 
it is often found that liberalisation involves privatisation of the state-owned 
company that dominate the industry. Moreover, given that natural mo­
nopolistic gas transportation will be subject to regulation, the efficiency in 
this part of the industry can be promoted through some forms of incentive 
regulation. Even though by definition of liberalisation, these three related 
issues (i.e structural reform, privatisation and incentive regulation) are not 
required, from the past experiences, it appears that they have been tied up 
both economically and politically with liberalisation. The next three sec­
tions, therefore discuss how these related issues are crucial for the success of 
a liberalisation policy.
Structural reform
To discuss the importance of restructuring on the success of liberalisation 
in gas supply industries, suppose that the industry to be hberalised was 
originally monopohsed and vertically integrated by a company. Then i t  is 
assumed that any new entrants are legally allowed access to final consumers 
via the existing pipeline network and to compete with the incumbent on 
the supply service. What would happen if the industry has been liberalised 
without any structural reform? Without any structural reform, after liberal­
isation, despite the open access, it is likely that the incumbent company is 
still able to deter the competition in several aspects.
Firstly, the incumbent, as the owner of both the pipeline and the supply
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service, will be able to cross subsidise the competitive business—in this case 
its supply service—by the higher profit gained from the natural monopoly el­
ement like gas transportation. By this, it means that the incumbent company 
will be able to offer a lower price, compared with its competitors, to the final 
consumers. Secondly, the incumbent might also discriminate in favour of its 
own gas supply business both in terms of prices and the quality of service. 
Besides, even though these anti-competitive behaviours are just a fear of new 
entrants and might never been used, this fear tends to be powerful enough to 
deter the new entry and hence also deter competition. For instance, in the 
UK, without any structural reforms British Gas was privatised in 1986 and 
became the private-owned integrated monopoly. In consequence, there was 
no entry, hence no competition, up until the industry was unbundled in 1997. 
As a result, to sustain effective competition in the market after liberahsation, 
it can be argued that some forms of restructuring will be required.
The pro-competitive structural reforms normally involve either horizontal 
and/or vertical separations, as suggested in Klein (1998). Vertical separa­
tion, generally speaking, is the separation of economic activities in different 
stages of production chain. Particularly in a gas supply industry, a network 
industry, vertical separation concerns with the separation between the natu­
rally monopolistic gas transportation and potentially competitive gas supply 
service. This type of separation is often referred to as unbundling.
On the contrary, the horizontal separation is undertaken at one single eco­
nomic activity, in order to immediately create some competing companies in 
the industry. If the separation is carried out in a potentially competitive ac­
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tivity, for instance power generation, the splitting of one big company which 
originally owned many power stations into several relatively small power pro­
ducers will instantly create several competing companies as well as dilute the 
market power of the big company. On the other hand, if the separation hap­
pens in a natural monopoly activity such as gas transportation, by dividing 
a national pipeline network into several regional network operators—for ex­
ample in Argentina, the gas transmission has been divided into two networks 
based on geology: the north and the south (lEA, 1999)—it provides the reg­
ulator a chance to promote competition through yardstick competition, [see 
Section 3.3.3 for more details on yardstick competition].
Even though restructuring seems to have many benefits to competition, 
it still has some drawbacks. Firstly, the separations will result in the loss 
of benefit of economies of scale and scope, which, as discussed earlier, is 
significant in the network industry like the gas industry. Secondly, given 
that in the gas industry the balance between demand and supply must be 
constantly monitored, the unbundling might lead to the loss of good coordi­
nation between the pipeline operator and the service providing over it. This 
might cause higher long-run average costs and prices (Hollas et al., 2002), in 
spite of the attempt to maintain the good coordination between the activities 
after the unbundling by the regulator. In consequence, it should be aware 
that there are costs that seem to grow with the scale of structuring, while 
the benefits of restructuring depend on whether the effective competition be 
achieved. All in all, structural reform is important for the success of liberal­
isation in gas supply industries, however it will be worth undertaking if only
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the benefits gained are larger than its costs.
Privatisation
Privatisation, by definition, means the change of company’s ownership from 
the state to private parties. According to Vickers and Yarrow (1991), it can 
be undertaken in three main different forms. The first one involves the sale of 
state-owned company’s assets to private parties in the competitive market, 
which means that in this model the company has no market power either un­
der state or private ownerships. Similarly, the second also involves the sale of 
the state-owned company; however, in this model the company has market 
power, such as the company in network industries, eg. gas supply indus­
tries. Unlike the first two, the last one refers privatisation as the contracting 
out of the state-owned activity, previously operated by the state, to private 
company(s). Besides, it can also be taken in the form of a public-private 
partnership. Therefore, this form of privatisation does not involve the sale of 
physical asset, but the rights over any financial surplus arising from the ac­
tivity concerned are transferred to the private contractor(s). However, there 
have been arguments over referring the contracting out as privatisation. For 
instance Parker (2004) argued that it might be misleading to refer to the 
contracting out and the public-private partnership as privatisation, since the 
state remains primarily responsible for deciding the outputs and sometimes 
the inputs, instead of the market.
Similar to the restructuring, even though liberalisation does not require 
the change of a company’s ownership, it has been frequently linked with
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liberalisation. The question is what the effects of company’s ownership on 
its performance are. The argument for privatisation is that, in a  compet­
itive market, a privately-owned company tends to perform more efficiently 
compared with the state-owned for many reasons. First of all, the privately- 
owned company has one clear objective—obviously profit maximisation, in 
which contrast to the state-owned company, whose tends to have several 
uncertain objectives. On one hand, for business purpose, the state-owned 
company would want to maxmise its profit. On the other hand, as owned 
by the government, it might have to weigh the social welfare. Besides as 
operated by a minister, he or she might have to put his or her own agendas 
taken into account. These agendas are uncertain and likely to be changed 
according to the political changes. In consequence, it can be argued that a 
state-owned company suffers from interventions of the government. Never­
theless, this does not mean that the decision of a private company cannot 
be infiuenced by the government, but rather it would be tougher or more 
costly for the government to intervene in a privately-owned company com­
pared with one that is state-owned. These uncertainties and the lack of a 
clear objective might lead to inefficiency in the state-owned company.
Furthermore, competition allows the comparison of managerial perfor­
mance among competing companies, which can improve company’s perfor­
mance (Pollitt, 1995). Nevertheless, the punishment for poor performance 
is more severe in a privately-owned than in a state-owned company. As 
privately-owned, a poor financial performance might lead to either the bankruptcy 
or being taken over. Such threats in the privately-owned company tend to in-
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duce the company owners to put more pressure on their managers to improve 
their performances. In contrast, as the owner of the state-owned company, it 
is unlikely that the government will let the company go bankrupt. Moreover, 
state-owned company’s pricing often features heavy subsidies on its capi­
tal, therefore it seems that the managers of a state-owned company has few 
incentives to improve their technical efficiency (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991; 
Jackson and Price, 1994).
In all, it can be argued that the threat that a private company faces 
leads to more strict monitoring on the manager compared with that in a 
state-owned company, who faces no such threat (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). 
In contrast, the no clear objectives, political uncertainties, over-expanded 
budgeting, the lack of a profit maximising motive which reflect technical 
waste and inefficiency, are all likely to lead to the failure of a state-owned 
company to perform efficiently. In these respects, a privately-owned company 
has more incentives to perform efficiently and that is where the benefits of 
a change in ownership can be obtained. Nonetheless, it is essential to note 
that these incentives for a privately-owned company, and hence the benefits 
of privatisation are only in a competitive market.
When there is the presence of market power, there is no evidence suggest­
ing that there is a difference between a state-owned company’s performance 
and that of a privately-owned (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). In summary, pri­
vatisation is necessary to facilitate competition in the liberalised industry. 
Nonetheless, as discussed these benefits arising from privatisation can be 
achieved only when the market is competitive but so far there is no implica­
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tion that only privatisation is sufficient to sustain the effective competition. 
Incen tive  R eg u la tio n
The last related issue of hberalisation is regulation. As argued in Section 
3.3.3, hberalisation in gas industries rather focuses only on the potentially 
competitive activities and leaves the core natural monopoly gas pipeline un­
der regulation. A form of regulation caUed Incentive regulation can be used 
to promote efficiency in a natural monopoly business. It has been intro­
duced as an alternative of the traditional rate-of-return regulation (Averch 
and Johnson, 1962), which has been argued to provide insufficient incentives 
for cost reduction and also to lead companies to overinvestment.
Incentive regulation can take several forms. One is price cap regulation. 
Price cap regulation is a price-based regime. Basically, the regulated com­
pany, at the beginning of the regulatory period, will be given the maximum 
price allowed to charge. Until the next price revision, any profit gained 
by the cost reduction can be kept by the company. That means, under 
this price regulation regime, the company will have strong incentives to cut 
their cost where possible and that will systematically improve the company’s 
cost efficiency. However the regime has some drawbacks. One problem that 
arises with the price cap regulation is the problem of under investment. As 
discussed, under this regime, the regulated company has strong incentive 
to cut costs and the cost that is likely to be cut is the lump-sum invest­
ment on pipeline. If the situation carries on, the industry might face the 
under-investment problem. [For more detail on price cap regulation, see i.e
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Armstrong et al. (1994).]
Alternatively, incentive regulation can be taken in a form of yardstick 
competition also known as comparative competition. Yardstick competition 
was originally introduced by Littlechild (1986) to be applied in UK water 
industry, where the industry is separated and operated by several regional 
monopolists. Basically, under this regime, the regulator mimics competition 
among companies, which are not physically competing with each other. This 
regime is very useful for the regulator who has to regulate monopolist(s) and 
faces asymmetric information, as, for instance, the company’s cost and other 
characteristics cannot be fully observed, [See e.g. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) 
for more detail on yardstick competition.]
3.4 P revious Studies on Efficiency in Gas Sup­
p ly Industries
There are a number of studies particularly in recent years, trying to assess the 
efficiency of organisations in many energy industries. For instance, Kashani 
(2000) measured efficiency in the North Sea. Moreover, extensive bench­
marking studies have been done for electricity supply industries. They have 
concentrated on different parts of the industry—power generation, power 
transmission and power distribution. These includes Pollitt (1995), Bag- 
dadioglu et al. (1996), Yunos and Hawdon (1997), Olatubi and Dismukes 
(2000), Dte (2000) and recently Rungsuriyawiboon and Coelli (2004), Ja- 
masb and Pollitt (2003)and Jamasb et al. (2004). A wide-ranging survey on
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the efficiency studies in electricity industries can be found in Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2001).
Focussing on the gas supply industries, the studies on the performance of 
the gas industries are varied upon the type of efficiency being measured, the 
data set and the specification of inputs and outputs. In addition, the tech­
niques employed for measuring efficiency are also different, although most of 
the studies use two main methods: D ata Envelopment Analysis (DEA)—a 
non-parametric technique—or Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA)—a para­
metric technique, which will be discussed in details in Chapter 5. The studies 
on efficiency in the gas industries have been carried out both by academics 
and regulators across the globe, mostly aiming to examine the success of 
implemented policies i.e liberalisation, privatisation or review of price cap 
regulation.
It can be found that many studies concentrated on the US and the UK. 
The studies focusing in the US gas industry including Granderson and Linvill 
(1997). This study tried to measure the productive efficiency of the inter­
state natural gas transportation under the regulatory constraints in the US 
between 1977 and 1987. Applying DEA on a balanced panel data of twenty 
major interstate gas pipeline companies over the eleven-year period, they 
assumed that gas transmission involved two inputs and one output. The 
inputs are total expenditure on labor, the capital of compressor stations and 
transmission pipelines. The single output is the sum across all shipment 
of the gas volumes times distance transported. The results indicated that 
there was a decline in productivity growth for the last six years due to the
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scale disecomonomies. In spite of the decline in productivity growth, tech­
nical efficiency, allocative efficiency and technical change improved. Using 
the same data set, Granderson and Linvill (2002), using Granger causality, 
tried to examine whether financial performance of the interstate natural gas 
transporting companies caused their productive efficiency from 1977 to 1987. 
However they found no statistical evidence that the improvement of finan­
cial performance in the past caused the company’s increase in productive 
efficiency.
Another study on the US gas industry’s efficiency is Hollas et al. (2002). 
They assessed the effect of the restructuring and regulatory changes on the 
technical efficiency and productivity change of thirty three US gas distrib­
utors during the period 1975 and 1994. DEA was repeatedly appfied to a 
cross-section data for the thirty three US gas distributors for twenty times 
at each year period (from years 1975 to 1994). They assumed that gas dis­
tribution was associated with three inputs (i.e. amount of gas purchased, 
full-time employees and companies’ capital) and three outputs (i.e. amounts 
of gas sold to residential consumers, commercial consumers and industrial 
and large consumers, respectively). They have not found strong evidence 
suggesting the effect of the enhancing competition on economic efficiency 
in US gas distribution. However, the restructuring obviously reduced the 
scale of gas distributors and hence led to the loss of benefit of economies of 
scale. Nonetheless, the restructuring did not appear to have an effect on gas 
distributors’ efficiency neither on productivity changes.
Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) were also interested in gas distribution,
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but for the UK. Using panel data for twelve British Gas’ gas distributing 
regions from 1977/78 to 1990/91, Malmquist DEA was adopted to investi­
gate the effect of British Gas’ privatisation in 1986 on their gas distribution 
performances. Unlike Hollas et al. (2002), they assumed that gas distribu­
tion involved two inputs and five outputs. The two inputs were number of 
employees and the length of gas transmission and distribution pipeline. The 
outputs included residential gas sale, industrial gas sale, commercial gas sale, 
number of customers and gas applications sold. Their results suggested that 
unlike the US’s, UK gas distribution’s productivity had grown dramatically 
since privatisation. This improvement was entirely due to the increase in 
efficiency of the industry, which was beheved to be derived from the change 
in the company’s ownership and the regulatory change during the period 
studied.
Another study that focussed on the performances of British Gas is Bous- 
sofiane et al. (1997). However, they concentrated on the performance of the 
whole business of British Gas. They studied the change of British Gas’ tech­
nical efficiency change due to their privatisation in 1986. DEA was applied 
on time series data for the company for a twenty-year period—from 1976 to 
1995. It was assumed that British Gas was associated with two inputs, i.e. 
employee hours and length of main gas pipeline, and a single output, which 
was the volume of gas sold. They found that privatisation was connected 
with the efficiency improvement. The results shown that the improvement 
started even before the privatisation actually commenced. They referred to 
this as an anticipation effect, in the sense that under the threat of privatisa­
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tion, the company prepared for the sale and therefore, it started to perform 
more efficiently even before it was actually privatised.
There are also studies that focussed on some other countries besides the 
US and the UK. For instance, Rossi (2001) measured the technical efficiency 
of gas distribution in Argentina aiming to evaluate the technical and pro­
ductivity change in the sector due to the privatisation and restructuring in 
1992. The parametric technique—SFA—was employed and applied on an 
unbalanced panel data of twelve gas distribution companies for a five-year 
period, from 1993 to 1997. He assumed that gas distribution was a single­
output, two-input case. The only output was number of customers; the two 
inputs, similar to Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) were lengths of pipeline 
and numbers of employees. In addition, he supposed that there were another 
three environmental variables including concession area, market structure 
and maximum demand. He concluded that during 1993-1997, there was an 
improvement in productivity of gas distribution. Besides such improvement 
was derived both from the shift of the efficient frontier, reflecting the improve­
ment in productivity of the whole industry and the efficiency improvement 
of those inefficient companies.
Besides these single-country studies, there are international efficiency 
studies. As argued in Section 3.2.1, gas supply industries in the past, were 
traditionally nationally monopolised. Therefore, it was hard to find other 
local comparative gas companies to conduct efficiency measurement. In con­
sequence, an international comparison is required as it allows regulators to 
evaluate efficiency of their regulated monopolists. The international com­
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parison studies are, for example, BIE (1994)^. The study was carried out 
by the Australian government, intended to evaluate the performance of Aus­
tralian’s natural gas transportation: transmission and distribution, against 
the gas companies operated in other countries i.e. the US, the UK, Canada 
and Japan. In this study, a cross-section data of forty two gas companies 
operating in five different countries for the year 1994 was used for evaluating 
technical efficiency of these companies. Using the DEA technique, it sup­
posed that gas transportation was associated with two outputs—amount of 
gas sold and the number of customers—and three inputs—number of em­
ployees, length of transmission pipeline and length of distribution pipeline. 
In addition another two environmental variables were also included. They 
were climate measured in the number of Degree Days^ and customer density. 
The results suggested that when the environmental variables were taken into 
account, Australian gas companies performed second least relatively techni­
cally efficient after the US. Therefore there were still some scope for efficiency 
improvement.
Another international comparison conducted by the Australian regulatory 
agency was IPART (1999)^, which compared the performances of Australian’s 
gas distributors against the performances of those operating in the US. Using 
a cross-section data for fifty nine gas distributors in 1999, various efficiency
measurement techniques were adopted. It assumed that gas distribution was
^BIE =  Bureau of Industry Economics, Australia
^The Degree Days (heating) is a measure if the coldness experienced, based on the 
extent to which the daily mean temperature falls below a reference temperature of 18°(7 
(BIE, 1994).
I^PART = Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal of New South Wales - the 
energy regulator in the New South Wales, Australia
60
a two-input, three-output case. The inputs were the lengths of the pipeline 
and the companies’ operating costs, while the outputs were the numbers of 
residential customer, the number of other customers and the amount of gas 
dehvered to the customers. In addition, the analysis included two environ­
mental variables, similar to BIE (1994), the Degree Day to measure climate 
and the age of network^. The results shown that most of the Austrahan gas 
distributors were performing more efficiently than the sample average and 
also that the environmental variables—both climate and network age—did 
not have a significant influence on efficiency. This regulator’s study was later 
published in Carrington et al. (2002).
Furthermore, Kim et al. (1999) also performed an international compar­
ison of economic efficiency using the DEA technique and a panel data for 
twenty eight natural gas transportation companies—some are only trans­
porters, whereas some are integrated companies—from eight countries for 
a nine-year period from 1987 to 1995. They assumed that gas companies 
were a three-input, one-output case. The inputs were labour, capital and 
administration, whereas the output was total volume of supplied gas. DEA 
was applied repeatedly to each yearly cross section. The efficiency scores for 
each year over the nine-year period are aggregated and averaged. The results 
suggested that the Asian gas companies (i.e Japanese and Korean) had rela­
tively low economic efficiency compared with those from such as Canada and 
France. Finally, recently, Hawdon (2003a) conducted extensive international
F^or the Australian gas distributors, the age of network was measured by the ratio of 
depreciated optimised replacement cost to optimised replacement cost for the local. For 
the US gas distributor, it was measured one minus the ratio of accumulated depreciation 
to asset value. (IPART, 1999)
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comparisons of technical efficiency in gas industries across many countries; 
even though the results are inconclusive. Using cross-section data of thirty 
three gas industries in year 1998, he supposed that the industry involved 
two inputs (employment and lengths of pipehne) and two outputs (gas con­
sumption and number of customers). Extending from this study, Hawdon 
(2003b) applied bootstapping technique to the DEA results. The results of 
bootstrapping suggested that the original DEA produced biased efficiency 
scores and hence should be aware by regulators using these indices to design 
yardstick competition. Table 3.1 at the end of the chapter summaries the 
discussion above.
3.5 Sum m ary and C onclusion
This chapter has reviewed the economic characteristics of gas supply indus­
tries in general. It shown that the gas industries characterise of a network 
industry, as that to deliver gas to final consumers, it requires a huge nat­
ural monopolistic pipeline network. In addition, with the characteristic of 
a natural monopoly, competition is not desirable in gas transmission and 
distribution; but apart from the pipeline network, the supply service and 
even gas production are potentially competitive. Nonetheless, as discussed 
in Section 3.2.3, they are interdependent—each activity is reluctant to invest 
unless their customers are secured under long-term contracts. Therefore, in 
the past, gas industries were traditionally vertically integrated. Moreover, in 
some countries, as a strategic utility, they were also nationalised.
However, such vertical integration and monopoly are believed to lead
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to economic inefficiency, as discussed in Section 3.3.1. Aiming to promote 
efficiency in the industry, liberalisation has been implemented to promote 
competition where possible. Due to the mix of characteristics—both natural 
monopoly and potentially competitive activities—of the industry, liberalisa­
tion in gas industry tends to apply to only the potentially competitive ac­
tivities, while the core natural monopolistic pipeline is subject to regulation. 
The detail of liberalisation programmes varied from-country-to-country. In 
some cases, purely legal liberalisation was implemented; although it is ar­
guably not enough to sustain the competition in the gas industry. In some 
others, like the nationalised gas industries, privatisation might be required 
to encourage a levelled-playing field among the incumbent and new players. 
Structural reform—unbundling—might be involved to separate the natural 
monopoly elements from the other businesses. Finally some forms of incen­
tive regulation might also be needed to prevent the abuse of market power, 
in the natural monopoly element.
In order to assess the success of the liberalisation, given the main of 
objective of efficiency improvement, the level of efficiency needs to be mea­
sured. The previous benchmarking studies have been conducted by both 
academics and regulators. The studies are varied upon the type of efficiency 
being investigated, the techniques used for the measurement and the data set. 
Their results show inconclusive effects of the liberalisation programmes on 
the efficiency. For instance, the studies by Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) 
and Boussofiane et al. (1997) found that productivity of British gas had im­
proved after the privatisation. In contrast, in the US, according to some
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studies by Hollas et al. (2002), there was no evidence suggesting the link 
between enhancing competition and the improvement in efficiency of US gas 
distribution.
In addition, from the review of previous studies in Section 3.4 and Table 
3.1, it can be summarised that to measure, technical efficiency of gas com­
panies in particular, two variables: employees (either number of employees 
or employee hours) and length of the pipeline have been the most popular 
choices for companies’ input by most previous studies. As for the output, 
it is apparent that the volume of gas sold is the dominant output measure 
chosen by almost every study; even though for some, they also added num­
ber of customers as another output. These data issues are further discussed 
in the next chapter. Moreover, it also noted that there are two dominant 
techniques that have been widely used for measuring efficiency; one is Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and the other is Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA). Details of these techniques, as well as a comparison of their relative 
strengths and limitations will be presented in Chapter 5.
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Table 3.1: Summary of Previous Studies on Efficiency in GSIs
Papers Objectives Methodology Data
BIE (1994) Assess performances of 
Australian gas 
transportation against 
the world best practice.
DEA Cross-section data o f 42 
gas pipeline companies 
in 1994.
In p u ts: number of 
employees, length of 
transmission pipeline, 
length of distribution 
pipeline.
O u tp u ts:  amount of gas 
sold, the number of 
customers.
E n v ir o n m e n ta l  
v ariab les: climate, 
consumer density
Price and W eyman-Jones 
(1996)
Examine the effect of 
privatisation on British 
Gas’s distribution 
productivity.
DEA and Malmquist 
Productivity Index
Panel data of 12 British  
gas’s gas distribution  
regions from 
1977/78-1990/91.
In p u ts: number of 
employees, the length of 
gas transmission and 
distribution pipeline.
O u tp u ts: residential gas 
sale, industrial gas sale, 
commercial gas sale, 
number of customers and 
gas applications sold.
Boussofiane et al. (1997) Examine the effect of 
British Gas’s 
privatisation on its 
technical efficiency.
DEA Time-series data of 
British Gas betweén 
1976-1995
In p u ts: employee hours 
and length of main gas 
pipeline
O u tp u t: Total gas sale
continued on next page
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continued from previous page
Papers Objectives Methodology Data
Granderson and Linvill 
(1997)
Measure productive 
efficiency of US 
interstate gas pipeline 
companies under 
regulatory constraints
DEA and Fisher 
Productivity Index (FPI)
A panel data of 20 US 
interstate gas pipeline 
companies during 1977 
and 1987
In p u ts: total 
expenditure on labor, 
the capital of compressor 
stations and 
transmission pipelines. 
O u tp u t: the sum across 
all shipment of the gas 
volumes x distance 
transported.
IPART (1999) and 
Carrington et al. (2002)
Examine technical 
efficiency of Australian’s 
gas distributors against 
the US’s.
DEA, COLS, SFA Cross-section data of 59 
gas distributors at 1999
In p u ts: the lengths of 
the pipeline and the 
companies’ operating 
costs
O u tp u ts: the numbers 
of residential customer, 
the number of other 
customers and the 
amount of gas delivered 
to the customers 
E n v ir o n m e n ta l  
variab les: climate and 
the age of network
Kim et al. (1999) Conduct international 
comparison of economic 
efficiency.
DEA Panel data of 28 gas 
companies from 8 eight 
countries during 1987 
and 1995 
In p u ts: labour, capital 
and administration 
O u tp u t: total volume of 
supplied gas
Rossi (2001) Assess technical 
efficiency of Argentinian 
gas distribution after 
restructured
SFA Panel data of 12 
Argentinian gas 
distributors during 
1993-1997 
In p u ts: lengths of 
pipeline and number of 
employees 
O u tp u t: number of 
customers
continued on next page
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Papers Objectives Methodology Data
Granderson and Linvill 
(2002)
Examine whether 
company’s finanacial 
performance causes 
produtive efficiency
DEA and Granger 
causality
A panel data of 20 US 
interstate gas pipeline 
companies during 1977 
and 1987 
In p u ts; total 
expenditure on labor, 
the capital of compressor 
stations and 
transmission pipelines. 
O u tp u t: the sum across 
all shipment of the gas 
volumes tim es distance 
transported.
Hollas et al. (2002) Assess the effect of 
restructuring and 
regulatory change on 
technical efficiency and 
productivity change of 
US gas distributors
DEA Panel data of 33 US gas 
distributors during 1975 
and 1994
In p u ts: amount of gas 
purchased, full-time 
employees and 
companies’ capital 
O u tp u ts: amounts of 
gas sold to  residential 
consumers, commercial 
consumers and industrial 
and large consumers, 
respctively
Hawdon (2003a) Conduct internationally 
comparative technical 
efficiency.
DEA Cross-section data of 33 
gas industries
In pu ts: employment 
and lengths of pipeline 
O u tp u ts:  gas 
consumption and 
number of customers
Hawdon (2003b) Conduct internationally 
comparative technical 
efficiency.
DEA and bootstrapping Cross-section data o f 33 
gas industries
In pu ts: employment 
and lengths of pipeline
O u tp u ts: gas 
consumption and 
number of customers
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Chapter 4
D ata
4.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the data requirements for the research undertaken 
in this thesis and its collection and construction. In addition, the data set 
utiUsed for the research is briefly described. This begins by discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of cross-section verses panel data followed by 
Section 4.2 that discusses the required variables for the research undertaken 
in this thesis. Section 4.3 discusses the problems encountered when collecting 
data and the resultant data set used in this thesis followed by a description 
of the data in Section 4.4. Finally, Section 4.5 offers a brief summary.
4.1.1 Cross Section vs Panel Data
Efficiency is a relative concept, therefore in order to estimate the efficiency 
of a particular company, information and data on other companies running
68
similar business are required in order to ‘benchmark’ against^. As highlighted 
in the previous chapter, the majority of earlier studies on efficiency were un­
dertaken using cross-section data therefore estimating the relative efficiency 
across a wide-range of companies. Such data sets with a large number of 
firms at one point in time have a number of advantages. Firstly, generally a 
larger data set is preferred to a smaller one on technical/ statistical grounds^. 
Secondly, arguably when a firm is estimated to be relatively efficient from a 
data set with a large number of companies then the result is more acceptable 
and reliable given it has been ‘benchmarked’ against many companies; hence 
in contrast, when a firm is estimated to be relatively efficient from a data set 
with a smaller number of companies it could be argued that this might be 
misleading since the result might change if more companies were included. 
That said, unless a researcher can guarantee that s/he has included all pos­
sible firms in the data set (i.e. the data set is the population rather than a 
sample) then this is always a possibility.
However, a disadvantage of a cross-section data set is that the estimates 
refer to only one point in time and may not reflect the changes in relative 
efficiency over time, which is arguably equally important. The use of panel 
data (i.e. data for a number of companies over time, thus including the cross- 
section and time series element) allows for such effects, being able to not only 
estimate relative technical efficiency at a particular point in time but also 
analyse the change in technical efficiency and technological progress overtime.
^The concept and definition of efficiency are discussed further in Chapter 5.
^Chapter 5 discusses some of the technical problems that might develop in some tech­
niques when the data set is small.
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Therefore the ideal situation would be to have a large number of companies 
over time, but the availability of data often restricts this and researchers have 
to make a choice between using a cross section with a relatively large number 
of firms or a panel with the time dimension but with a fewer number of firms. 
As discussed above, both have their advantages and disadvantages and the 
choice depends often primarily on data availability but also on the aims of 
the researcher; but whatever is chosen the relative merits and demerits need 
to be borne in mind.
4.2 R equired Variables
Drawing on the literature survey presented in Chapter 3, Table 4.1 sum­
marises the variables used to represent the inputs and the outputs in the 11 
previous studies on efficiency in gas industries. This shows that the majority 
used the number of employees and the length of pipeline for inputs and gas 
sales and the number of customers as outputs. Further discussion follows.
Table 4.1: Summary of inputs and outputs used for gas companies from the 
previous studies (Units are number of studies)
Variables Inputs Outputs
Number of Employees 8
Length of Pipeline 9
( N o te :  O n e  s t u d y  s p l i t s  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t o t a l  p i p e l i n e  
i n t o  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  t r a n s m i s s i o n  p i p e l i n e  
a n d  t h e  l e n g t h  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  p i p e l i n e . ]
Operating Costs 2 _
Expenditure on Labour 2
Expenditure on capital 2 —
Number of Customers 5
Total Gas Sale 10
[ N o te :  t w o  s t u d i e s  d e c o m p o s e  
t h e  a m o u n t  o f  g a s  s a l e  i n t o  t h e  
s a l e s  t o  d i f f e r e n t  t y p e s  o f  c u s t o m e r s . )
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4.2.1 Inputs
The first input— numbers of employees (L)—is used to reflect labour, which 
is essential in the production process. Even though the labour used by the 
company can also be measured by the expenditure on labour forces; it can 
be observed that many previous studies like BIE (1994), Price and Weyman- 
Jones (1996), Boussofiane et al. (1997), Rossi (2001), Hawdon (2003a,b) used 
the number of full-time employees as a representative of the quantity of labour 
in the companies. The number of employee might not necessarily be the best 
representation of labour used in production process since, as pointed out by 
BIE (1994), some companies might also provide services like the sale of gas 
appliances and maintenances, which might increase the number of employees. 
On the contrary, if the company contracts out the services like maintenances, 
that will reduce the company employee numbers; hence its input. Despite 
this, it is the most commonly used measure and the one adopted here.
The second input is the length of total pipeline (K).  The variable is used 
as a proxy to measure the capital stock of the gas companies. An integrated 
gas supply industry is a capital intensive business - requiring a huge amount 
of investment particularly in a pipeline network. While the physical measures 
(such as the length of the pipeline measured in km) are consistent with the 
definition of technical efficiency (examining the ability of the companies to 
convert physical inputs into physical outputs) they have some drawbacks; 
they cannot capture all the capital investment in the production process; 
and they are difficult to account for the differences in quality of the asset, 
age and size, etc. Arguably therefore, monetary measures reflect the capital
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in production process better, but the construction of such variables is often 
problematic. Consequently, despite the limitations of the physical measure, 
the length of pipeline has been widely adopted by many studies. Most of 
them, for instance Price and Weyman-Jones (1996), Boussofiane et al. (1997), 
IPART (1999), Rossi (2001), and Hawdon (2003a,b), used total length of 
pipeline, whereas BIE (1994) used the length of transmission pipeline and 
the length of distribution pipeline as two separated inputs. Given that in 
Thailand effectively there is no distribution, this study also uses the total 
length of pipeline to represent the capital of gas companies, but noting that 
this might not account for the differences in technical specification of the 
pipeline such the sizes of pipeline and the material used and probably have 
effects on companies’ technical efficiency.
In addition to labour and capital, a few studies also included operating 
cost as an input, aiming to cover the other costs of the company. However 
it can be argued that the majority of the operating costs are derived from 
the costs of employee, which have been reflected by the number of employee. 
Therefore, operating cost is not included in this study.
4.2.2 Outputs
As Table 4.1 shows, by far the most common measure of output is the amount 
of gas sold (SALE)  measured in a physical unit such as therms; although 
two studies. Price and Weyman-Jones (1996) and Hollas et al. (2002), used 
the amount of gas sold per sector (residential gas sales, industrial gas sales 
and commercial gas sales) as outputs of the gas companies. Nonetheless,
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given the characteristics of Thai gas sales (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) 
such decomposition here would be unwise given the very small amounts for 
residential etc. Therefore, in this thesis following the previous studies like 
BIE (1994), Boussofiane et al. (1997) and IPART (1999), the total amount 
of gas sold measured in therms is used as an output of the gas companies.
Table 1 shows that just under a half of the studies cited also used the num­
ber of customers as a measure of output. Price and Weyman-Jones (1996), 
IPART (1999), Rossi (2001) and Hawdon (2003a,b) used this variable as an 
output of the gas companies, since it should reflect the coverage of service of 
the companies. In Thailand before 1990, all the gas was consumed by one 
electricity generating company (for many power stations) and thereafter by 
this large buyer plus a handful of large industrial consumers and new inde­
pendent power producers (since 1996) [as described and discussed in Chapter 
2]. Therefore it would not be appropriate to use customer numbers for this 
research given it would not adequately reflect the coverage of service of the 
companies as in the studies cited above. Consequently, in this thesis it is 
assumed that the gas companies produce only one output—the total volume 
of gas sale.
4.2.3 Environmental Variables
As shown and discussed in Chapter 3, there are other important variables, 
referred to as environmental variables, that may have an effect on the tech­
nical efficiency of a company, but not controlled by the companies. However, 
unlike the inputs and outputs discussed above (and highlighted in Table 4.1,
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there is no dominant variables utilised since it depends on the circumstances 
of the study being undertaken. In this study therefore three environmental 
variables are considered and described below.
The first environmental variable is the concentration of the gas market. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the concentration of the gas market is hkely to 
affect a companies’ technical efficiency. It can be argued that the company, 
whose gas market is very concentrated (where the majority of the gas is 
consumed by a few but large consumers like power generators) will be re­
quired to invest relatively less (particularly on capital) than the company 
with the less concentrated gas market (where a large proportion of gas is 
consumed by small consumers such as in the residential and commercial sec­
tors). For instance, suppose that the amount of gas sold (the output) is 
fixed, the company (Company I) facing a very concentrated market would 
be required to lay pipeline only to link between a few power plants. In con­
trast, considering another company (Company II) whose market is primarily 
in the residential sector, the company is likely to be required to invest a huge 
amount of pipeline to create a network that links to every household in the 
area. Comparing between the amounts of pipeline these two companies are 
needed to lay, it might indicate that Company I is more technically efficient 
than Company II, as it uses the least input to produce the same amount of 
output.
As a result, it can be expected that, if this factor is significant, it implies 
that the difference in the pattern of gas market has affected on the companies’ 
technical efficiency. Therefore, in this study, the concentration of the gas
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market (STRU C T) is measured by the ratio of the amount of gas sold to 
large consumers in the industrial sector and the power generation (LARG E) 
to the amount of total gas sold {TOTAL).
ST R U C T  = ^  (4.1)
The second environmental variable is time (t), therefore assuming that 
the technical efficiencies are time-varying. Moreover, it is not only that 
the technical efficiency scores are time-varying; it is also likely that they 
vary from-company-to-company across countries, given that each company 
is operating in different countries facing different circumstances. Hence, an 
allowance is made for a differential time effect on efficiency for each company.
The last environmental variable is state ownership ( E s t a t e )- Again, 
as discussed in Chapter 3, comparing a performance of a privately-owned 
with that of a state-owned company, it can be argued that under effective 
market forces, the lack of clear objectives and profit maximising motive due to 
political uncertainties, over-expanded budgeting might reflect technical waste 
and inefficiency of the state-owned company. In response to this argument, 
a dummy variable for being state-owned is included in the analysis to test 
the effect of company’s ownership on the gas company’s technical efficiency.
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4.3 D ata  C ollection
As discussed in Chapter 2 , PTT is a monopoly in gas supply in Thailand and 
therefore to measure technical efficiency of PTT, an international comparison 
is required. There are many gas companies operating in the gas industries 
across the world—in North and South America such as Argentina, in Asia for 
instance Malaysia, China, Japan and Indonesia, and in Europe including the 
UK, Italy and France, so the ‘population’ of companies from which to raw a 
sample is, ‘theoretically’ large. However, the companies considered for using 
to benchmark PTT had to have certain characteristics in order to allow an 
appropriate comparison.
Firstly, the companies need to have a similar structure as P T T ’s before 
the proposed change in 1997, in the sense that the comparative companies 
should be a monopoly with the integration of high-pressured gas transmis­
sion, low-pressured gas distribution and supply service. This therefore meant 
that many companies were excluded, for example the Latin American com­
pany such as Argentinean YPF was not considered despite it having a similar 
structure as PTT (being state-owned with the integration of transmission, 
distribution and supply service) in the 1980s following the reforms in the 
early 1990s, the company was split into two transmission and eight distribu­
tion companies, [see Chapter 3 for more details] and therefore could only be 
used for a comparison for the 1980s, but given the decision to use a panel 
rather than a cross section (detailed below) it could not be used and hence 
excluded from this study.
Despite this even after excluding a number of companies there still existed
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a fairly large number of potential comparator companies, such as British Gas 
(before 1997), Petronas, Osaka gas, Tokyo Gas, Trans Canada, GdE (a gas 
monopoly operating in Mexico) plus a number of USA companies^ (before 
the split of supply fropm the pipeline businesses in 1992). But in addition 
to the problem on the compatibility of the companies, there was still a lack 
of available data for suitable and appropriate firms with many problems en­
countered during the collection process. For example in the case of Japanese 
companies, as discussed in Chapter 3, in Japan, the gas industry has been 
operated by several regional monopolies. Given that these companies were 
an integrated monopoly of transmission, distribution and supply service sim­
ilar to PTT, they were potentially useful comparators to PTT. Therefore two 
companies-Osaka Gas and Tokyo Gas-were contacted for the data. Unfortu­
nately, for Tokyo Gas, the data of some variables (number of employees and 
length of pipeline) of the years before 1990 were not available. Some Aus­
tralian companies were also considered given they had a similar structure to 
PTT up until their reform in 1999. However it proved impossible to get any 
data for these companies before 1997.
The examples above highlight the difficult choice that had to be made 
when starting the research. It would have been possible to collect a cross 
section data set for one year in the 1980s or possibly the very early 1990s 
consisting of gas supply companies around the world that had a similar struc­
ture to PTT and therefore suitable for the analysis. However, the number 
of firms would still have been relatively small; probably less than 10 at the
*See TEA (1994) for the list of major gas companies in the US.
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most. However, this was not regarded as adequate. Moreover, it was felt that 
an understanding of any change in relative efficiency over time was equally 
important to the research; therefore panel data, with fewer companies, but a 
time series dimension was also explored. Again, from the example highlighted 
above this meant that an unbalanced panel could be constructed with five 
companies: PTT, Petronas, Osaka Gas, Tokyo Gas and British Gas could be 
constructed for the period 1984/85-1996/97. However, one technique—the 
DEA in particular—used to estimate technical efficiency in this research is 
not compatible with the unbalanced data. Therefore, in order to construct a 
balanced panel there was a choice: either have five companies over the seven 
year period 1990/91-1996/97 giving 35 observations or four companies over 
the 13 year period 1984/85-1996/97 giving 52 observations. And the set with 
the larger number of observations was chosen; hence Tokyo Gas was excluded 
from the analysis. It is recognised that this is a relatively small data set, but 
taking account of the advantages and disadvantages discussed in section4.1.1 
above this is the best available given the constraints. Therefore, throughout 
the analysis undertaken for this thesis the robustness of results are examined 
to check where possible if they are a result of the chosen data set or not.
4.4  D ata  Sources and D escrip tion  o f D ata  Set
Therefore, as discussed in the previous section the data set used in this thesis 
is a panel data consisting of four gas companies (PTT, Petronas, Osaka Gas, 
and British Gas) over thirteen-year period (1984/85-1996/97). Moreover,
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as explained above, it is assumed that these gas companies used two inputs^ 
(number of employees and length of total pipehne) to produce a single output 
(total amount of gas sold) with three environmental variables (concentration 
of gas market, time trend, company’s ownership). The sources of the data 
are presented below followed by a description and discussion of the data.
4.4.1 D ata Sources
Most of the data are obtained directly from the companies—extracted from 
a number of issues of their respective Annual Reports. In addition, British 
Gas in particular, its data are extracted from British Gas’s Financial and 
Operating Statistics (1991, 1996). However, some data not available from the 
companies (including details on the gas sales of PTT, Petronas and British 
Gas) were taken from the national energy balances of Thailand, Malaysia 
and the UK, respectively. These are appropriate estimates since all three 
companies were national monopolies during the period—hence all natural 
gas consumed in the country was transported by them. Furthermore, the 
length of pipeline of PTT is obtained from PTIT (2000).
4.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
G as Sales in  th erm s (SA L E )
Figure 4.1 shows the annual amount of gas sales (S A L E )—in therms—for 
each gas company over the thirteen-year period. It is apparent that the size
'^ Note that another ‘input’ also included in the parametric technique used for measuring 
technical efficiency is ‘t’ which is included into a production frontier model as a proxy to 
capture the effect of technical progress over the thirteen year period of the sample.
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Figure 4.1: Gas Sale of the four gas companies during 1984-1996
of output produced by British Gas was much larger that those of the other 
companies. However, focussing on the trend of each company, it can be seen 
that for all companies, over time the amount of output produced by the 
companies increased; with quite dramatic increases for PTT and Petronas, 
whereas the rise for Osaka Gas and British Gas were more stable—with an 
increase of about 50 and 70 percent of the their gas sales over the thirteen 
years, respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Number of Employees of the four gas companies during 1984- 
1996
Num ber of Employees (L)
Figure 4.2 shows the number of employees (L) of each gas company over the 
1984 to 1996 period. Again, it can be seen that the amount of employees hired 
by British Gas was much larger than those of the others. While the numbers 
of employees of PTT and Petronas increased over the year, the numbers of 
employees of Osaka Gas and British Gas were continuously decreasing since 
1984. Nonetheless, the decline in the number of British Gas’s employees 
appears to be in the larger scale—from 93 thousands in 1984 to only 33 
thousands in 1997, whereas Osaka Gas’s employees dropped from around 10
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to 8.6 thousands.
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Figure 4.3: Length of the pipeline of the four gas companies during 1984- 
1996
Figure 4.3 illustrated the amount of the length of pipeline (K )—in kilo­
metres—of these companies over the thirteen-year period. Similar to the gas 
sales and the number of employees, the amount of pipeline owned by British 
Gas was much larger than those of the others, followed by Osaka Gas, PTT  
and Petronas, respectively. Overtime, the amount of pipeline of every com­
pany increased. While the amounts of pipeline of British Gas and Osaka Gas 
increased slightly by around 16.8 and 16.3 percent, respectively, the increases
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in the pipeline of PTT and Petronas appear to be more dramatic—around 
89 percent of the first year for PTT and more than 27 times for Petronas. 
However, it should be noted that the increases in the pipelines in PTT  and 
Petronas did not gradually increase like those of British Gas and Osaka Gas; 
instead they experienced some large stepped increases but remained constant 
for the rest of the period.
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Figure 4.4: Level of concentration of gas market of the four gas companies 
during 1984-1996
Figure 4.4 shows the level of concentration of gas market of each company, 
representing patterns of gas utilisation in each country. It is apparent that
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the companies faced two different types of gas market. While British Gas 
and Osaka Gas faced relatively less concentrated gas market (varying from
0.3 to 0.47), as more than half of their gas was consumed by numerous small 
consumers in households in the residential and commercial sectors, PT T  and 
Petronas faced very highly concentrated gas market (around 1), as more than 
90 percent of their gas was consumed by a few large industrial consumers and 
in power generation. Generally, the pattern of gas utilisation faced by each 
company remained the same throughout the period; even though it can be 
noticed that the gas markets of British Gas and of Osaka Gas tended to 
slightly more concentrated toward the end of the period.
Table 4.2 shows descriptive statistics (including Mean, minimum, max­
imum and standard deviation) of each factor company-by-company in the 
data set. From Table 4.2a, it can be seen that British Gas produced the 
largest amount of output followed by PTT, Petronas and Osaka Gas, respec­
tively. However, overtime, the production of Osaka Gas was the most stable, 
given its smallest deviation. Regarding labour, on average British Gas used 
the largest amount of employees, followed by Osaka Gas, PTT  and Petronas, 
respectively. In addition, British Gas’s number of employees was most fluc­
tuated with the biggest standard deviation followed by Osaka Gas, Petronas 
and PTT, respectively. Similarly, for the capital, on average, British Gas 
used the largest amount of pipeline followed by Osaka Gas, Petronas and 
PTT. In sum, these statistics suggest that there are some differences in the 
size of these gas companies with British Gas clearly the largest. Finally, 
Table 4.2d confirms what has been suggested earlier that on average, these
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Table 4.2: Summary of statistics of each variable for each company
Gas Sale (therms)
PT T Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Mean 2071.51 1289.67 1142.63 22604.07
Min. 800.80 85.32 899.36 18564.89
Max. 3732.58 3608.77 1357.64 32034.66
S.D. 946.10 1100.04 152.75 3893.06
(a)
Number of Employees
PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Mean 662.23 849.08 9393.31 71069.23
Min. 244.00 183.00 8684.00 33000.00
Max. 811.00 1494.00 10335.00 93100.00
S.D. 141.99 497.44 499.14 17908.63
(b)
Length of Pipeline (km)
PT T Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Mean 1143.85 360.46 38,749.00 252,590.39
Min. 1070.00 32.00 35,787.00 232,061.06
Max. 2030.00 897.00 41,655.00 271,100.00
S.D. 266.26 372.44 1,928.71 13,938.49
(c)
Concentration of Gas Market (STRUCT)
PT T Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Mean 0.9999 0.9520 0.3441 0.3765
Min. 0.9994 0.7814 0.2535 0.3211
Max. 1.0000 0.9954 0.4597 0.4741
S.D. 0.0002 0.0544 0.0769 0.0512
(d)
companies faced two different types of gas markets; PTT  and Petronas faced 
very concentrated markets (0.9999 and 0.95 respectively) whereas British 
Gas and Osaka Gas faced relatively less concentrated (only 0.37 and 0.34 
respectively).
Unlike Table 4.2, Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics for each variable 
in the data set on an annual basis. It confirms the information found in
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Table 4.3; Summary of statistics of the data set on yearly basis
G a s  S a l e  (therms)
M e a n M i n . S .D
1 9 8 4 5 0 8 7 .5 9 8 5 .3 2 1 8 5 6 4 .8 9 8 9 9 2 .1 8
1 9 8 5 5 5 3 9 .1 3 3 3 1 .7 5 1 9 8 3 2 .9 0 9 5 3 4 .3 4
1 9 8 6 5 6 1 0 .1 1 4 6 7 .8 6 2 0 0 7 2 .8 8 9 6 4 4 .5 3
1 9 8 7 5 9 7 4 .6 4 5 0 7 .5 5 2 0 9 4 7 .8 8 9 9 8 8 .9 7
1 9 8 8 5 8 9 5 .6 2 5 6 2 .3 1 2 0 2 9 1 .1 5 9 6 0 8 .0 6
1 9 8 9 5 8 1 1 .7 3 5 6 4 .2 9 1 9 8 0 8 .1 3 9 3 4 3 .4 6
1 9 9 0 6 0 0 0 .8 4 7 3 2 .1 5 2 0 3 7 1 .9 5 9 5 9 0 .1 1
1 9 9 1 6 6 3 6 .1 1 1 1 6 5 .2 9 2 1 8 9 7 .7 5 1 0 1 8 7 .2 0
1 9 9 2 6 7 6 2 .5 9 1 2 2 9 .2 5 2 1 8 6 5 .5 0 1 0 0 8 1 .4 3
1 9 9 3 7 6 1 1 .4 5 1 2 6 7 .0 4 2 4 4 7 7 .1 1 1 1 2 5 9 .8 1
1 9 9 4 8 2 1 2 .5 0 1 3 2 3 .2 2 2 6 0 9 1 .3 8 1 1 9 4 2 .0 3
1 9 9 5 8 7 7 4 .9 2 1 3 3 2 .9 8 2 7 5 9 6 .7 8 1 2 5 7 6 .0 6
1 9 9 6 1 0 1 8 3 .4 1 1 3 5 7 .6 4 3 2 0 3 4 .6 6 1 4 6 0 8 .3 3
(a)
N u m b e r  o f  E m p l o y e e s
M e a n M i n . S .D
1 9 8 4 2 5 9 6 5 .5 0 1 8 3 .0 0 9 3 1 0 0 .0 0 4 5 0 0 9 .9 5
1 9 8 5 2 5 1 8 2 .2 5 3 4 7 .0 0 8 9 7 0 0 .0 0 4 3 2 5 1 .1 1
1 9 8 6 2 4 2 5 1 .7 6 3 8 2 .0 0 8 6 1 0 0 .0 0 4 1 4 6 9 .0 9
1 9 8 7 2 3 1 5 5 .0 0 4 2 0 .0 0 8 1 8 0 0 .0 0 3 9 3 3 8 .6 0
1 9 8 8 2 2 4 9 8 .5 0 4 6 2 .0 0 7 9 3 0 0 .0 0 3 8 1 0 6 .9 8
1 9 8 9 2 1 5 4 2 .5 0 5 5 4 .0 0 7 5 6 0 0 .0 0 3 6 2 7 0 .9 6
1 9 9 0 2 1 6 6 4 .5 0 6 7 0 .0 0 7 6 2 0 0 .0 0 3 6 5 7 3 .3 1
1 9 9 1 2 1 2 7 9 .7 5 6 8 8 .0 0 7 4 4 0 0 .0 0 3 5 6 2 3 .5 6
1 9 9 2 2 0 5 8 9 .5 0 7 6 7 .0 0 7 1 2 0 0 .0 0 3 3 9 5 8 .0 1
1 9 9 3 1 9 4 5 5 .5 0 7 8 1 .0 0 6 6 5 0 0 .0 0 3 1 5 9 3 .1 9
1 9 9 4 1 6 3 0 4 .0 0 7 4 1 .0 0 5 4 0 0 0 .0 0 2 5 4 1 3 .9 0
1 9 9 5 1 3 5 3 1 .5 0 7 1 4 .0 0 4 3 0 0 0 .0 0 1 9 9 9 0 .5 5
1 9 9 6 1 0 9 9 4 .7 5 8 1 1 .0 0 3 3 0 0 0 .0 0 1 5 0 9 6 .7 3
(b)
Figure 4.1 to Figure 4.4. Table 4.3a shows that over the period on average 
the amount of gas sales (SA LE ) has increased from around 5 thousands 
therms to more than 10 thousands therms. However it can be found that 
the standard deviation for each year is large implying a wide variation in 
the size of the output across the companies. Unlike the sales, statistics in 
Table 3b suggest a decline in the average amount of employees (L) used by 
companies. The decrease, as seen in Figure 4.2, is influenced by the drop 
in number of employees of British Gas throughout the period. Again, the 
variation across the companies at each year was wide, reflecting the difference 
in size of the companies. Table 4.2c shows that over the period, on average
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L e n g th  o f  P ip e l in e  ( km)
M e a n M i n . S .D
1 9 8 4 6 7 2 3 7 .5 2 3 2 .0 0 2 3 2 0 6 1 .0 6 1 1 1 1 3 1 .5 4
1 9 8 5 6 7 7 1 7 .6 1 3 2 .0 0 2 3 3 5 0 9 .4 3 1 1 1 8 0 3 .1 3
1 9 8 6 6 8 6 0 4 .7 8 3 2 .0 0 2 3 6 5 6 7 .1 0 1 1 3 2 6 8 .4 7
1 9 8 7 6 9 9 2 0 .5 0 3 2 .0 0 2 4 1 3 9 5 .0 0 1 1 5 6 1 4 .1 7
1 9 8 8 7 1 0 9 4 .0 6 3 2 .0 0 2 4 5 4 1 8 .2 5 1 1 7 5 3 9 .8 9
1 9 8 9 7 2 3 2 2 .0 7 3 2 .0 0 2 4 9 9 2 4 .2 9 1 1 9 7 2 9 .3 5
1 9 9 0 7 3 2 5 3 .2 5 3 2 .0 0 2 5 3 2 0 0 .0 0 1 2 1 3 0 6 .4 6
1 9 9 1 7 4 4 6 3 .0 0 7 1 3 .0 0 2 5 6 8 0 0 .0 0 1 2 2 8 9 6 .9 7
1 9 9 2 7 5 8 2 6 .5 0 7 1 3 .0 0 2 6 1 8 0 0 .0 0 1 2 5 3 2 6 .4 8
1 9 9 3 7 6 7 7 3 .5 0 7 1 3 .0 0 2 6 5 0 0 0 .0 0 1 2 6 8 5 2 .8 7
1 9 9 4 7 7 4 6 4 .2 5 7 1 3 .0 0 2 6 7 3 0 0 .0 0 1 2 7 9 4 6 .1 1
1 9 9 5 7 8 1 4 4 .5 0 7 1 3 .0 0 2 6 9 6 0 0 .0 0 1 2 9 0 4 3 .3 9
1 9 9 6 7 8 9 2 0 .5 0 8 9 7 .0 0 2 7 1 1 0 0 .0 0 1 2 9 5 1 3 .8 3
( c )
C o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  G a s  M a r k e t  ( S T R U C T )
M e a n M i n . M a x . S .D
1 9 8 4 0 .6 0 5 0 .2 5 4 1 .0 0 0 0 . 3 4 6
1 9 8 5 0 .6 4 4 0 .2 5 4 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 8 3
1 9 8 6 0 .6 4 5 0 .2 8 6 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 8 1
1 9 8 7 0 .6 3 8 0 .2 6 6 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 8 7
1 9 8 8 0 .6 4 4 0 .2 8 7 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 8 8
1 9 8 9 0 .6 5 3 0 .2 9 3 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 8 3
1 9 9 0 0 .6 6 5 0 .3 2 5 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 7 7
1 9 9 1 0 .6 6 8 0 .3 2 1 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 7 8
1 9 9 2 0 .6 8 1 0 .3 2 9 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 6 5
1 9 9 3 0 .7 0 0 0 .3 8 7 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 4 4
1 9 9 4 0 .7 0 6 0 .4 2 5 0 .9 9 9 0 .3 1 8
1 9 9 5 0 .7 1 7 0 .4 4 5 1 .0 0 0 0 .3 0 4
1 9 9 6 0 .7 2 2 0 .4 6 0 0 .9 9 9 0 .2 9 5
(d)
there was an increase in amount of capital (AT), representing length of total 
pipeline, used by the companies, which can be expected given the increase the 
output. However, again the large standard deviations confirm the difference 
in the size of the companies. Finally, statistics in Table 4.2d indicate that 
on average the gas markets seemed to be more concentrated - from 0.6 in 
1984/85 to 0.72 in 1996/97. This is a result of the market of British Gas and 
Osaka Gas becoming a little more concentrated. This can be confirmed by 
the slightly smaller standard deviation toward the end of the period.
Finally, Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics for all 52 observations. 
Large variations in S A L E  (gas sales), L (number of employees) and K  (length 
of pipeline) suggest the differences in the size of the companies in the stud-
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Table 4.4; Summary of statistics of all observations
SALE L K STRUCT
Mean 6776.97 20493.46 73210.93 0.67
Min. 85.32 183.00 32.00 0.25
Max. 32034.66 93100.00 271100.00 1.00
S.D. 9451.47 30945.48 105962.4 0.32
ies. Moreover, for the variations in ST R U C T  (concentration), it indicates 
the difference in pattern of gas utilisation faced by these gas companies. 
As discussed earher, PTT and Petronas faced industrialised market (very 
concentrated market where most gas was consumed by a few industrial con­
sumers and power plants), whereas Osaka Gas and British Gas faced much 
less concentrated market, where more than half of the gas was consumed in 
numerous households.
4.4.3 Single-factor technical efficiency
Table 4.5; Single-factor productivity of each company
LfSALE KjSA LE
PT T Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas PT T Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Mean 0.36 0.88 8.41 3.33 0.67 0.23 34.28 11.36
Min. 0.22 0.41 6.40 1.03 0.33 0.04 30.68 8.46
Max. 0.67 2.14 11.49 5.01 1.34 0.59 39.79 12.62
S.D. 0.14 0.42 1.60 1.18 0.32 0.18 2.99 1.22
Finally, before turning to the technical aspects of how efficiency and pro­
ductivity can be estimated using linear programming and/or econometric 
methods it is useful to consider the ’nave’ measures of labour and capital 
productivity [S A L E /L  and S A L E /K  respectively) as summarised in Fig-
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Figure 4.5: Single-factor productivity of each company
lire 4.5 and Table 4.5. These simple measures are useful summary measures 
that indicate how much amount of gas produced and sold per unit of input 
(either labour or capital).
The more gas sold per unit of labour, the higher in productivity regarding 
the labour of company. From this measure, it can be observed from Table 4.5 
that on average PTT produced the largest amount of gas per unit of labour, 
whereas Osaka Gas produced the least. In particular, one unit of labour 
PTT produced more than 3 units of gas, whereas one unit of labour of Osaka 
Gas produced only 0.12 unit of gas. Even comparing with British Gas, whose
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market was similar, one unit of labour of Osaka Gas appears to have been able 
to produce only 34 percent of the amount that a unit of labour of British 
Gas produced. However, from Figure 4.5, overtime, there were increases 
in productivity of labour of each company. The change in productivity of 
PTT was more dramatic than those of the other companies, which can be 
confirmed by its largest standard deviation, followed by Petronas Osaka Gas 
and British Gas.
Similarly, the capital productivity summary indicates how much gas was 
produced and per unit of capital or more specifically per unit of pipeline. 
Again the company that produced the largest amount of gas per unit of 
pipeline has the highest productivity in capital. It can be observed from 
Table 4.5 that on average Petronas produced the largest amount of gas sale 
per unit of pipeline (more than 9), and hence the company had the highest 
productivity with regard to capital, whereas Osaka Gas appeared to be able 
to produce the least amount of gas sale per unit of pipeline (only 0.03) - which 
is accounted for again only 33 percent of the amount that British Gas could 
sell using a unit of pipeline. The movement of the capital productivity for 
each company can be observed in Figure 4.5. It can be seen that while Osaka 
Gas and British Gas appear to gradually improve in their capital productivity 
over the years, there were a few dramatic drops in the capital productivity 
of PTT and Petronas—particularly when there were step increases in the 
amount their pipeline, that is during 1995/96-1996/97 in PTT and during 
1990/91-1991/92^
^These simple measures of productivity will be a useful point of reference for the MPI 
results later in the thesis.
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4.5 Sum m ary
This chapter has discussed the data requirements, the data collection and 
construction (with the associated problems involved) the details of the data 
set actually used plus a description of these data. In short, given the aims of 
the research and the availability of the data a panel data set is used for four 
companies (PTT, British Gas, Petronas and Osaka Gas) over the thirteen 
year period 1986/87—1996/97. Although this is a relatively small data set 
it is the best available in order to attem pt to answer the research question 
outlined in Chapter 1. The next chapter therefore focuses on the concept of 
efficiency and the appropriate techniques that the data set may be applied 
to for estimating relative technical efficiency and productivity.
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Chapter 5
Techniques for M easuring 
Technical Efficiency
5.1 Introduction
Following the literature survey in the previous chapter, it is apparent that 
efficiency can be measured by several techniques. Given that the interest 
of the thesis is in technical efficiency and productivity change, this chapter 
reviews the techniques for measuring technical efficiency and the change in 
productivity. Strengths and limitations of each technique are also compared. 
Therefore by the end of the chapter, the preferred techniques for measuring 
technical efficiency, employed in analyses later in the thesis, can be justified.
The chapter is constructed as follows. Starting with an overview on effi­
ciency and the change in productivity, their definitions as well as how they 
are related to each other are illustrated. Then, in Section 5.3, the concept of 
technical efficiency measurement is presented in details. The main techniques
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for measuring technical efficiency are reviewed, in particular, the two widely 
used techniques: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic Fron­
tier Analysis (SFA). Extending from the technical efficiency measures, the 
techniques for measuring the change in productivity are presented in Section 
5.4. Similar to technical efficiency, the change in productivity can be mea­
sured by either non-parametric (DEA-like) or parametric approaches. Both 
approaches are illustrated in Section 5.4.2 and Section 5.4.3, respectively. 
The strengths and limitations of these techniques for measuring technical 
efficiency and the change in productivity are compared in Section 5.5, and 
hence the preferred techniques that will be used throughout the thesis are 
chosen. Finally, a summary and some concluding remarks are presented in 
Section 5.6.
5.2 Efficiency and P rod u ctiv ity
Generally speaking, efficiency is a relative concept and efficiency of producers 
can be derived from the concept of the production function, which is discussed 
as follows. By definition, a production function indicates the relationship 
between the inputs used for production of output, at a particular technology 
and assuming producers perform efficiently (Black, 1997). However, it is 
possible for the producers to fail to achieve the maximum output due to 
their inefficiency.
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) defined that the efficiency of producers— 
productive efficiency—indicates how successful producers are in allocating 
the inputs at their disposal and the output they produce, in an effort to
93
meet some objectives. At the elementary level, the objective is as simple 
as seeking to avoid waste through maximising the produced outputs at the 
given amount of inputs or minimising the inputs used in the production of 
certain amounts of outputs. It can observed that this objective makes the 
efficiency consistent with Koopmans’s (1951) definition of technical efficiency, 
described in Chapter 1. At the higher level, when the information on the 
prices of inputs and outputs can be observed, economic efficiency can be 
measured. Economic efficiency can be represented in terms of, for instance, 
cost minimisation (allocating inputs efficiently), which is referred to as cost 
efficiency, or profit maximisation (allocating inputs and outputs efficiently), 
which is referred to as profit efficiency.
To describe how efficiency can be measured, suppose that there is tech­
nical inefficiency—producers fail to achieve the maximum amount of output. 
The maximum amounts of outputs produced from a given amount of inputs 
(or the minimum combinations of inputs required for the production of a 
certain amount of outputs) are referred to as an efficient production func­
tion also called production frontier. That means the producers operating on 
the frontier will be regarded as technically efficient, whereas those under the 
frontier will be considered relatively inefficient. As a result, technical ineffi­
ciency can be measured from a distance of the producer’s performance from 
the production frontier.
Measuring technical efficiency by using the concept of distance function 
is basically developed from the study of Parrel (1957). In that study, he 
proposed that economic efficiency can be decomposed into two components:
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Figure 5.1: Farrell’s Efficiency
technical efficiency and allocative or price efficiency, which can be explained, 
as follows with the aid of Figure 5.1^ For simplicity, it is assumed that there 
are constant returns to scale (CRS) and that companies use two inputs to 
produce one output. Point P  is denoted to be an observed performance 
(or a combination of inputs used for a production of one unit of output) 
of company P. The isoquant S S ' represents the minimum combinations 
of inputs required to produce a unit of output and hence it is called the 
efficient production function. Any combinations of inputs on this production 
function are labelled technically efficient; whereas those, including point P , 
lying above the isoquant, are relatively inefficient, as they use inputs more 
than enough to produce one unit of output. Point Q represents a technically 
efficient company using the same ratio of two inputs as P  does. That means 
company Q is able to produce the same amount of output as the company 
P  does but uses less amount of input—at only QQ/OP of the amount of 
^This figure is an adapted version of Figure 6.1 firom Coelli et al. (1997)
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input that the company P  uses in its production. Alternatively, it can be 
thought that if using the same amount of input, the company Q can produce 
QP/QQ more than the company P  can. Hence, OQ/OP represents the technical 
efficiency (TE) of the company P  compared with the company Q.
In addition, if the prices of inputs can be observed, companies try to 
minimise its costs, at the given prices of the inputs. Line A A' is an iso­
cost curve. The slope of the AA' line is the ratio of the prices of two inputs. 
Moreover, as it is tangent to the efficient production function (at Q'), the AA' 
line indicates the minimum level of costs the company needs for producing 
a unit of output efficiently. It can be observed that both Q and Q' are 
technically efficient; however with respect to the given input prices, Q' is the 
optimal method of production, not Q, since it uses the least cost to efficiently 
produce a unit of output. The fraction OR/OQ is the company Q’s price 
efficiency or allocative efficiency (AE), as it represents the cost reduction 
that will make the company Q, (while remaining technically efficient) become 
allocative efficient. Combining both technical and allocative efficiency is 
called overall efficiency, productive efficiency or economic efficiency (EE) 
and it is equal to:
E E  = T E  X A E  (5.1)
which for the company P  is:
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(5.2)
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Figure 5.2; Productivity Change
Furthermore, overtime, efficiency may change—the company may per­
form more or less efficiently. The change in the company’s efficeincy may 
lead to the change in productivity of the company. The change in produc­
tivity can be graphically explained in a single-input, single-output case, as 
shown in Figure 5.2^. In this case, a level of productivity of a company can
be expressed in terms of a ratio of the output to the input, which is equal to
2 This figure is an adapted version of Figure 1.2 from Coelli et al. (1997) and Figure 2 
from Price and Weyman-Jones (1996).
97
the slope of a ray through the origin measures productivity at that particular 
point in the figure. In consequence, if each point represents a performance 
of a producer, the greater the slope of the ray, therefore, implies the higher 
level of productivity.
The curves f ( s )  and f{t )  denote non-CRS production frontiers at the
and period, respectively. In the first period period), company P  
operates at point p ', which is technically efficient relative to the production 
frontier in the period, since it is lying on the frontier. However, at the 
same period, by moving from p' along the frontier f {s)  to p", the company 
is still technically efficient, since it still operates on the frontier; nonetheless 
its productivity has improved, as the slope of the ray through the origin is 
steeper. This move is an example of exploiting scale economies; therefore 
called scale efficiency. Moreover, the production frontier might shift over­
time. If the frontier shifts upward for instance from the frontier / ( s )  in 
period s to the frontier f{t)  in period t in the figure, it implies technological 
progress. Suppose that the performance of the same company measured in 
the period is Pf  Compared to the new frontier in the period, the 
company is technically inefficient as point pt is under the frontier f{t )  (the 
producer does not always have to be efficient). However, compare its level of 
productivity to those of p" and p ', the level of productivity of pt is higher. 
This is another source of productivity improvement, which is referred to as 
technical change effect. In summary, the productivity improvement, by mov­
ing from point ps to pt, might not only be a result of efficiency change and 
scale effect but might also include the effect due to the shift of the frontier
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or technical change^.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that efficiency and productivity change 
can be measured in accordance with the concepts presented above, if and 
only if the frontiers (i.e. the isoquant S S  in Figure 5.1 or the frontiers /(s )  
and f ( t )  in Figure 5.2) are known. Since in practice, the frontier cannot 
be observed, it is necessary in order to conduct efficiency measurement that 
the frontier has to be estimated. Given the interest of this thesis, the dis­
cussion in the next section, therefore, focusses on reviewing the definitions 
and notations of a production frontier and technical efficiency as well as the 
techniques for measuring technical efficiency.
5.3 Technical Efficiency M easurem ent
5.3.1 Definitions and Notations 
Production Frontier
As defined earlier in this chapter, a production frontier characterises the 
boundary of production technology, which represents the maximum outputs 
that can be produced from a given combination amount of inputs {output- 
oriented production frontier). Alternatively it can also indicate the mini­
mum amount of inputs used for the production of a certain amount of out­
puts {input-oriented production frontier). Assume that producers use a nou­
ait is noted that to explain the causes of the change in productivity, the assumption on 
constant returns to scale (CRS) is relaxed. It is because under CRS, the frontiers f{s) will 
be a ray from through the origin like OP" (,see Price and Weyman-Jones (1996)), not the 
convex curve like in the Figure 5.2. As a result, under CRS the effect like scale efficiency 
is assumed to be zero.
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negative vector of N  inputs denoted =  e  to produce
a non-negative vector of M  outputs denoted y =  {p i,. . .  ,î/m} G R f ,  the 
feasible production set is defined as,
P  = {(re, y)\  X can produce y }
or.
=  {y|(a;,î/)| e  P}, (5.3)
e  P}
Modified from Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), for the multiple-input, 
multiple-output case, a joint production frontier can be expressed as.
D efin ition  5.1 (A  Jo in t P ro d u c tio n  F ro n tie r): is a function of F (p,rc) = 
0 having the properties Isoq X{y)  = {x\F(y,x)  = 0} and Isoq Y{x)  — 
{y\F{y,x)={)) .
where,
1. The Input Set: X{y)  = {re|(p,rc) is feasible}
2 . The Input Isoquants: Isoq X{y) = {x\x e  X(y) ,  Xx ^  X{y),  X < 1} de- 
scribe the set of input vectors capable of producing each output vector 
y but which, when radically contracted, become incapable of producing 
output vector y.
3. The Output Set: Y{x)  = {y\{y,x)  is feasible)
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4. The Output Isoquants: Isoq y(æ) =  {y\y e  Y{x) ,Xy  ^  Y (re), A > 1} 
describe the set of all output vectors(Y(re))that can be produced with 
each input vector x  but which, when radically expanded, cannot be 
produced with input vector re.
However, if a single-output specification of production is valid^, the joint 
production frontier in Definition 5.1 will collapse into a production frontier, 
which can be expressed as,
D efinition 5.2 (Production Frontier); /(re) =  max{y\y € Y(re)} =max{i/|re € 
X{y)) .
The production frontier /(re) indicates the maximum output that can be 
produced with any given input vector and characterises;
1. The Input Sets: X{y)  = {re|/(re) >  y} consist of all input vectors 
capable of producing at least scalar output.
2. The Input Isoquants: Isoq X(y)  = {re|/(re) =  y} consist of all input 
vectors capable of producing scalar output y and which, when radially 
contracted, are incapable of producing scalar output y.
3. The Input Efficient Subsets: Eff X{y)  = {re|/(re) = y , x  < x  => /(ré) < 
y}  consist of all input vector capable of producing scalar output y and 
which, when contracted in any dimension, are incapable of producing 
scalar output y.
'^The single-output specification may be valid in two main circumstances. First is when 
the production involves only one output. The other is when the production associates 
with several outputs but they can be aggregated into the single composite output: y  =  
g { y i i . . .  (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
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In other words, the production frontier f {x)  represents the upper boundary 
of production possibihty and all feasible input-output combinations of pro­
duction lie either on or under the frontier. Those locating on the frontier will 
be considered efficient, while those lying under the frontier will be relatively 
inefficient.
D istance Function
As argued in Section 5.2 citing to the work of Parrel (1957), technical inef­
ficiency is derived from the distance that the performance of the company 
deviated fi'om the production frontier, which can be measured through the 
concept of distance function initiated by Debreu (1951). Basically, the dis­
tance function can be presented into two ways—an input distance function 
and an output distance function. Using the notations presented in Kumb­
hakar and Lovell (2000), the distance functions can be defined as follows.
y
y
X
(a) (b)
Figure 5.3: Input-distance function
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D efin ition  5.3 (In p u t d istan ce  F unction); Di{y,x)  = max{A| (rc/A) G 
^(3/)}.
A input distance function adopts the input-conserving concept and rep­
resents the maximum amount by which a company’s input(s) can be radially 
reduced and still remains feasible for the output vector it produces. Figure 
5.3^ illustrates the input distance functions for (a) a single-input, single­
output case and (b) a two-input and single-output case. In Figure 5.3a, a 
company uses x  amount of input to produce y  amount of output. Nonethe­
less, it can still producer y  with only x / \*  amount of input. Therefore, the 
input distance function of x  is A*: Di{y,x)  = X* > 1. Similar in the case 
of two inputs and single output, as shown in Figure 5.3b, suppose that a 
company use (xi ,X2 ) to produce a unit of output y. However, the com­
pany is still able to produce y using only the radially contracted input vector 
(x/A*); hence D i{y,x) = X* > 1.
D efin ition  5.4 (O u tp u t d istan ce  F unction): Do{y,x)  = min{/x| {y/fi) G 
y(a;)}.
In contrast. Definition 5.4 implies that an output distance function, fol­
lowing an output-expanding approach, representing the minimum amount 
by which an output vector can be deflated and still remains producible with 
a given input vector. Figure 5.4^ shows the output distance functions for
®This figure is an adapted version of Figure 2.8 and 2.9 from Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000).
®This figure is an adapted version of Figure 2.10 and 2.11 from Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000).
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X X(a)
Figure 5.4: Output-distance function
(a) a single-input, single-output and (b) a two-output, single-input cases. 
In Figure 5.4a, a y amount of output is produced from x  amount of input. 
However, the larger amount of output: can be produced using the same
amount of input (x). Therefore, Do{x,y) = y* < 1 is the output-distance 
function of {y, x). Similarly, in Figure 5.4b, the vector output:y =  (2/1, 3/2), is 
produced using input x. However the same amount of input can also produce 
the radially expanded output vector: y/y*,  hence Do{x^y) = y* <1.
Technical Efficiency
Following the Koopmans’s (1951) definition of technical efficiency^ and De- 
breu’s (1951) concept of distance function, Farrel (1957) suggested an em­
pirical technique for measuring efficiency. He assumed that efficiency can
^Koopmans (1951) gave the definition of technical efficiency that a producer is techni­
cally efficient if and only if it is impossible to producer more of one output without causing 
the decrease in the production of the other output or the increase in some input used.
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be decomposed into technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Moreover, 
he argued that the production frontier should represent the best actually 
achieved rather than some unattainable ideal, therefore it should be esti­
mated from the observations of the input and outputs of a number produc­
ers. The concept is referred to as the best-pmctice approach. In consequence, 
he proposed a non-parametric linear programming technique, which eventu­
ally becomes the concept underlying most of the techniques for measuring 
efficiency. Parrel’s (1957) concept of efficiency can be described as follows.
Focussing on technical efficiency, using the notations in Kumbhakar and 
Lovell (2000), assuming a single-input, single-output case, Farrel (1957) de­
fined that.
D efin ition  5.5 (In p u t-o rien ted  techn ica l efficiency): is a function of 
T E i{y ,x)  =  min{^| Ox e  X{y)}
The input-oriented technical efficiency [TEi{y, re)] satisfies the properties: 
1, T E i(y ,x )  < 1.
2 . T E ,(2/,T
3. T E i{y ,x
4. T E j{y ,x
5. TE r(y ,x  
measured.
=  1 re E Isoq X{y).
IS non-mcreasing m x.
is homogeneous of degree -1 in x.
is invariant with respect to the units in which y  and x  are
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D efinition 5.6 (O utput-oriented technical efficiency); is a function of
TEo{y,x)  =  [max{ÿ| (j)y G K(re)}]"^
The Output-oriented technical efficiency [TEo{y,x)] satisfies the properties:
1. TE o{y ,x)  < 1.
2. TEo{y,x)  = l < ^ y  e  Isoq Y{x).
3. TEo{y,x)  is non-decreasing in y.
4. TEo{y,x)  is homogeneous of degree -fl in y.
5. TEo(y^x)  is invariant with respect to the units in which y  and x  are 
measured.
Following the discussion in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) (p.45), all prop­
erties except the second are desirable. The first property ensures that tech­
nical efficiency scores both input-oriented and output-oriented are bounded 
above by unity. The third property states that TEi{y^x)  does not increase 
when the amount of any inputs used increases, as well asTE o{y ,x )  dose not 
decrease when production of any output increases. The fourth property is a 
homogeneity property stating that an equi-proportionate change in all inputs 
and equivalent change in the same direction in TE[(y^ x). Similarly an equi- 
proportionate change in all outputs results in an equivalent change in the 
same direction in TEo{y^x). The last property is the invariance property— 
stating that the efficiency scores will not be affected by the change in the 
unit of either input or output.
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For the second property, Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) argued that it 
is not desirable since it uses the relaxed standard Isoq X{y)  and Isoq Y{x) 
instead of the Eff X (y)  and Eff y(rc) (See Definition 5.1 and Definition 5.2).
One can strengthen the second property to TEi{y^x)  =  1 æ G Eff %(?/) 
and TEo{y, x) = 1 ^  y e  Eff Y (x), given that Eff X (y)  = Isoq X(î/) and Eff 
Y (x)  = Isoq Y(x). As argued in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), this change 
is satisfied only by a Cobb-Douglas production frontier but not by other 
technology hke the translog. Finally, the relationship between TEj{y, x) and 
T E o{y ,x)  is given by;
Proposition 5,1: TE j{y ,x)  =  TEq (y,x)y{y,x)  is feasible 4  ^ X{Xy) =
A%(?/) <=> y(AT) =  Ay(T)
that is TEj(y^ x) and TEo{y, x) give the same efficiency scores, if and only if 
the technology is homogeneous of degree +1 ; in other words the technology 
has constant returns to scale.
So far the discussion, following Farrel (1957), has focussed on the single­
input, single-out case. If the production involves multiple outputs, the frame­
work is still similar to the discussion above except that the production fron­
tier is replaced with distance functions—the input-distance function for the 
input-oriented measure, whereas the output-distance function for the output- 
oriented measure. The definitions for the measures for input-oriented and 
output-oriented technical efficiency in multi-output are given as;
D efinition 5.7 (Input-oriented technical efficiency for m ulti-output case):
is T E i{y ,x )  =  m:m{e\Di{y,ex) > 1}
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D efinition 5.8 (O utput-oriented technical efficiency for m ulti-output case):
is TEo{y,x)  =  [max{(j)\Do{(j)y,x) <  1}]"^
The distance functions above are similar to what shown in Definition 5.3 and 
Definition 5.4. It is because the distance functions measure the distance of 
the performances of producers from the efficient frontier, which is consistent 
with the concept of technical efficiency. Therefore, the relationship between 
the distance functions and the radial technical efficiency is;
P ro p o sitio n  5.2: TE i{y ,x)  =  [Di{y,x)]~^ and TEo{y,x)  =  Do{y,x),
In summary, the techniques for measuring technical efficiency can be put 
into two groups—the input-oriented and output-oriented approaches—based 
on the type of the distance function. The input-oriented approach will be 
chosen when the studied producers are assumed to have more control on 
the inputs than on the outputs, as by the definition presented earlier that 
it involves minimising the amounts of combinations of inputs used for a 
production of a given amount of outputs. In contrast, if it is assumed that the 
producers have more control on the outputs than on the inputs, the output- 
oriented approach will be implemented, following its definition of maximising 
the amounts of the outputs produced by a given combinations of the inputs®.
Focussing on the case of gas companies, most previous studies reviewed 
in Chapter 3 employed the input-oriented approach since in business a cost-
minimising gas company tends to have more control on its inputs than on
®Since completing the research, a recent study by Orea et al. (2004), suggested the 
model selection approach of Vuong (1989) for helping on choosing the proper technical 
efficiency orientation.
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its outputs. Nonetheless, when the gas companies are a monopoly such as 
PTT which is the interest of the thesis, it can be argued that under a pro­
tected, monopoly, the gas companies can have a control over their output and 
hence the output-oriented approach can be implemented. As a result, in this 
thesis, both output-oriented and input-oriented approaches will employed in 
Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, respectively.
Another criterion used to categorise the technical efficiency empirical 
measures is whether the technique for estimation of the efficient frontier is 
the non-parametric or the parametric. The non-parametric approach seems 
to be developed directly from Parrel’s (1957) technique, using linear mathe­
matical program to construct a piecewise efficient frontier. The well-known 
technique in this group is called Data Envelopment Analysis (DBA), which 
will be discussed in detail in Section 5.3.2. On the other hand, the parametric 
approach estimates the efficient frontier using a econometric technique, given 
a mathematical specification. The key techniques in this group are such as 
Corrected Ordinary Least Square (COLS) and Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SPA). The techniques in this group will be reviewed in Section 5.3.3.
5.3.2 D ata Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
D ata Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a data-oriented efficiency measuring 
method. It is a mathematical programming model applied to observational 
data that provides a way to construct the production frontier and calculate 
technical efficiency scores related to the constructed frontier. The technique, 
firstly proposed by Charnes et al. (1978), basically calculates the relative
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efficiency among a set of performance, referred to as 'decision-making units' 
(DMUs) in the programme, in order to construct a 'best-practice frontier'. 
The DEA relative efficiency, following (Cooper et al., 2004), can be defined 
as:
D efin ition  5.9 (Eflficiency); Full (100%) efficiency is attained by any DMU 
if and only if none of its inputs or outputs can be improved without 
worsening some of its other inputs or outputs.
D efin ition  5.10 (R ela tive  Efficiency): A DMU is to be rated as fully 
(100%) efficient on the basis of available evidence if and only if the 
performances of other DMUs does not show that some of its inputs or 
outputs can be improved without worsening some of its other inputs or 
outputs.
The general concept of DEA can be graphically explained using Figure 
5.5. In Figure 5.5, suppose that companies use two inputs (xi, X2 ) to produce 
the output y. Each dot indicates different company’s performance (or D M U  
in DEA). Line SS ' represents the piecewise isoquant frontier, which is derived 
directly from the observed companies’ performances. There are three DMUs: 
D, C, and G, that are lying on the frontier SS'. These DMUs  are labelled 
technically efficient and referred to as the peers. Company’s inefficiency 
can be determined by comparing its D M U  to a single peer or a convex 
combination of peers—lying on the frontier and utilising the same proportions 
of inputs. For instance, the technical efficiency of E  can be measured by 
comparing E  with its peer, D, thus it can be determined by the ratio of
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OD/OE. For F , its technical efficiency is represented by OF'/OF, where F' is 
a linear combination of two peers {D and C), which lie on the frontier and 
use the same proportion of inputs as F  does. What DEA basically does is 
using a linear mathematical programming to calculate the efficient frontier, 
which graphically envelops all DMUs  and hence the technical efficiency of 
each D M U  will be calculated individually.
Xj/y
-4—  Efficient Frontier
0
Figure 5.5: Input-oriented DEA Model
DEA can be undertaken with either input or output orientation. The 
models in DEA vary according to the assumptions about the returns to scale. 
For instance, the basic DEA model proposed in Charnes et al. (1978) was 
input-oriented and assumed constant returns to scale (CRS). An alterna­
tive model was subsequently proposed by Banker et al. (1984), where the 
assumption of constant returns to scale was relaxed and variable returns to 
scale (VRS) was allowed. Besides these two models, DEA models can be
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altered by the change in the constraint on return to scales to, for example, 
a non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS) model or a non-increasing returns 
to scale (NIRS) model. In addition, DEA models can also be differentiated 
by the type of data set (i.e cross section, time series or panel data) and also 
by the choice of variables.
CRS m odel
The CRS model is a simple DEA model, firstly introduced by Charnes et al. 
(1978), as a generalised version of Farrel (1957). Suppose that there are 
N  DMUs (i.e companies) to be evaluated. Each DMU uses m  inputs to 
produce r  outputs. For the company, it uses amount Xji of input j  to 
produce amount yki of output k. The DEA relative efficiency is measured 
through the Watio-form'—the ratio of outputs to inputs of each DM U, which 
was introduced by Charnes et al. (1978). In the mathematical programming, 
for each particular DM U, says DMUi, it solves.
max ho{u, v) =  (5 .4)
Imposing the constraint that the ratio of weighted outputs to weighted 
inputs for every D M U  must be less than or equal to unity (see Definition 5.5 
and Definition 5.6), the mathematical programming solves the problem of.
max ho{u,v) =  (5.5)
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s.t
Uk, Vj > 0
u and V are the weights that solve this maximisation problem. The equation 
implies that, as 0 <  max ho < 1, the D M U  will be technically efficient if 
and only if the ratio is equal to unity.
Nonetheless, one problem that arises from Equation 5.5 is that if (u*, v*) 
is optimal, then {au*, av*) is also optimal for a  >  0. This problem can be 
avoided by imposing an additional constraint, i.e. =  1, so the
maximisation problem in Equation 5.5 becomes.
r
max z 
s.t
UkVko (5.6)
k= l
^ U k V k i - ' ^ V j X j i  <  0 
k= l j = l
m
53 '^3^0° ~ ^
i=i
U k,V j > 0
Denote is a m x 1 vector representing the inputs used by the com­
pany, and yi is a r  X 1 representing the output produced by the company. 
X  is the m x  N  input matrix, when X  G . Y  is the r  x F  output matrix, 
when Y  e  v i s a m x l  vector of input weights and u  is a r  x 1 vector of
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output weights. Equation 5.6 can then be rewritten in these vector notations 
as.
max (liyo) (5.7)
s.t UYo -  VXo < 0
VXo =  1
u , v  > 0
Equation 5.7 is known as the multiplier model. Its linear-programming (LP) 
dual problem can be written as,
^I,CRS ~~ 0I,CRS (5.8)
s.t —y ^ + Y A  ^ 0  
Oxq — XA ^  0 
A > 0
where, ^ is a scalar and A is a TV x 1 vector of constraints. obtained
from Equation 5.8, according to Farrel (1957), will be technical efficiency 
of the i^  ^ company . It satisfies ^ < 1. The D M U  for which =  1 is
technically efficient, whereas those whose < 1 are relatively technically
inefficient. It should be noted that by imposing the constraint: '^j^jo —
1, it implies that the producers have control on inputs used for production. 
Therefore, Equation 5.8 is referred to as the Input-oriented Envelopment
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Model, which aims to maximise the proportional decrease in input factors.
Contrary to this, DEA can also be done in output orientation—where 
trying to maximise the proportional increase in the output factors. That 
is, instead of considering the maximisation of ratio of the virtual output to 
input as in Equation 5.4, output-oriented DEA considers the minimisation 
of ratio of virtual input to output.
min h o { u , v )  (5 .9)
'^kVko
Following the similar transformation process, but replacing the constraint: 
2 ^ 1  '^ 3^ 30  =  1 by YJk=i '^kVko = 1, Equation 5.7 becomes.
min (vXo) (5.10)
s.t UYo -  VXo <  0
uyo =  1
Ù/V > 0
which is known as the output-oriented multiplier model. And Equation 5.8 
becomes,
^0 ,C R S  ~  4*0,CRS  (5.11)
s.t —4>Yodr'y\ ^ 0  
Xo — XA > 0
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> 0 .
Equation 5.11 is known as Output-oriented Envelopment Model Table 5.1 
compares the input-oriented CRS model with the output-oriented CRS model.
Table 5.1: Comparison of input-oriented and output-oriented CRS models
Input-oriented Output-oriented
Multiplier Model
max (liyo) 
s.t. liyo — VXo < 0
VXo =  1
u , v > 0
min (vXo) 
s.t. liyo -  VXo < 0 
uyo =  1 
u , v > 0
Envelopment Model
mine,A 9i 
s.t. —yo +  YA ^ 0 
Ox-o — XA ^  0 
A > 0
uiax<^ ,A 4>o 
s.t. —0yo +  YA > 0 
Xo — XA > 0 
A> 0
Another problem might arise due to the sections of the piecewise lin­
ear frontier that run parallel to the axes. For example the case of point 
J  in Figure 5.5, even though it is on the piecewise-linear efficient frontier, 
it is questionable whether it is efficient or not, since it could reduce the 
amount of X2 used by JG  but still be able to produce the amount of out­
put. This excess input is called Hnput slack'. Besides, in the multiple-input, 
multiple-output case, there is a possibility of output slack as well. Since both 
Equation 5.8 and Equation 5.11 seem to ignore the possible presence of these 
non-zero slacks, thus the efficiency scores obtained from both equations are 
referred to as ^weak efficiency'. To avoid the slack problem, the following 
linear programming—maximising the sum of slacks required to move from 
an inefficient point to the efficient point—is performed.
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max. ^ 5 , .  + Y 2 S +  (5.12)
j = l  k = l
S . t .
N
5  V ^ j i ^ i  d~ S j  — 6  Xjo]  .7 — 1 , 2 , . . . ,  777-5
i = l
N
5  V Vki i^ —  Vkoi k  —  1 ,  2 ,  .  .  .  ,  S 5
i = l
A<,5;;-,F+>0;V2,;,A;
where S j  and are input and output slacks, respectively. The problem 
with regard to the slack leads to the following definitions (Cooper et al., 
2004):
D efin ition  5.3 (D EA  Efficiency): The performance of DMC/q is fully (100%) 
efficient if and only if both (1.) 9* = 1 and (2 .) all slacks 5T* =  F+* =
0 .
D efin ition  5.4 (W eakly D E A  Efficiency): The performance of DMUo 
is weakly efficient if and only if both (1.) 9* = 1 and {2.)Sj* ^  0 
and/or ^  0 for some ÿ an d  k  in some alternate optima.
The input-oriented DEA programme solves the following problem.
Min.9 -  e ( ^ S j  + 5 3 * ^ ^ ) (5.13)
j = l  k= l
S . t .
N
5 3  i  =  1, 2, . . . , 777;
i= l
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Ni = l
Xi,Sj  , S^  > 0 ; \ f i , j , k
where and are slack variables. Given that e >  0 , s i s  so-called 
non-Archimedean element and defined to smaller that any positive that any 
positive real number (Cooper et al., 2004). Equation 5.13 is calculated in two 
stages; first by ignoring the slack, minimising 6. Then fixing the maximised 
6 = 6*, the slacks are maximised. In other words, in the second stage— 
calculating the slack, is a constant obtained from the first stage, not a 
variable to be solved. The slack output-oriented DEA solves.
Max.<j> + e ( y ;  SJ  + ^  S+) (5.14)
j = l  f c = l
S.t.
N
5  V ^ jiXi 4- Sj = Xjo', j  = 1 ,2 , . . . ,  ?7i;
i = l
N
^ y k i X i  -  =  (l)yko] k = l , 2 , . . . , s ' ,
i = l
Af >  0;V2
Similar to the process underlying Equation 5.13, in order to solve Equation 
5.14, first is maximising ÿ, by ignoring the slack, then by setting ÿ =  ÿ*, 
maximising the slack.
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V RS m odel
It has been argued that the CRS assumption would be appropriate only 
when aU companies were operating at an optimal scale and that imperfect 
competition, or the constraints on finance may cause a company to be not 
operating at optimal scale (Coelli et al., 1997). Banker et al. (1984) extended 
the CRS model of Charnes et al. (1978) by allowing the variable returns 
to scale (VRS) situations. This model will be referred to as VRS model 
throughout this thesis. Similar to the CRS model, suppose that there are N  
companies (or DMUs). Each company uses m  inputs to produce s outputs. 
The input-oriented VRS DEA progranune solves the problem,
^I,VRS — 6iyjis  (5.15)
s.t —Yo 4- VA > 0  
Oxq — XA ^  0 
N l'A  =  1,
A > 0
whereas, the output-oriented VRS model will be,
4*0,VRS ~  4*0,VRS (5.16)
s d  ~4)yo +  Y X  > 0
Xo — XA ^  0
N l'A  =  1,
A > 0
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It is obviously seen that the difference between Equation 5.8 and Equa­
tion 5.15 and between Equation 5.11 and Equation 5.16 is the convexity 
constraint, N l'A  =  1. The constraint ensures that each D M U  will be only 
compared to the other of similar size. Therefore, the VRS model can be used 
to avoid the problem of distorted technical efficiency due to scale efficiency 
{SE) when not all companies are operating at the optimal scale.
Output
OC: CRS Envelop 
ABODE: VRS Envelop 
OCDE: NIRS Envelop
CRS
VRS
(DRS) E (DUS)
NIRS ’^ Company at most 
productive scale size
’'n-j T echtiical Inefficiency
/  S ({ale Inefif^cienc^
0 f
>  Input
Figure 5.6: Returns to scale and DEA Technical efficiency
The difference between the CRS and VRS models can be explained graph­
ically using Figure 5.6^. For simplicity. Figure 5.6 considers a single-input, 
single-output case. While the ray OC  represents the efficient frontier asso­
ciated with constant returns to scale, VRS model adds the convexity to its
^This figure is an adapted version of Figure 6.7 from Coelli et al. (1997)
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efficient frontier and that leads to allowing variable returns to scale. The VRS 
frontier (Envelop A B C  DE)  exhibits all increasing, constant and decreasing 
returns to scale. The segment A B C  characterises increasing returns to scale 
(1RS), whereas the segment C D E  characterises decreasing returns to scale 
(DRS). Point C  is the DMU on VRS frontier, but giving that it is also lying 
on the CRS frontier, C  exhibits constant returns to scale. As CRS model is 
less restrictive—due to the absence of convexity constraint, lower efficiency 
scores is possible. It can be seen that by CRS model. A, B, D  and E  are 
technically inefficient, whereas by VRS model, they are efficient. As for F , 
which neither lies on the VRS nor the CRS frontier, it is labelled inefficient 
in both models. Under input orientation, its technical efficiency obtained 
by CRS model is h0 //0 ; on contrary, obtained by the input-oriented VRS 
model, technical efficiency of F  will be /0 / /0 ,  which is higher than h 0 //0 . 
The distance that deviates the VRS frontier from the CRS, which is / /  in 
the case of F , is dedicated to scale inefficiency. The scale efficiency {SE) 
can be calculated from CRS technical efficiency { T E c r s )  and VRS technical 
efficiency { T E v r s ) -
T E c r s  — S E  x  T E v r s  (5.17)
In the case of F ,
T E c r s  — S E  x  T E v r s
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;  =
S E  =  “
/O
It can be argued that VRS model cannot indicate whether the DMU is 
operating under increasing or decreasing returns to scale (Murillo-Zamorano, 
2004). This problem can be solved by modifying the convexity constraint 
according to the conditions obtained from Banker et al. (2004), as follows.
T heorem  5.1
1. Constant returns to scale prevail at (xo, yo) if N l'A  =  1 in any alternate 
optimum.
2. Decreasing returns to scale prevail at ( f  o, Vo) if N l'A  >  1 in any alter­
nate optimum.
3. Increasing returns to scale prevail at (xo,yo) if N l'A  <  1 in any alter­
nate optimum.
Therefore, suppose that the optima associated with decreasing returns 
to scale (Nl'A  > 1 ) .  In order to avoid examining all alternate optima, 
following Banker et al. (1996), the N l'A  =  1 constraint in Equation 5.16 will 
be replaced by N l'A  < 1, and hence the output-oriented DEA solves the 
following linear programming problem.
4*0,VRS  — 4 * o ,v r s  (5.18)
s.t —4*yoPYX > 0
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X q  — X A  ^  0
N l'A  <  1,
A > 0
The constraint N l'A  < 1 imposes the non-increasing returns to scale 
(NIRS) in the model. Comparing to the VRS model, as shown in Figure 5.6, 
the NIRS frontier {OCDE  Envelop) and hence its technical efficiency scores 
will be different from the VRS froniter, when the DMUs have increasing re­
turns to scale. In contrast, they will be equal to the VRS technical efficiency, 
when the DMUs exhibit decreasing and constant returns to scale. In addi­
tion, it should also be noted that regardless to whether the DEA model is the 
input-oriented or the output-oriented, it provides the same value of technical 
efficiency under constant returns to scale (CRS), whereas provides different 
efficiency scores when the returns to scale are assumed otherwise (i.e. VRS, 
NIRS, and NDRS). More details on DEA can be found in for instance, Fare 
et al. (1994), Coelli (1996a), SCRCSSP (1997), Coelli et al. (1997), Bowlin 
(1998), Cooper et al. (2000), and Cooper et al. (2004).
Environm ental Variables in D EA
In many cases, the production might involve some ^^environmental vari­
ables"— the factors which could influence the efficiency of the company, 
such as, the difference in companies’ ownership, local market characteristics 
and regulation. As outlined in SCRCSSP (1997) and Coelli et al. (1997), 
the environmental variables can be included in a DEA model by three main 
groups of techniques.
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The first group involves dividing samples into sub-sample based on the 
similar environment. For instance, in the case where the value of the envi­
ronmental variable can be ranked from the least to the most serious effect 
upon efficiency. Banker and Morey (1986) suggested the total observations 
to be grouped based on their value of environmental variable. Then, the 
efficiency of a particular company, say the company, is compared only 
with other companies, whose value of the environmental variable are less or 
equal to that of the company. This will ensure that no company will 
be compared with higher-ranked company with respect of the environmental 
variable. Nonetheless, if the environmental variable cannot be ranked (e.g. 
difference in companies’ ownership), the approach of Charnes et al. (1981) 
can be employed. That is firstly, the observations are separated into groups 
according to the environmental variable, then DEA is apphed for each group 
before projecting all observed data point to their respective frontier and run­
ning another DEA on the projected data points. However, Coelli et al. (1997) 
criticised that these two approaches have some drawbacks. The first is that 
the environmental variable is restricted to only one at a time. Besides, as 
the comparison set is reduced and many companies tend to be efficient; the 
discriminating power of the analysis is also reduced.
The second group is where the environmental variable(s) to be included 
directly to the envelopment model, as an input or as neutral variables, which 
can be either discretionary (under the control of the manager) or not. The 
studies that used this approach are for instance, BIE (1994), Price and 
Weyman-Jones (1996) and Boussofiane et al. (1997). Including environmen­
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tal variable in the linear programming can be done in several ways. For ex­
ample, firstly suppose that the environmental variables are non-discretionary 
neutral variables. The input-oriented VRS model with L  non-discretionary 
neutral environmental variables can be written as.
min 9 (5.19)e,x ■  ^ *
s.t 6xi — XA >  0,
—Ji +  YA >  0 ,
Zj — ZA =  0,
Nl'A = 1,
A > 0
where, Zj is the L x 1 vector of environmental factors for the company
and Z is the L x  N  matrix of environmental factors for the whole sam­
ple. Equation 5.19 implies that the 2*^  company will only be compared with
the efficient company which has the same environment. However, as the 
company’s efficiency will be measured against only those efficient companies 
whose environments are similar, the reference set is reduced significantly and 
that inflates the efficiency scores.
Alternatively, the environmental variables can also be included in the 
model as discretionary inputs. In that case. Equation 5.19 would become.
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min e (5 .20)6»,A ^  *
s.t 6xi — XA ^  0 ,
- V i + Y X  > 0 ,
9zi — ZA ^  0 ,
Nl'A = 1,
A >0
This model ensures that a company will not be compared with any company 
in better environments. Besides, the constraint (^z^ — ZA > 0) shows that the 
environmental factors (z^) are directly involved in the calculation of efficiency 
score (9) in the sense that the environmental variables can be proportional 
reduced by 0 as the inputs can be. In other words, this implies that the 
managers can change their environments to improve efficiency. However, 
this technique requires the specification of the direction of influence of the 
environmental variables on efficiency, which cannot always be observable.
On the other hand, the environmental variables are included in the model 
as non-discretionary (beyond the control of the manager) variables,
min 9 (5.21)e,x  ^ ’
s.t 9xi — XA ^  0,
~2/i 4-YA > 0 ,
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Zi — ZA > Oj 
N l'A  =  1
A > 0
It can be seen in Equation 5.21 that similar to Equation 5.20, the company 
will be compared only with those efficient companies which are in no bet­
ter environment. In addition, it still requires a priori direction (a sign) of 
influence of the environmental variables on companies’ efficiency. However, 
unlike the Equation 5.20, the environmental variables are no longer directly 
involved with efficiency scores.
The third and final group is called the two-staged approach. The first 
stage involves running DEA using only the inputs and output and ignoring 
environmental variables. Then in the second stage, the efficiency scores ob­
tained from the first stage are regressed upon the environmental variables 
using the Tobit regression. The signs of coefficients in front of the environ­
mental variables indicate the direction of influence of the particular environ­
mental variable on the efficiency. If these environmental variables are signif­
icant, their coefficients can be used to adjust the DEA scores for differences 
in the environment (IPART, 1999). Comparing with the first two groups, 
this approach contains several advantages. For instance, it can accommo­
date more than one environmental variable, while the first group cannot. 
Moreover, the variables can be both quantitative and qualitative data. In 
addition, it does not require the specification on the direction of the influ­
ence of the variables on efficiency, whereas the first two groups do. However,
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it has one drawback that if the input and/or output variables in the first 
stage are highly correlated with the second-staged environmental variables, 
the results are hkely to be biased (Coelh et al., 1997). The studies that used 
this approach include McCarty and Yaisawarng (1993), IPART (1999) and 
Resende (2000).
Bootstrapped D EA
Civen that DEA is a deterministic technique, it is criticised to be sensitive 
to the data set used (Weyman-Jones, 2003). In addition as a non-parametric 
method, the technique is also accused to be lack of statistical underpinning 
and hence it is argued that the uncertainty surrounding DEA estimates (or 
the sampling noise) can lead to erroneous conclusions (Simar and Wilson, 
2000). Regarding the sensitivity in the sampling variations, bootstrapping 
can be applied to DEA efficiency scores by analysing the sensitivity of DEA 
to sample variations providing confidence intervals for the DEA efficiency 
scores and corrections for the bias.
Bootstrapping was firstly applied to DEA efficiency scores by Ferrier and 
Hirschberg (1997). Nevertheless, the bootstrapping procedure suggested by 
Ferrier and Hirschberg (1997,1999) was criticised by Simar and Wilson (1998, 
1999) on its inconsistency. In consequence, Simar and Wilson (1998, 1999, 
2000, 2004) suggested a new bootstrap procedure, which is the procedure 
adopted in this thesis. Following Simar and Wilson (2004), the Simar and 
Wilson’s bootstrapping procedure can be presented as follows.
Let X G is a vector of m  inputs, %/ G R+ is a vector of r  outputs;
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therefore, rewritten Equation 5.3, the feasible production set is defined as,
P  =  {(æ, 7/)| X can produce y}
or,
Y(x)  =  {2/|(x,ÿ)| € P},
^ { y )  = {x\{x,y)\ € f }
Denote that Do{x,y\P)  is an output distance function. S n  are observed 
sample set of inputs and outputs of N  companies, which can be written as,
(5.22)
and, Sm are generated from.
F  = F(P, f{xi,yi))  (5.23)
In practice, P , P  and therefore the distance function: Do{x,y\P)), are 
unobserved. However, P  can be estimated from the sample set, In 
consequence, the estimator of P  can be used to construct the estimator of 
Do{x,y\P). Nonetheless, constructing the estimator of P  can be done by 
several models, in which results different estimators. For instance, if the 
output-oriented CRS DEA model is adopted.
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[Do{x, y\V)] =  max{(l)\ (l)y <  Y \ , x >  XA, X e  R^}  (5.24)
It can be noticed that Equation 5.24 is equivalent to Equation 5 .11. Dq (x , y\V) 
is the output-distance function obtained from the CRS DEA model and V  is 
the estimator of P  in CRS DEA model. On contrary, if the output-oriented 
VRS DEA model is employed.
[Do(x,y\P)]  ^ =max{(t)\ #  <  YA,T >  XA,zA =  1, A G R+} (5.25)
where P  is the estimator of P  in VRS DEA model. For F, denote F{Sn ) a 
consistent estimator of F, where.
F(S'^) =  F(Ay(3;,3/)) (5.26)
Simar and Wilson suggest that bootstrapping can be simply done by 
drawing a new data set from F{Sn )- Then apply the
original estimator to these new data. Suppose that the original estimator for 
a point {Xo,yo) is Do(xo,yo\P)^ and the estimator obtained from F{Sn ) is 
Eo{xo,yo\R*), where P* is the VRS frontier of obtained by solving,
[Do{xo,yo\P*)]~^ = max{4)\(l)yo < Y*A,To > X*A, zA =  1, A G P+} (5.27)
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where Y* =  X* =  [rrî. . .  a;;^], (x*,yl) G S* .^ Repeating this
process B  times will result in a set of bootstrap values {-Do,6(a^o,2/olF*)}^i- 
Bootstrap is consistent when,
yo|P*) -  y o |f  )]|F(P, /(a;, y)) (5.28)
[Do{xo,yo\P) -  Do{xo,yo\P)]\F{PJ{x,y))
When the bootstrap values, {Do,b{xo,yo\P*)}b=iJ &re obtained, the confi­
dence intervals for the true distance function, Do{xo, yo\P) can be estimated. 
If the true distribution of [Do{xo, yo\P) — Do (xq, yo\P)] is known, the confi­
dential interval can be presented as.
Pr[-ba, < Do{xo, yo\P) -  Do{xo, yo\P) < - a j  =  1 -  «  (5.29)
However, in practice, and ba are unknown, so they have to be es­
timated from the empirical bootstrap distribution of the pseudo estimates 
{Do,b{xo,yo\P*)), when.
P r [ - K  < Do{xo, yo\P*) -  Do{xo, yo\P) < -aa |F (F „)] «  1 - a  (5.30)
Finding àa and ba involves sorting the values, [Do{xo, yo\P*) — Do{xo, yo\P)], 
b = 1, . . . ,  R, in increasing order then deleting ( |  x 100)-percent of the 
elements at either end of the sorted list. Then set —ba and —âa equal to
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the end points of the truncated, sorted array, with <1^.  Therefore, the 
approximation of Equation 5.29 is.
Pr[—ha. < Do{xQ,yQ\P) — Do{xQ,yQ\P) < —a j  ^ 1  — a  (5.31) 
and the estimated (1 — a)-percent confidence interval is.
D o{xq, yo\P) +àa < Do{xo,yo\P) < Dq {xq, yo\P) +  (5.32)
The bootstrapping procedures described above are simplified into step- 
by-step algorithms easy to follow, which will be employed later in thesis, 
presented in Appendix A.
5.3.3 Parametric Techniques
Parametric techniques are referred to the technical efficiency measures that 
use econometric techniques to estimate a production frontier. Following Far- 
rel’s (1957) concept of technical efficiency that technical efficiency can be 
measured from the deviations of the companies’ performances from the pro­
duction frontier, the techniques can fit in an econometric context. Given 
that a production function represents the maximum output(s) that can be 
obtained from a given combination of input(s) at particular technology, as­
suming that they are used efficiently (Black, 1997), it can be considered as 
the production frontier and inefficiency is identified with disturbances in a
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regression model (Greene, 1993), which can be explained as follows.
For simplicity, suppose that producers use m  inputs; x  € R +, to pro­
duce a single output y G R+. When producers are efficient, the production 
function can be expressed as.
2/*= / (x i ; / ? )  (5.33)
where,
1. y is a production function,
2 . y* is a production function when there is no evidence of inefficiency,
3. /(x i; /?) is a production frontier,
4. 13 is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
However, if the company performs inefficiently (as it fails to achieve 
the maximum possible outputs), its production function can be written as.
Vi = /(x i; P) • exp{zzi}, (5.34)
where zz^  is a disturbance term assumed to represent the factors that con­
strain the company from achieving the maximum output; hence the technical 
inefficiency. As a result, in this econometric approach, the technical efficiency 
can be written as,
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=  exp {w i} (5 .35)
where exp{wi} indicates the present ability of the company to produce 
compared with the efficient performance. It is so called the company’s 
technical efficiency. It implies that the company will be technically efficient: 
TEi = 1, if and only if the company produces the maximum output: yi = 
/(xijyd); otherwise TEi < 1- Equation 5.34 is referred to as a deterministic 
production frontier model, since it does not account for the possibility of 
random shocks. To accommodate the random shocks, it requires a stochastic 
production frontier model, which can be expressed as,
Vi = /(x ii 13) • exp{uj • TEi (5.36)
where, /(xj;/3) • exp{uf} is a stochastic frontier consisting of two parts: 
/(x j; P) is the deterministic production frontier and exp{ui} aims to capture 
the producer-specific random shocks. Therefore, technical efficiency obtained 
from the stochastic model can be defined as.
It can be found that the producer will be technically efficient: TEi =  1, if
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and if only he or she achieves the maximum output: yi = f{xi] P) ' exp{u^}, 
given the producer-specific environments characterised by exp{ui}.
In summary, so far it can be observed that the parametric techniques 
can be divided into two groups: deterministic and stochastic approaches. 
Nonetheless, similar to the non-parametric techniques, the parametric tech­
niques can also be undertaken both by input and output distance functions.
O u tp u t a n d  In p u t D istance F unctions
Consider N  companies who use m  inputs: x  e  to produce r  outputs: 
y  e  R\_. Rewrite Definition 5.4—an o u tp u t  d istance fu n c t io n  (Do{y,x)),
Do{y, x) = min{//| {y/p) G F(a;)},
where, Y{x)  is the output set, which Y{x) = {y\(y,x)  is feasible}. In addi­
tion, following Proposition 5.2,
TEo{y,x) = Do{y,x).
As noted in Lovell et al. (1994), Do{y, x) is nondecreasing, positively linearly 
homogenous and convex in y and decreasing in x. Furthermore, the distance 
function will be less than or equal to 1, if the output y is in the feasible 
production set: Do{x,y) < I ii y e Y { x ) .  That is.
=1, y e l s o q Y { x ) ;
Do { x , y )
=y, {y\y ^ Y { x ) , \ y  ^ Y { x ) , \ > i } ,
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In other words, if y is located on the outer boundary of the production 
possibility set, the distance function will take the value of unity. These 
properties are consistent with Definition 5 .6 .
Following Coelli and Perehnan (2000), a translog output-distance func- 
tion^°, when the companies use m  inputs to produce r outputs, can be defined 
as.
r  ^ r r
In(Doi) =  ao +  In y^i +  -  aki In yki In yn (5.38)
k=l k=l 1=1
m ^ m  m
+ A + 9 X] X/ A'/i 111 ^ h i2j=l j=l h=l
m r
In yki;
j=l k=l
i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,  N
where i denotes the company in the sample. It can be observed that 
Do{x,y)  =  1 if the left-handed side of Equation 5.38 is equal to zero. The 
output-oriented technical efficiency satisfies homogeneity of degree d-1 in out­
puts and the restrictions for this property are.
= 1 ; (5.39)
k=l
i°Even though the discussion here is focussed on Translog technology and Fare et al. 
(1993) and Coelli and Perelraan (2000) argued in favour of the Translog technology over 
the Cobb-Douglas that it is more flexible, it is noted that for analysis in this thesis, it is 
assumed Cobb-Douglas technology due to the limited availability of data.
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= 0; 1, 2 ,
1=1
r
= 0; l , 2 , . . . , m.
k = l
The restrictions required for symmetry are
«fcz =  o^ ik; k , l  =  1 , 2 , . . .  ,r  (5.40)
Pjh — Phj\ h , j  = l , 2 , . . . ,  TTL.
It is also noted in passing that the restrictions required for separability be­
tween inputs and outputs are.
dkj — Oj k — 1 ,2 ,. . . ,  rj j  — 1,2 , . . . ,  Tfi. (5.41)
Following Lovell et al. (1994) and Coelli and Perelman (1999), the homogene­
ity restriction is imposed to transform Equation 5.38 into a form that can be 
estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS). They noted that homogeneity 
implies,
Do{ x , Xy )  =  XDo{x, y) ;  X > 1  (5.42)
Let, A =  l / y ^  therefore,
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Do{x, y/Vr) =  Do{x, y)/yr.  (5.43)
By the transformation, Equation 5.38 becomes.
r —1 - r —1 r —1
\n.{Doi/yri) = a o - \ - '^ a k ln y l i  + - ^ ' ^ a k i h i y l i \ T i y ^ i  (5.44)
fc=l k=l 1=1
m  j  m  m
+  X /  A  In +  9 ^ 2  Xv A/» In Xji In Xhi2j = l  j = l  h= l
m r —1
j = l  k = l
i = 1 ,2 , . . .  , N
where, yl^ = yki/yn^ 
Rewritten, Equation 5.44 as
r —1 - r —1 r —1'  ; 2 1 " 1 *
-  ln(i/H) =  <^ 0 +  X )  «A: In ^  ^  o;fcz In yl^ In i/f- (5.45)
fc=l k=l 1=1
m  ^ m m
+ Xy A n^ Xji +  -  ^ 2  X /  Ak In Xji In x^2j=l j=l h=l
m  r —1
+ Sjk In Xji In yli -  In(Poi);
j=l k=l
I =^1,2,... ,N
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Equation 5.45 is the output distance function that is used to estimate the 
output-oriented technical efficiency, where -  \n{Doi) can be either determin­
istic {-Ui) or stochastic (vi -  Ui) efficiency effect. Nonetheless, in the case 
tha t there is only one output and multiple inputs. Equation 5.45 will collapse 
to the traditional production: pi =  /(x^; /?) • exp{uj • TEi, m the stochastic 
frontier approach.
Similar process can be done to find an in p u t  d istance fu n c t io n .  Ac­
cording to Definition 5.3, an input distance function can be expressed as,
Di{y,x)  =  max{A| { x / \ )  G X{y)}.
In addition, following Proposition 5.2,
T E i{y ,x)  = [Dj{y,x)]~^.
As noted in Lovell et al. (1994), the input distance function D i{x,y)  is 
non-decreasing, positively linearly homogenous and concave in x  and decreas­
ing in y. Furthermore, Di{x, y) will be greater than or equal to unity if the 
input vector x  is in the input set X{y), that is Di{x,y)  >  1, if a; G X{y). 
Moreover,
I =1, a; G IsoqX(î/);
Di{x,y)  <
=x, {a:|a; G X(?/),Aa; ^ X(i/),A < 1}.
In other words, the input distance function will take a value of unity of x  
located on the inner boundary of the input set. A Translog input distance 
function can be written as,
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r ^ r r
ln(D/i) =  ao + ' ^ a k ] n y k i  + - ' ^ ' ^ a u l n y k i h i y i i  (5.46)
fc=i fc=i i=i
m m m
Y  X^ P j  In X ji  +  % X / X /  A/l ^ j i  ^  ^ hi2
3—1 3=1 h=l
m r
3=1 k= l  
ï =  1, 2, . . . ,  AT
where i denotes the 2*^  company in the sample. It can be observed that 
D i{x,y)  =  1, if the left-handed side of Equation 5.46 is equal to zero. The 
input-oriented technical efficiency satisfies homogeneity of degree -}-l in in­
puts and the restrictions for this property are,
X / A  ~  (5.47)
j=i
m
X ^A /i =  0; 1, 2 , . . . ,m ;
h=\
m
X i  Afc =  0; 1, 2 , . . . ,  r.
j=i
The restrictions required for symmetry are
o^ ki = Oiik] k , l  = 1 ,2 , . . .  ,r  (5.48)
Pjh — Phj] h , j  = 1, 2 , . . . ,  TÏI.
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It is also noted in passing that it requires the restrictions for separability 
between inputs and outputs, which can be expressed as.
Skj = 0; /c =  1,2, . . .  ,r; j  =  l ,2,  . . . , m  (5.49)
Imposing the homogeneity restriction, which implies
Di{x, y/xm) =  Di{x, y)/xm  (5.50)
As a result. Equation 5.38 becomes.
r  ^ r r
ln (D /i/Xmi) = û!o +  Vki +  ^ ]X  3/w 111yii (5.51)
k = l  k = l  1=1
m —1 - m —1 771—1
+ X] 9 X] XI2j=i j=i /i=i
771—1 r
j = l  f c = l
2 =  1, 2 , . . . ,  A
where, x^^ = Xmi/xji. 
Rewritten, Equation 5.51 as
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r  ^ r r
M^mi) =  OiQ + ' ^ a k l n y k i - h - ' ^ ^ o c k i l n y k i l n y i i  (5.52)
A:=l k=l 1=1
m —1 _ m —1 m —1
+  X )  A  +  9  X ]  X ]  A v i E i a ; } .  l u 3:%^2j=l j=l h=l
m —1 r
+  X !  X I yki -  k i(% );
J = 1  f c = l
2 =  1, 2 , . . . ,  A
Similar to the output distance function, Equation 5.52 is the input dis­
tance function tha t can be used to estimate input-oriented technical ef­
ficiency, where — ln(A/i) can be either deterministic (—u%) or stochastic 
{vi — Ui) efficiency effect.
D eterm inistic Approaches
As mentioned earlier, the parametric techniques for measuring technical ef­
ficiency can be classified by whether the frontier they estimate is determin­
istic or stochastic. In this section the deterministic approaches are reviewed, 
whereas the stochastic will be presented in the next section. To study the 
deterministic techniques, rewritten Equation 5.34 where the deterministic 
production frontier can be expressed as.
2/i =  /(xi;/5)-exp{uJ.
This equation implies that all deviations of the actual output {pi) from the
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frontier f{xi;P)  are presumably due to technical inefficiency, given the statis­
tic noises are negligible. Equation 5.34 can also be written as.
Vi =  /(x i; P) • exp{-Ui}, (5.53)
when, Ui >  0 and TEi = exp{—Ui}. The difference between Equation 5.53 
and Equation 5.34 is the negative sign at the non-negative Ui, which ffims 
to ensure that TEi < 1. In other word, it confirms that all the companies’ 
output lie below or on the frontier as yi < /(x i; p). A log-linear form of the 
production frontier in Equation 5.53, supposing that producers produce one 
output from m  inputs and have Cobb-Douglas technology, can be written as.
ln(?/i) =  A  +  A  In fe i) -  (5.54)
j=i
where, Ui >  0. Equation 5.54 is referred to as a linear regression model with 
a non-positive disturbance.
Estimation of the deterministic frontier can be done by several techniques, 
which can be put into two groups. First is Parametric Linear Programming 
(PLP), whereas the other is the econometric techniques i.e. Corrected Ordi­
nary Least Squares (COLS), Modified Ordinary Least Squares (MOLS) and 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Both groups will be reviewed as 
follows and for simplicity, it should be noted that the following discussion 
will focus only on the output-oriented production frontier, when producer
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uses m inputs to produce single output.
Firstly, Param etric  Linear Program m ing (P LP ), proposed by Aigner 
and Chu (1968), similar to DEA uses a mathematical programming tech­
nique to estimate a deterministic production frontier like Equation 5.54. In 
the study, they assumed Cobb-Douglas technology and suggested two mod­
els subjected to two different specifications: a linear programming and a 
quadratic programming specifications. Given that PLP is similar to DEA, it 
is suffered from the similar criticism that the parameters Ps in the production 
function are calculated rather than estimated, which complicates statistical 
inference concerning the calculated parameter values (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). However, in response to the problem regarding its lack of statistical in­
terference, Schmidt (1976) pointed out that under the specific assumption on 
the disturbances {uj), the Aigner and Chu (1968)’s model can be estimated 
using M axim um  Likelihood E stim ation  (M LE), which will give the 
statistic inference to the model. Apparently, the MLE was firstly employed 
by Greene (1980).
Another group of the deterministic approaches that uses the econometrics 
techniques to estimate the production frontier was led by Winsten (1957)—a 
discussion in response to the work of Parrel (1957). Winsten (1957) proposed 
that the deterministic production frontier can be estimated in two-step ap­
proach. The technique eventually becomes known as Corrected Ordinary 
Least Square (COLS). The first step involves OLS. Then the biased OLS 
intercept (A ) is ''corrected'  ^ by shifting it up until the estimated frontier 
bounds all data from above (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). By that, all
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COLS residual will be non-positive and at least one being zero. The COLS 
intercept Pq can be written as,
Pq — Pq + maxi{ui\ (5.55)
where, A  is the OLS intercept,and maxi{uî\ is the maximum residual ob­
tained from the OLS. The COLS residuals u\ can be estimated from.
u f  =  maxi{ui} -U i\  2 =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  A  (5.56)
where, Ui is residual obtained from OLS. Equation 5.56 ensures that COLS 
residuals u f  are non-negative and at one being zero. COLS technical effi­
ciency for each company is equal to.
T E ?  = e x p i - u fy ,  i = l , 2 , . . . , N  (5.57)
Afriat (1972) and Richmond (1974) proposed a variation on COLS. They 
suggested that the production frontier can be estimated by OLS but under 
the assumption on the distribution of non-positive disturbance (u%), for in­
stance the half-normal, the exponential or the gamma distribution. This 
technique is referred to as M odified  O rd inary  Least Squares (M O L S ) .  
Similar to COLS, MOLS consists of two steps. The first step is OLS; nonethe­
less, in the second step, the OLS intercept (A ) is shifted up by the mean of
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the assumed gamma distribution. Therefore, the MOLS intercept can be 
written as.
and.
—u ^  — Ui — E{ûi); i = 1 ,2 , . . .  ,N .  (5.59)
MOLS technical efficiency is,
TEi = e ^ p { - U i} ;  2 =  1 , 2 , . . . , A. (5.60)
However, this technique does not guarantee that the efficient frontier will 
envelop the whole observations. For instance, when the company has a very 
large positive ûi, there is a possibility that [ui -  E{ui)] > 0 , which leads to 
TEi > L Besides, there is also a possibility that no company is technically 
efficient.
In sum, besides PLP, a deterministic production frontier can be estimated 
by three main econometric techniques, MLE, COLS and MOLS. Comparing 
these three econometric techniques, it is apparent that they do not take into 
account the random errors (i.e error of measurement or strikes), assumed
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Figure 5.7: COLS, MOLS, and MLE deterministic production frontiers
to be beyond the control of the managers. Instead, they attribute all de­
viations from the frontier to technical inefficiency. The differences of these 
three techniques can be illustrated in Figure 5.7. From the figure, it can be 
seen that COLS and MOLS is the adjusted OLS. Both adjust only the OLS 
intercept (^o) but leave the other (5s unchanged. In consequence, graphically, 
both COLS and MOLS frontiers are parallel to the OLS regression, as only 
the intercept is changed. This implies that the structure of “best practice” 
production technology (i.e. scale, substitution characteristics) is the same 
as the structure of “central tendency” production technology ( =
Therefore these two techniques apply the same efficiency ranking to 
the companies as OLS. It can be argued that this is an undesirably restric­
tive property, since it rules out the possibility that efficient companies are
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efficient because they exploit the available economies and substitution pos­
sibility, and hence have difference production technology from the company 
in the middle of the data (Lovell, 1993; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). The 
difference between the two frontier is that while the COLS frontier envelops 
aU the observations, there is a possibihty that the MOLS will not, partic­
ularly when the observation has a significantly large positive residual. In 
contrast to MOLS, MLE also envelops all observations. Furthermore, unlike 
both COLS and MOLS, MLE allows for structural dissimilarity between the 
OLS and the efficient frontier technology (Lovell, 1993).
Stochastic Approaches
While the deterministic techniques overlook the possibilities of random errors 
and all deviations from the efficient frontier are assumed to be caused by the 
inefficiency, stochastic techniques, in contrast, incorporate company-specific 
random shocks, which are beyond the control of the companies. Stochas­
tic frontier analysis (SEA) was independently introduced by Aigner et al. 
(1977), Meeusen and van den Broeck (1977) and Battese and Corra (1977). 
In these models, SFA was designed for cross section data and a single-output 
stochastic production frontier can be expressed as.
Vi = f{xi] P) exp{ui} • exp{-Ui} (5.61)
where, Ui > 0 , and [/(x%; /I) exp{uj] is the cross-sectional stochastic pro­
duction frontier. It is apparent that the stochastic frontier consists of two
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parts: the deterministic frontier [/(xi; /?)] and a company-specific exp{ui} in­
tending to capture the random shocks. Similar to the deterministic frontier, 
exp{—Ui} represents technical inefficiency. Hence, technical efficiency can be 
expressed as.
=  exp{-Ui}
From Equation 5.62, it is apparent that yi will achieve the maximum feasible 
output: /(x i; P) exp{ui}, if only TEi =  1. Moreover TEi < 1 implies that the 
company fails to achieve the maximum possible output given the company- 
specific environment characterised by exp{ui}.
Modified from Equation 5.34, a stochastic production frontier model, with 
Cobb-Douglas technology can be written in the log-linear form as.
ln{yi) = Po + ' ^ P j ln { x j i ) - ^ V i - U i  (5.63)
2 =  1, . . . , #
where,
Ps = parameters to be estimated,
Vi =  the random disturbance term to capture the statistic noises, assumed to 
be independently and identically distributed as N{0,al)  (Aigner et ah,
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1977)
Ui =  a nonnegative disturbance term representing companies’ technical in­
efficiency, assumed to be distributed independently of Vi.
From Equation 5.63, it can be observed that if vi = 0, which implies that 
there is no statistical noise, the model will coUapse to a deterministic pro­
duction function. On the contrary, if vi ^  0 but u  ^=  0 , in other words, there 
is no inefficiency in the observation. Then Equation 5.63 will collapse to the 
OLS.
The stochastic frontier model, such as Equation 5.63, can be estimated 
using Maximum-Likelihood Estimation (MLE). In general, MLE is a two- 
step procedure. The first step involves OLS to estimate the slope parameters 
(j0s). The second step uses maximum likelihood to estimate the intercept and 
the variances of the two error components. The distributional assumptions 
imposed upon U{ are varied. For instance, in Aigner et al. (1977) it is assumed 
to be truncated-normal distributed A'(0,cr^); Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977) assumed u, to has exponential distribution; Greene (1980) supposed 
Ui is gamma-distributed.
Nonetheless, it can be found that the technical efficiency score obtained 
from these early developed models are a mean efficiency of the sample. Sub­
sequently, Jondrow et al. (1982) and Battese and Coelli (1988), proposed a 
method of estimating the value of Ui for each observation.
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SFA M odels for Panel D ata
In general, panel data has some advantages over the cross-section. For in­
stance, there will be a larger number of degree of freedom for the estimation. 
Besides, panel data allows the investigation of technical change and technical 
efficiency change over time. As Schmidt and Sickles (1984) pointed out, there 
are some difficulties of cross-sectional stochastic production frontier model, 
which can be overcome by panel data. They are outlined as follows.
• By MLE, technical inefficiency of a particular observation can be es­
timated but not consistently. Since the production function contains 
statistical noise as well as the technical inefficiency, the variance of the 
distribution of technical inefficiency conditional on the whole error term 
does not go to zero, even though the size of cross section increases.
Specific assumptions on the distribution of technical inefficiency (i.e. 
half-normal, exponential) are required for the MLE and the separation 
of technical inefficiency from statistical noise. The robustness of the 
results is not well documented.
• It may be incorrect to assume that inefficiency is independent of the 
regressors, as if a company realises its level of inefficiency, it might 
affect its input choices.
These problems, as argued in Schmidt and Sickles (1984), can be avoided 
when panel data become available. Firstly, suppose the panel data are for N  
companies and, T  periods of time. The technical inefficiency of a particular 
company can be estimated consistently as T —> oo; adding more observations
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on each company without adding more companies. Secondly, not all panel 
data estimation techniques require the strong assumptions on the distribu­
tion. Essentially, evidence of inefficiency can be found in constancy over time 
as well as in skewness. Finally, estimates of the parameters and of compa­
nies’ inefficiency can be obtained without the assumption of independence 
of the technical inefficiency from the regressors. Repeated observations on 
a particular company can also serve as a substitute for the independence 
assumption (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
There are several stochastic frontier models for panel data, which can be 
classified into two sub-groups. First is Time-Invariant Stochastic Production 
Frontier Models, as they allow technical efficiency to vary across companies 
but the efficiency is assumed to be constant throughout the time. The second 
group is more generalised, when technical efficiency is allowed to vary both 
across the company and time. Therefore the latter group is called Time- 
Varying Stochastic Production Frontier Models.
Firstly, consider a Cobb-Douglas production function with time-invariant 
technical efficiency for N  companies, T  periods:
ffi(mt) +  Pj In(Tjit) -h Vit -  Ui (5.64)
j
i = 1 , . . . ,  N ; t  = 1 , . . .  ,T.
At first, suppose the inefficiency effect term {ui) is treated as fixed, and 
assumed to be non-negative: rt* >  0 but there is no distributional assumption
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made on Ui. This is called a fixed-effect model—the simplest panel data 
model. As UiS are fixed, they become producer-specific intercept parameters 
to be estimated along with the /?„s. Equation 5.64, then, can be expressed 
as.
ln(î/it) =  Poi -j- ^  Pj \n{xjit) -f Vit (5.65)
3
Î =  1 , . . . ,  AT; t  =  1 , . . . ,  T
where, /?oi = Po — Ui are producer-specific intercepts. The estimation can be 
achieved in three ways as outlined in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). One of 
the three methods is using the within transformation, in which all data are
expressed in terms of deviations from companies’ means and the producer-
specific intercepts are recovered as means of companies ’residuals. After esti­
mation, Po is normalised,
Po =  m&x{Poi} (5.66)
and,
Ui = Po — Poi (5.67)
Producer-specific technical efficiency is,
TEi = exp{—Ui}; i = l , . . . , N  (5.68)
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It can be observed that in the fixed-effect model at least one company will 
be technically efficient and the efficiency scores of other companies will be 
measured relatively to the technically efficient company. This characteristic 
makes the fixed-effect model similar to the COLS. Even though the fixed- 
effect model is simple to implement, it has a serious drawback. The fixed 
effect UiS are aimed to capture the difference of time-invariant technical inef­
ficiency across the companies. However, they seem to capture also the effect 
of other factor (i.e. the regulatory environment), which are invariant but 
varied across companies (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). This drawback has 
motivated a development of random-effect time-invariant panel data models.
In the random-effect model, UjS are non-negative {ui > 0) and are as­
sumed to be randomly distributed with constant mean and variance. They 
are also assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressor and the random errors 
(ui). However, there is still no distributional assumption made upon them. 
The random-effect model can be written as.
ffi(z/i) — [P ~ E{ui)] -h ^ 2  f t  ^u{xjit) +  Uit — [ui — E{ui)]
3
— 00 f t  ^u{xjit) 4- Vit — u f  (5.69)
3
The model in Equation 5.69 can be estimated by the two-step generalised 
least squares (GLS). Comparing with the fixed-effect model, one of the ad­
vantage of the random-effect model is that it tends to separate the effect of 
time-invariant regressors from the inefficiency effect. However it is restricted
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with the assumption of Ui to be uncorrelated with the regressors, whereas 
the fixed-effect is not. So far it can be observed that both fixed-effect and 
random-effect model do not require the distributional assumption on the UiS. 
Nonetheless, if the distribution can be specified, the panel data model can 
be estimated using MLE. The procedure of MLE of panel data stochastic 
production firontier model is similar to those of cross-section model and the 
technique has been widely used. The models that use MLE are for instance 
P itt and Lee (1981).
P itt and Lee (1981) proposed three models modified from Aigner et al. 
(1977)’s half-normal stochastic frontier model for panel data : N  companies, 
T  periods of time, which generally can be expressed as
\n(yu) =  XitP +  Vit -  Uit (5.70)
z =  1, . . . ,  AT; t  =  1 , . . . ,  T
Where,
yit — an output of company at period,
Xit =  & 1 X K  vector of inputs and others appropriate variables associated 
with a suitable functional form,
P =  a A  X 1 parameter vector to be estimated.
Vit =  random errors, assumed to be i.i.d. and have N{0,al)  distribution, 
independent of UuS,
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Uit =  the technical inefficiency effects, assumed to be nonnegative and have 
half-normal distribution.
M odel 1 Uit = UiW t: this model is the time-invariant stochastic model.
M odel 2 E(uit,Uit) =  0; V z and for t  jtz { and E{uit, Uu) =  0 ; V z ^  Z, im­
plying that UitS are not correlated and none of the company inefficiency 
stays with it over time.
M odel 3 E{uit, ûu) =  and E{uu, uu) =  0 V; z 7  ^ /, implying that variance 
and covariance depend on time periods and allow to stay with the 
company.
The first two models were estimated using MLE. In contrast for Model 3, 
they adopted the Zellner (1962)’s seemingly unrelated regression since they 
argued that under the multivariate truncated normal distribution, MLE is 
computational intractible (Pitt and Lee, 1981). Many studies have extended 
from P itt and Lee (1981), including Schmidt and Sickles (1984) considering 
Model 1 to discuss the properties of the within GLS and MLE; Battese and 
Coelli (1988) modified Model 1 by following Stevenson (1980) with u%s as­
sumed to have the generalised truncated-normal distribution; Battese et al.
(1989) extending the model further to be able to accommodate the unbal­
anced panel data.
So far the literature are focussed on time-invariant model. However, as T 
becomes larger, it seems more unrealistic, since it can be expected that man­
agers would learn from their experience, so their technical efficiency would
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change in some persistent pattern over time (Coelli et ah, 1997). And this mo­
tivates the idea of time-varying efficiency models. The time-varying efficiency 
studies are for example, Kumbhakar (1990) suggesting the time-varying effi­
ciency model, which assumed that the inefficiency u^s are a function of time 
and can be expressed as.
Uit =  [1 +  exp(6t -h cr)] • Ui (5.71)
UiS are time-invariant inefficiency, which vary across companies, assumed to 
be half-normal distributed, b and c are parameters to be estimated. The 
model was suggested to be estimated by MLE.
Furthermore, Battese and Coelli (1992) proposed a time-varying efficiency 
model, which can accommodate unbalanced panel data. It is similar to the 
Kumbhakar (1990) in the sense that it is estimated by MLE; besides the tech­
nical inefficiency effects (u^s) also vary systematically with time. However, 
their u^s  are defined by
Uit =  {exp[-?y(( -  T)]}ui (5.72)
i = 1 , . . . ,  N ] t  = 1 , . . .  ,T
UiS are the time-invariant technical inefficiency assumed to have the gener­
alised truncated-normal distribution. However, this model has some limi­
tations. From Equation 5.72, it can be observed that for the company,
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the technical inefficiency effect of the early period is the product of technical 
inefficiency effect of the last period and the value of {exp[— —T)]}—which 
depends on the value of 77 and the difference between the present period and 
the last period: t — T. This implies that technical efficiency will either in­
crease or decrease at a decreasing rate (if 77 > 0), or decrease at an increasing 
rate (if 77 < 0), or remain constant (if 77 =  0). Besides, it is obvious that 
this model does not account for situations in which some companies may be 
relatively inefficient initially but become relatively more efficient in subse­
quent periods (Coelli et al., 1997). As apparently, the Uus are equal to the 
same exponential function, exp[—77(t — T)], of the corresponding company- 
specific inefficiency effect at the last period, which implies the ordering of 
the companies is the same at all time periods.
Another group of time-varying efficiency models has developed from the 
work of Schmidt and Sickles (1984), suggesting for panel data, the distri­
butional assumption on inefficiency effects might not be required as it is in 
Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992). This is because the param­
eters can be estimated using the traditional panel data methods of dummy 
variables (or within estimator)—similar to fixed-effect estimation, or error- 
components estimation. Following the idea, Cornwell et al. (1990) and Lee 
and Schmidt (1993) proposed the extended versions of the Schmidt and Sick­
les (1984)’s model, which can accommodate time-varying inefficiency effects. 
Cornwell et al. (1990)’s time-varying model assumed that the intercepts of 
each company at each period of time were a quadratic function of time with 
company-specific parameters. In contrast, Lee and Schmidt (1993) supposed
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that the technical inefficiency effects for each company at each time period 
{uit) are defined by the product of individual company and time effects. One 
advantage of these studies, comparing with Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese 
and Coelli (1992), is that they more flexible in the sense that they do not re­
quire the assumption of any special density function for the company-specific 
effects (Kalirajan and Shand, 1999). However, this benefit comes with the 
cost, as there are many more parameters required to be estimated (Coelh 
et al., 1997).
There is also another group of models, which tried to explain the ineffi­
ciency effects (uits) or sources of inefficiency. They seem to develop from P itt 
and Lee (1981), which suggested the sources of inefficiency can be examined 
by regressing the efficiency effects obtained from the stochastic frontier model 
upon the company-specific factors (i.e age, size and ownership of the com­
pany). This two-step technique is criticised for serious problems, as noted in 
Kumbhakar et al. (1991) as follows.
• Technical inefficiency may be correlated with the inputs, which is not 
compatible with the Jondrow et al. (1982) and causes the inconsistency.
• The OLS results in the second step may not be appropriate since tech­
nical inefficiency (the dependent variable) is one-sided.
• The meaning of the residual term in the second-step regression is not 
clear.
Responding to these problems, studies like Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and 
Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991), suggested cross-sectional stochastic mod-
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els, in which the inefficiency effects are defined by a set of deterministic 
company-specific factors. These models are estimated by one-step MLE. 
Furthermore, Battese and Coelli (1995) extended these studies to accommo­
date panel data. They assumed that u^s—technical inefficiency effects—are 
independently but not identically distributed non-negative random variable 
and obtained by truncation (at zero) of a^) distribution, where.
fJ'it = + Wit; j  =  1 ,2 , . . . ,  771. (5.73)
Denote that,
Zji =  a 1 X m vector of observable explanatory variables, whose values are 
fixed constant,
Ô =  a m X 1 unknown scalar parameter to be estimated, generally expected 
to include and intercept parameter.
Wit = the random variable defined by the truncation of the N{0, cr^ ) distri­
bution such that the point of truncation is —Zit<5, i.e., W^ >  —ZitS.
The model is estimated by MLE. The likelihood function^^ is parame- 
terised in terms of 7 , given that 7  =  cr /^cr  ^ where = [a  ^H- cr^ ]. The value 
of 7  are between zero and 1: 0 < 7  < 1. This relationship suggests that, 
if 7  equals zero [when =  0], the deviations from the frontier are entirely 
derived from random error. On contrary, if 7  equals one, all the deviations
^^ The likelihood function and its partial derivative with respect to the parameters of 
the model are presented in the appendix of Battese and Coelli (1993).
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are due to technical inefficiency. The technical efficiency of company in 
period t  is equal to,
TEit =  E[exp{-Uit\eit)] (5.74)
=  E[exp{-Zitô -  Wit\eit)]
where, eu — vu - uu- It can be observed from Equation 5.73 and Equation 5.74 
tha t the values of the environmental variables will have an inverse effect on 
the level of companies’ technical efficiency. In other words, the positive sign 
of the estimates of the environmental variables will systematically lower the 
value of technical inefficiency {uu)- In consequence, since TEu  is a function 
of , given that uu is a non-negative value, the lower the value of uu leads 
to a higher value of technical efficiency. It can be seen that Battese and 
Coelh (1995) is more generalised than the other model such as Kumbhakar
(1990) and Battese and Coelli (1992), in the sense that it allows the test of 
the influence of company-specific factors believed to have on efficiency, as 
well as the assessment of technical efficiency change and technical change 
over time.
5.4 P rod u ctiv ity  Change M easurem ent
As discussed in Section 5.2, overtime the production frontier can shift due 
to the change in productivity. In addition the causes of the change in pro­
ductivity come from several sources, for instance the change in efficiency
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or the change due to technological progress or even the exploitation of scale 
economies. This section, moving from the technical efficiency measures, aims 
to review how the change in productivity of producers can be measured.
Following Diewert (1992), productivity change of a company from the 
period to the period, assuming a single-input, single-output case, can be 
defined as.
“•■•-EH
where,
Vti Vs = the observed outputs produced by the company in the t*^  and the 
periods, respectively,
Xt, Xs = the inputs used by the company in the and the periods, 
respectively.
Therefore,
Vt/Vs = the output growth rate going from period s to  ^ (also called a 
quantity index of outputs),
xt/xg = the corresponding input growth rate going from period s to t (also 
called a quantity index of inputs).
If > 1, the output growth rate is greater than the input growth rate
going from the period to the t^  ^ period. In other words the company
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has productivity improvement during the two years. However, if =  1, it 
imphes that the productivity of the company remains constant. On contrary 
ag^ t < 1 indicates that the output growth rate is less than the input growth 
rate going from the period to the period or the company experiences 
a productivity decline.
As outhned in Section 5.2, the productivity change can be attributed to 
three main factors. The first two initial factors of the change in productivity 
are the shift in production technology due to the magnitude of neutral techni­
cal change and the biases of technical change and the structure of technology 
as a result of the exploitation of scale economies (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 
2000). In addition, when there is a presence of inefficiency, the change in 
efficiency (either the improvement or the decline) becomes another source 
of the productivity change. The effects of these factors on the change in 
productivity can be presented as follows.
Suppose that the company is technically inefficient, following the discus­
sion and notations in Coelli et al. (1997), its observed output is denoted 
as.
3/, == 0 A, <: i  (5.7())
where, ft{xt) is its production function at the period. The value of 
implies that the company produces less than the maximum feasible output 
and hence is technically inefficient in the period. Substitute Equation
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5.76 in Equation 5.75, it can be rewritten as.
a! ^ K w / j -
Assume that the quantity of input usage is fixed: Xg =  Xt = x*, then Equation
5.77 becomes.
“  a! Im
where, the first ratio represents the effect of change in technical efficiency 
on productivity change, and the second ratio represents the technical change 
effect
Now suppose that the level of inputs are different as =  KXg. Besides it 
is assumed that the production function is homogenous of degree e{t), at Xt 
in t*^  period. Equation 5.77 becomes.
Ag fs\^s)
where, the first ratio is the technical efficiency change and the middle ratio 
shows the effect of a change in scale of operation. The last ratio represents the 
technical change effect. The scale effect itself is composed of two components:
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K is the scale of operation, and e{f) represents the returns to scale parameter. 
Therefore, if constant returns to scale (CRS) is presented, the scale effect is 
unity.
To measure the change in productivity, it can be undertaken by two 
main approaches. First is by Index Number Techniques—a mathematics ap­
proaches, including the Fisher (1923) and Tdrnqvist Indexes, [ see i.e Diew­
ert (1992) and Coelli et al. (1997) for reviews on Index Number Techniques]. 
These techniques require quantity and price information, as well as assump­
tions concerning the structure of technology and the behaviour of the com­
pany; even though, they do not require any estimation. The main drawback 
of the productivity change obtained by the Index Number Techniques is that 
it cannot be decomposed into the sources of the change, as presented in the 
equations above.
Another approach for measuring the change in productivity is the Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI). In contrast to the index number techniques, MPI 
does not require the price information or the technological and behavioral 
assumptions; even though, some estimations are needed. One advantage of 
MPI is that, unlike the index number techniques, the sources of the change in 
productivity can be examined. Regarding this advantage, MPI is chosen for 
measuring the change in productivity in this thesis. MPI can be estimated by 
two main techniques: non-parametric (DEA-like) or parametric (i.e. SFA- 
like) techniques. In the next section, the general concept of MPI will be 
shown as well as the techniques for calculating MPI—both the DEA-like and 
the parametric approaches. For the reviews on productivity measurement,
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see i.e Diewert (1992), Grosskopf (1993), Coelli et al. (1997) and Kumbhakar 
and Lovell (2000).
5.4.1 Malmquist Productivity Index
Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) was developed from the original work of 
Malmquist (1953) by Caves et al. (1982a) and Caves et al. (1982b). Basically, 
MPI captures the productivity change between two observations performing 
at two different time periods using the concept of distance function and 
Parrel’s technical efficiency. Therefore, hke the efficiency measures, MPI can 
be estimated in either output or input orientation. However in this section, 
only the output-oriented MPI will be considered.
For simplicity, assume it is a single-input, single-output case. For the 
period, a output distance function for a given output vector y and input 
vector X can be defined as,
dl{y,x) = m in {y :{y /y L ,x )e S ^ } .  (5.80)
This implies that dl(x ,y) is the smallest factor by which output needs to 
be deflated so as to be feasible with a given input vector x  under the 
technology. Using the output distance function in Equation 5.80, Caves et al. 
(1982b) suggested that the Malmquist output index based on technology s 
can be defined as.
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Vs, Xt, yt) =  ■ (5.81)
al{xt,yt)
Suppose that the company is technically efficient: dl{xs,ys) = 1, so that,
(5.82)
min^{/i : (yt//^, Xt) € 5*}
=  max{p : (p2/t,Xt) € S^} (5.84)
p
Hence, ml{xs, 3/g,Tt,i/() is the maximum inflation factor such that the deflated 
output of the company in the period, and the input, Xt, is just
on the production surface of the technology. Prom the perspective of 
technology, if the company in the period has higher productivity than the 
company in the period, then m®(*) >  1.
Assuming the constant returns to scale (CRS)^^, Fare et al. (1994) showed 
how MPI suggested by Caves et al. (1982b) can be decomposed into efficiency 
change and technical change components. Following Fare et al. (1994), the 
MPI between the and the periods when s is the base year, can be 
expressed as.
Assumed that there is no scale effect, when CRS is presented, (see the previous sec­
tion).
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m i
The index can be decomposed into,
where, the efficiency change effect {T E A )  is.
T E A  = (5,87)
diiVs^Xs)
It is also referred to as catching-up effect, since it measures the degree that 
the company accomphshes for improving its efficiency. The technical change 
effect (TA) is.
TA -  X (K QQ',
which is also called frontier-shift effect, as it reflects the change in the effi­
cient frontier between the two periods. In addition, from Equation 5.86, if 
m j(') >  1, it implies that the improvement in productivity, whereas mj(-) < 1 
indicates the decline in productivity during the s^  ^ and the period.
However, it should be noted that MPI deflned in Caves et al. (1982b) does
168
not require the assumption on CRS. Despite the argument from Crifell-Tatje 
and Lovell (1995) that MPI provides an accurate measure of productivity 
change when CRS exists in both periods and that by allowing variable returns 
to scale (VRS) MPI provides systematically biased measure of productivity 
change, Fore et al. (1994) concluded that besides the two effects (efficiency 
change and technical change), MPI can be decomposed further into including 
the scale efficiency effect. Following Fare et al. (1994), when the scale effect 
is presented. Equation 5.86 becomes.
m l(xs,ys,X t,yt\C R S) =  T E A vrs x T A vrs S C  (5.89)
where, T E A v r s  and T A v r s  are the efficiency change and technical change 
effects derived from the VRS frontier, respectively, and can be expressed as.
-  I èSH'
rp^  ,dl(ys,Xs\VRS) dl{yt,xt\VRS)p/2 .  ,
-  W y , , x A V R S )  d l i y , , x , \ V R S Ÿ  ’
and, SC  is the scale effect, defined as.
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where, é^(yt,Xt\CRS) = Sl{xt,yt) x é^{yt,Xt\VRS). In the next two sec­
tions, two techniques: the DEA-like and the parametric approaches will be 
presented.
5.4.2 DEA-like Malmquist Productivity Index
Following Fare et al. (1994), MPI can be calculated using DEA-like ap­
proach, as follows. To calculate the output-oriented MPI for the company 
between the and the period, six following VRS linear programming 
(LPo) problems needed to be solved:
[(P^{yit,Xit\VRS)]  ^ = m a x 0  (5.93)
<j),\
s.t. —(j>yit +  YfA > 0  
Xit — Xf A >  0
N l'A  =  1
A > 0
[dl{yis,Xis\VRS)]  ^ =  m axÿ (5.94)4>,\
s.t. —<f>yis +  YgA > 0  
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Xis — XgA > 0
Nl'A = 1
A > 0
[dl{yis,Xis\VRS)]  ^ =max(f) (5.95)
4>,x
s.t.  — 0 ?/i5 +  Y t A  > 0
Xis ~  X(A >  0
Nl'A = 1
A > 0
[dl{yit,Xit\VRS)]  ^ =max(/) (5.96)4>,\
s.t.  — 0 7 / i f +  Y ^ A  > 0
Xit ~  XgA > 0
Nl'A = 1
A > 0
[di{yit,Xit\CRS)]-^ =max0 (5.97)
(/>,A
S.t. —07/it-|-YfA ^0
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Xit ~  X(A >  0
A > 0
[dl(yis,Xis\CRS)]  ^ = m a x 0  (5.98)<^,A
S.t. —07/is+ YgA ^  0
X i s  ~  XgA >  0
A > 0
The hnear programming problems in Equation 5.93 and Equation 5.94 solve 
for the output distance function of observations from their own corresponding 
VRS frontiers. On the contrary, Equation 5.95 and Equation 5.96 compare 
the observations to the VRS frontier from different time period. Equation 
5.97 and Equation 5.98 calculate the output distance function of observation 
from its own corresponding CRS frontier, for the estimation of the effect 
of scale economies. Finally it is noted that these six linear programming 
problems must be solved repeatedly for each company.
5.4.3 Parametric Malmquist Productivity Index
In addition to the DEA-like technique, MPI can be estimated by econometric 
techniques as follows. Consider a stochastic production frontier, assuming a 
company use m  inputs (x) to produce a single output (?/),
ln(7/it) =  /(x it, t; P) -f- Vit -  Uit; i =  1 , . . . ,  Y; t =  1 , . . . ,  T  (5.99)
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where,
Pit = an output of the company at the period,
Xit =  a 1 X m vector of inputs and other explanatory variables associated 
with the company at the period
/(•) =  a suitable functional form (i.e Cobb-Douglas, Translog),
P =  a AT X 1 vector of parameters to be estimated,
t  = a. time trend serving as a proxy for technical change, not restricted to 
be neutral with respect to the inputs^^.
Vit = random errors assumed to be z.z.d and have iV(0, crl) and independently 
distributed of the uus.
Uit = technical inefficiency effects.
Use either one of SFA models for panel data presented in Section 5.3.3 
to estimate technical efficiency of the company at each period. Technical 
efficiency of the company at the period can be defined as.
TEit — -Ë^ [gxp(—Tiitjeit)]; cu — Vu — Ur . (5.100)
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), a rate of technical change at the 
period is.
^^ For neutral technical change, it is required f{x.it,t]P) = A{t) • g{x.u;P)
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T A  =  (5.101)
Therefore, the rate of technical change between the period and the 
period of the company can be estimated by the geometric means, which 
can be expressed as,
t a , . , , ,  =  X (5.102)
where, TA(^ s,t-,i) ^  0- TA(^ s,t-,i) > 0 represents the shift up of the production 
frontier or technological progress; TA(^ s,t-,i) < 0 implies the shift down of the 
frontier and TA(^ s,t-,i) =  0 means the frontier remains unchanged.
In addition, a rate of change in technical efficiency can be defined as.
diL
== (5T03)
From Equation 5.100, TEu  =
\r T E u =  ~Uif
Therefore,
™  -  - I
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d ln T E
dt
As a result, the rate of change in technical efficiency between the period 
and the period of the company is.
T E A T  Ejt — T  Ejs
%
TEu
TEi.. - 1, (5.105)
where, TEA(^s,t-,i) ^  0. Similarly, TEA(^g f^,i) > 0 implies the improvement in 
technical efficiency over time; TEA^s,t-,i) < 0 indicates the decline in technical 
efficiency over time and TEA(^s,t-,i) = 0 means the level of technical efficiency 
of the company remains unchanged.
For the scale economies effect, it can be estimated by,
5 C  =  ( e - l ) y ; ( ^ ) i „  (5.106)
where =  Sn(x, t\P) =  X n fn {^ ,t;P )/f{x ,t;P ), n = 1 , . . .  are elasticities
of output with respect to each of the inputs, e =  e(x, t; P) — £n(x, t; p) ><
1 indicates returns to scale characterising the production frontier (Kumb­
hakar and Lovell, 2000). (c -- 1) captures the departure from CRS frontier. 
That means when CRS is presented, (e — 1) =  0, there is no effect of scale 
economies on the change in productivity. As a result, the contribution of the 
scale effect on the change in productivity between the period and the
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period of the company can be expressed as the means of,
=  9 (5.107)2
n
Taking all effects into account, the rate of productivity change {TFPsu-iY^ 
between the period and the period of the z*^  company is the sum of 
all three effects, which can be written as.
TFPsu,i — TA(^ s,t-,i) +  TEA( s^,t]i) +  SCA(^ s,t-,i) (5.108)
5.5 Justification  for Preferred Techniques
5.5.1 Comparison of the techniques
In this chapter, the techniques for measuring technical efficiency, both para­
metric and non-parametric techniques, have been reviewed. They all aim to 
estimate the best-practiced frontier and technical efficiency scores; therefore 
these techniques can also be referred to as the best-pmctice benchmarking 
techniques.
The main technique in the non-parametric approach is DBA. It uses the 
linear-programming technique to construct a piece-wise efficient frontier and 
calculate relative efficiency scores. Compared to the parametric approaches, 
DBA has many advantages. The main advantages of DBA are that no spec-
i^where, TFP  =  d{l/TFP)/dt.
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ification of functional form of production function is required either or the 
restriction on the distributional assumption on company-specific inefficiency 
effect Uit. In addition, the technique can accommodate multiple inputs and 
multiple outputs simultaneously (Kalirajan and Shand, 1999). Besides DBA 
can account for the factors beyond the control of the companies but affect 
their efficiency (environmental variables), either directly as inputs or outputs 
or via the second stage regression (Ofgem, 2003) [see Section 5.3.2]. Not 
only these, DBA also allows the efficiency scores to be decomposed into pure 
technical efficiency and scale efficiency. Furthermore, it can be the most con­
servative in its data requirements (only the relevant inputs and outputs). As 
a result DBA has frequently been used by regulators in practice, especially 
in initial benchmarking exercises (Weyman-Jones, 2003), [see Jamasb and 
Pollitt (2001) for an extensive survey on benchmarking techniques employed 
by regulators of electricity industry].
Nevertheless, DBA has some drawbacks. Since DBA is a deterministic 
approach, all deviations from the frontier are attributed to inefficiency, which 
implies that the technique ignores the possibility of random shocks. Besides, 
given that its frontier is constructed from the observed data, DBA efficiency 
scores are sensitive to the sample size (Ofgem, 2003; Sena, 2003; Weyman- 
Jones, 2003). In small samples, DBA is sensitive to the difference between the 
number of companies and the sum of inputs and outputs. This problem might 
result in many companies appearing to be efficient, when actually they are not 
(Kalirajan and Shand, 1999) or as argued in Jamasb and Pollitt (2001) that 
the number of companies appeared on the frontier tend to increase with the
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number of inputs and output variables. Another main concern about DEA is 
with regard to the lack of statistical inference in DEA and hence the analysis 
seems to heavily rely on the choice of inputs and outputs variables (Ofgem, 
2003). That means choosing the correct choice of variables is critical. In 
addition, without statistical underpinning, the noise or uncertainties around 
the DEA estimates can lead to the biased results. However, as discussed 
earlier the recent development of bootstrapping technique adds the sensitivity 
analysis to DEA and seems to ease the concern regarding the sampling noise, 
to some extent.
The parametric approaches, in contrast, tend to use econometric tech­
niques to estimate the efficient frontier and efficiency scores. Within this 
group, the techniques can be separated into two sub-groups, based on the 
type of frontier. One is the deterministic frontier techniques. Their repre­
sentative is such as COLS. Like DEA, the frontiers are deterministic, which 
means that all deviations from the frontier are believed to be derived from 
inefficiency and hence the techniques neglect the possibility of random shocks 
and measurement errors. In particular, COLS efficiency scores are heavily 
dependent on the position of the single most efficient company in the sam­
ple [see Section 5.3.3]. Nevertheless, despite these drawbacks, it should be 
noted that COLS is still used in the latest UK Electricity Distribution Price 
Review—but for a one-year cross-section analysis. Moreover, COLS also has 
some attractive characteristics. First it is relatively easy to implement. In 
addition, unlike DEA, it provides statistical inferences. Besides, even though 
COLS requires the assumption on the functional form of production function.
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it does not require the distributional assumption on the company-specific in­
efficiency effects UitS, like SFA does.
The other group in the parametric approach is stochastic frontier analy­
sis (SFA). Unlike both DEA and the deterministic frontier techniques, SFA 
accounts for the random shocks and measurement errors. Therefore com­
pared with COLS, it reduces refiance on the position of single efficient com­
pany Ofgem (2003). In addition, as using econometric techniques, the var­
ious hypotheses concerning modelling the technology and characteristics of 
company-specific efficiency measures can be statistically tested (Kalirajan 
and Shand, 1999). However, the technique still has some drawbacks. Firstly, 
like the deterministic techniques, the specification of the production function 
is needed. Besides as most of SFA models use MLE, they are also required 
the specification of the distributional assumption on the company-specific 
inefficiency effect UuS, which might result in some specification errors. Com­
pared with COLS, SFA is more complicated to implement. There are many 
parameters to be estimated, particularly when using panel data (Sena, 2003). 
More reviews on the comparison of methods can be found in for instance, 
IPART (1999), Kalirajan and Shand (1999), Dte (2000), Jamasb and Pollitt 
(2001), and Ofgem (2003).
In sum, it seems that when the information on the technology of compa­
nies production are weak, DEA seems to be more appropriated (Kalirajan 
and Shand, 1999; Weyman-Jones, 2003), which might be the reason why DEA 
has been widely used by regulators across the world. On contrary, to obtain 
the information on scale and substitution possibilities, SFA is more appro­
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priate. Despite the the differences in advantages and drawbacks of these 
techniques, there is no single technique strictly preferable to the others. Be­
sides, it seems that each technique has its own advantages and disadvantages 
which compensate each other. Ofgem (2003) and Murillo-Zamorano (2004) 
suggested that the appropriate measure is depended on the data to be applied 
to and the characteristics of the industry, while Sena (2003) recommended 
that they could be used jointly as they provide complementary information.
5.5.2 Preferred Techniques
In this thesis, as mentioned in Chapter 1, technical efficiency of PTT—the 
Thai integrated gas monopoly—is to be measured against those of another 
three integrated gas monopolies (Petronas, operating in Malaüysia; Osaka 
Gas, operating in Japan; and British Gas, operating in the UK) over thir­
teen years—from 1984/85 thru 1996/97. The data is a panel comprising of 
the four companies over the thirteen-year period. Therefore, the appropriate 
technique for measuring technical efficiency of these gas companies, firstly has 
to be able to accommodate a panel data. Secondly, since the studied compa­
nies were operating in different countries, different environments, it can be 
assumed that during those years, the companies faced some random shocks, 
which may vary from-company-to-company. As a result, the preferred tech­
nique should be able to accommodate the company-specific environmental 
variables.
Taking all the strengths and limitation of the techniques, discussed in the 
previous section, into account, firstly, the parametric group is considered,
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since the validity of the specification of the model can be tested, while the 
non-parametric technique, DEA in particular, cannot. In the parametric 
group, stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) seems to be more preferable than the 
deterministic techniques. It is because SFA accounts for the random shocks, 
whereas the deterministic techniques cannot. Then considering among the 
SFA model for panel data, the model of Battese and Coelli (1995) is chosen. 
The main reason is that the model is more flexible than the other models. 
While the others, for instance Kumbhakar (1990) and Battese and Coelli 
(1992) specified that the technical inefficiency effect {uu) is a time-varying 
function. In addition, Battese and Coelli (1995) allows a researcher to include 
any factors and test the influence of these company-specific factors believed 
to have on efficiency as well as the assessment of technical efficiency change 
and technical change over time.
Nonetheless, despite the advantages that SFA can provide statistic infor­
mation: the validity of the specification of the model, the significance of vari­
able, it should be noted that there is still possibihty of the mis-specification. 
To test the robustness of the result, DEA is undertaken. Civen that the cross 
section of the data set is limited, it is unlikely to be able to run DEA on this 
data set in the traditional way^^. Instead, following the technique employed
is necessary to be noted that traditionally most of the DEA applications have used 
cross section data. Even though their data sets were a panel, DEA was likely to be run 
repeatedly for every years of the data set. It is because that, giving there is technological 
changes overtime, if the data are pooled and the time-series aspect has been ignored, it 
seems like it is assumed that there is no technological change during the studied period. 
However, since there is no technical limitation that will restrict DEA only the cross section 
data, there are some studies, which did not apphed DEA on cross section data. Those 
are for instance, Boussofiane et al. (1997), who apphed DEA on time-series data of nine 
privatised UK companies and Parker and Wu (1998) who applied DEA on a panel data 
for seven steel companies operating in different countries over twenty-five year period.
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by Parker and Wu (1998), the time-series aspect is ignored, all data are 
pooled and treated as one cross section. The information on returns to scale, 
for instance, obtained from the SFA will be used to specify the model in DEA. 
Moreover, regarding the environmental variables, in this thesis, they will be 
included in the DEA model as a non-discretionary input. Furthermore, in 
response to the criticism on the lack of statistical inference in DEA, boot­
strapping is applied to the DEA technical efficiency. Using the bootstrapping 
procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson (2004), the technique aims to add 
statistical information to the non-parametric DEA technical efficiency scores.
As for the measure of the change in productivity over the thirteen-year 
period, it is likely that only SFA-like MPI, using the model of Battese and 
Coelli (1995), can be undertaken, whereas for DEA it is not technically pos­
sible. It is because, as discussed earher, the cross section of the data set is 
too small to run DEA. Besides, the technique used in Parker and Wu (1998) 
is not applicable here, as the technique ignores the time-series aspect, which 
is necessary for measuring the change in productivity over the thirteen years.
5.5.3 Softwares used for DEA, bootstrapped DEA and 
SFA
D EA
In this thesis, DEA is undertaken by Excel program written by the author 
following the guideline in Zhu (2003), as well as a software called Efficiency 
Measurement System (EMS) for the cross-checking. Even though there are
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several available software for DEA including DEAP^^, EMS is chosen be­
cause the software can accommodate environmental variables, as a non- 
discretionary input or output, while DEAP  cannot. The EMS software can 
be obtained from http://www.wiso.uni-dortmund.de/lsfg/or/scheel/ems/'^’^ .
B ootstrapped D EA
As mentioned in Section 5.5.2, in this study, bootstrapping is employed and 
applied to the DEA efficiency scores in order to provide the information on 
the statistical inference of the DEA technical efficiency scores. Bootstrapping 
DEA is undertaken by the modified version of the self-written Excel software 
for the DEA in the previous section. The modification involves adding the 
bootstrapping procedure suggested by Simar and Wilson presented in Simar 
and Wilson (2004), using VBA code. The VBA code for bootstrapping can 
be found in Appendix A.
SFA
For SFA, estimations for both technical efficiency and the change in produc­
tivity are undertaken by the software FRONTIER  version 4.1^ ®. More detail 
on the software can be found in Coelli (1996b) and also in the software review 
by Drinkwater and Harris (1999).
®^The software can be obtained from http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/deap.htm 
accessed at 16 February 2005. More details on the software can be found in Coelli (1996a).
^^Access at 16 February 2005.
®^The software can be obtained from http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/cepa/frontier.htm 
free of charge, accessed at 16 February 2005
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5.6 Summciry and C onclusion
In this chapter, the concepts of efficiency and productivity change are pre­
sented. Several techniques for measuring technical efficiency are also re­
viewed. It shows that apart from classifying the techniques by output- or 
input-distance functions, there are two groups of techniques. First is the 
non-parametric technique, mainly represented by Data Envelopment Analy­
sis (DEA). The other group is the parametric techniques. One of the well- 
known technique in the latter group is Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). 
Comparing between these two techniques, it can be seen that both have dif­
ferent strengths and weaknesses. In addition, from the discussion in Section 
5.5.1, there is no measure strictly more preferable than the other. Besides the 
strengths and weaknesses of these two techniques, they tend to compensate 
each other.
Therefore, as explained in Section 5.5.2, in this thesis, two techniques 
will be employed: one is DEA from the non-parametric group, the other 
is SFA from the parametric group, using the model of Battese and Coelli 
(1995). Both techniques will be applied on the same data set for cross­
checking purpose. In addition, in response to the criticism on the lack of 
statistical inference of DEA, the bootstrapping is applied to the DEA to pro­
vide some statistic information of the technical efficiency scores. Moreover, 
as for the change in productivity, the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) 
is employed. However, due to hmited cross section data, only the SFA-like 
technique will be used to estimated MPI.
Following the data specification presented in Chapter 4, in this thesis, it
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is assumed that gas companies use two inputs (numbers of employees and 
lengths of pipehne) to produce a single output (total amounts of gas sold). 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the gas companies associated with another 
three environmental variables, including the concentration of the gas market, 
time and the ownership of the gas companies. Given the specification of 
Battese and Coelli (1995) as shown in Section 5.3.3, these environmental 
variables can be included in the model naturally in the SFA model. On 
contrary, for DEA, these environmental variables are included in the model 
as a non-discretionary input. In the next three chapters, these techniques are 
employed to measured technical efficiency and the change in productivity of 
PTT. The detail of each analysis and its results will be presented and also 
discussed, respectively.
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Chapter 6
Technical Efficiency in the Thai 
GSI: Output-oriented Approach
6.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to examine technical efficiency of the Thai GSI through 
P T T ’s performance during the period 1984/85-1996/97. As described in 
Chapter 2, the Thai GSI has been integrated and monopolised by PTT—a 
state-owned company; hence there is no other local gas company to be com­
pared with PTT. Therefore to assess its technical efficiency, an international 
comparison is required. Consequently, in this chapter, PT T ’s technical effi­
ciency is measured against those of another three integrated gas monopolies: 
Petronas, Osaka Gas and British Gas.
Given the monopoly status of the four integrated gas companies during 
the period studied, in this chapter, it is assumed that the companies were able 
to control the amount of output. In other words, with a protected monopoly
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status, it might be possible that the gas companies ignore some demand on 
gas that are in remote area far from the existing pipeline network; instead, 
they concentrate on expanding the sale from the demand located around 
the pipehne. Furthermore, focussing on PTT, as argued in Chapter 2 under 
the present circumstance, with the monopolistic power in the GSI and its 
influence in the petroleum products market, PTT might be able to control 
its output, [see Section 2.6 of Chapter 2]. In this case, it can be argued that 
the gas companies tend to maximise their output given a amount of inputs, 
which is reasonable, when huge lump-sum investments are required for the 
new pipeline. Therefore, following the assumption that the monopolies have 
power to control the output, the analyses in this chapter will be output- 
oriented.
Following the data specification presented in Chapter 4, these gas compa­
nies are assumed to be associated with two inputs and a single output. The 
inputs are number of employees and length of pipeline (km), while the out­
put is amount of total gas sold (therms). Besides, it is assumed tha t there 
are three environmental variables that might affect the companies’ techni­
cal efficiency. These are (1) time aiming to capture technical progress, (2) 
concentration of the gas market and finally (3) ownership of the company.
In this chapter, two techniques, including Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
(SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), are employed. The first anal­
ysis is SFA adopting the model of Battese and Coelli (1995). The technique is 
applied on a balanced panel data for the four gas companies for the thirteen- 
year period. Since SFA is a parametric technique, it can be expected that
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the results will provide information on returns to scale. The property on 
returns to scale observed in the SFA results will be used to help specify the 
DEA model. For DEA, the technique used here follows the technique used in 
Parker and Wu (1998), which ignored the time-series aspect and treated the 
all observations as one cross section. As a result, an output-oriented DEA is 
applied on the same data set as of SFA—the balanced panel data for the four 
companies for the thirteen-year period subject to the constraint on returns to 
scale accordance with the SFA results. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 
5, in response to the criticism on the lack of statistical interference in DEA, 
bootstrapping is applied to the DEA, following the procedure suggested by 
Simar and Wilson (2004) [see Section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5].
In the next section, the model specification for both SFA and DEA will be 
presented. Then in Section 6.3, the results of SFA, DEA and bootstrapped 
DEA will be shown and discussed. Finally, Section 6.4 summarises and 
concludes.
6.2 M odel Specification for Integrated  Gas 
Supply Industries
6.2.1 SFA Specification
As mentioned, it is assumed that the integrated gas supply industries or 
more specifically the four integrated gas companies are associated with two 
main inputs (number of employees and length of pipeline) and a single out­
put (total gas sold). Measuring output-oriented technical efficiency in the
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single-output multiple-input case can therefore be undertaken by estimat­
ing a production function model. [See Chapter 5.] Adopting Battese and 
Coelli (1995) and assuming Cobb-Douglas technology^, a two-input, one- 
output stochastic production function model with Cobb-Douglas technology 
and non-neutral technical change can be written as
\n.(SALEit) — Pq +  ^K\ii{Kit) (6.1)
+/^Lt ln(Lit) • t  +  Pki In(Ait) • t  -f H- Vit ~  Uu
where,
SALEit =  volume of total gas sold (therms) of the company at the t^  ^
period,
Ps = unknown parameters be estimated,
Lit = number of employees of the company at the t^^ period.
Kit =  length of pipeline (km) of the company at the period.
Vit =  random error, i.i.d, iV(0,cr^),
Uit = technical inefficiency effects; N(fiit,cr^). 
and.
^It is noted that despite the discussion on the techniques in Chapter 5 focussed on 
Translog technology; here the Cobb-Douglas technology is assumed given the limited num­
ber of degrees of freedom.
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4fJ'it — 0^ +  ^s t r u c t S T R U C T it +  ^   ^^ jtd j ' t  +  ^s t a t e D s t a t e u  (6 .2 )
3=1
where,
ST RU CTit = concentration of gas market faced by the company at the 
period,
X)t=i ^jtdj • t  = time trend of each company, 
di
=  1, if the company is PTT; 
— 0, otherwise.
d2
d3
d.
=  1, if the company is Petronas;
=  0, otherwise,
=  1, if the company is Osaka Gas; 
=  0, otherwise,
=  1, if the company is British Gas; 
=  0, otherwise.
=  1, if the company is state-owned;
D  STATE
=  0, otherwise,
i =  1, ' -, 4 (1 =  PTT, 2 =  Petronas, 3 =  Osaka Gas, 4 =  British Gas) 
t  =  1 ,2 , ' . .  ,13 (1984/85 - 1996/97)
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and technical efficiency of the i*'^  company at the period (TEit),
TEit = E{exp{-Uit\eit)] eu =  Vu - u u  (6.3)
Equation 6.2 imphes that a company’s technical efficiency can be affected 
by three environmental variables. Firstly technical efficiency might be influ­
enced by the concentration of the gas market (STRU C T), in the sense that 
for those companies like PTT and Petronas, where the majority of gas is 
consumed by a few huge customers such as power plants^, the companies are 
required to invest in a relatively small amount of pipeline compared with the 
amount of gas sold. In contrast, for gas companies like British Gas or Osaka 
Gas, majority of their gas is served to numerous small consumers. W ith this 
type of gas market, the companies are required to invest in a large amount 
of pipeline and labour force to operate and maintain the network, compared 
with the amount of gas sold. Comparing the performance of companies fac­
ing two different types of market, it is possible that the companies facing the 
highly concentrated gas market would appear to be more technically efficient 
that those facing less concentrated market, [see the discussion in Section 4.2.3 
in Chapter 4]. Therefore, it is expected a-priori that a more concentrated 
gas market will generally increase (decrease) the level of companies’ technical 
efficiency (inefficiency). In consequence, it is expected that S s t r u c t  will be 
negative. Also in the general model, outhned above, a dummy variable for 
state ownership ( E s t a t e )  is included to examine whether ownership has an
S^ee Chapter 2 for discussion on the pattern of gas utilisation in Thailand.
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effect on companies’ technical inefficiency. Arguably a company that is under 
state ownership is more hkely to be inefficient compared to one in the private 
sector given the effects of share holder pressure, etc. Hence, it is expected 
a-priori that state ownership will generally decrease (increase) the level of 
companies’ technical efficiency (inefficiency). Therefore it is expected that 
that will be positive. Finally, an allowance is made for the technical
inefficiency to be affected over time, but varying from-company-to-company.
This formulation allows for four statistical tests to be undertaken, in 
order to test the vahdity of the preferred model specification: (I) tests the 
null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (CRS) with non-neutral technical 
change by imposing the restriction P lA P k-^P li+ P k i = 1; (H) tests the null 
hypothesis of Hicks neutral technical change by imposing the restriction P u = 
P k i  = 0; (HI) tests the null hypothesis of CRS with Hicks neutral technical 
change by imposing the restrictions P l + P k  =  1, and Put+PKtt = 0; and (IV) 
tests the null hypothesis of no technical inefficiency in the industry, =  0, so
that the estimated model collapses to the OLS model, achieved by imposing 
the restriction 7  =  =  ^ s tr u c t  = du = 621 =  — E sta te  =  0.
As a result, the general model and these imposed restricted models are all 
estimated using the program FRONTIER version 4.1. The results of the 
preferred model will be presented in Section 6.3.1.
In addition, from the SFA results, the estimates can be used to calculate 
the elasticity of input and an average rate of technical change as follows.
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Labour elasticity  (cl)
Consider a stochastic production frontier,
y =  f {K,  L, t] P) • exp{v -  u} (6.4)
Where,
y = the scalar output of a producer,
L ,K  = the scalar inputs of the producer,
P =  parameter vector to be estimated,
t  =  a time trend serving as a proxy to capture technical change, 
u =  a random error 
u =  technical inefficiency effect,
Civen that.
Therefore, differentiating Equation 6.1 with respect to ln(L), we get
L^ =  Pl -^  Put- (6.6)
It can be observed that in this case the labour elasticity is time (but not 
company) specific.
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C ap ita l e lastic ity  (s%) 
Given that,
differentiating Equation 6.1 with respect to ln(A), we get
=  Pk  +  p K tt  (6.8)
Similar to the labour elasticity, it is apparent that in this case the capital 
elasticity is time (but not company) specific.
R a te  o f Technical C hange (TA)
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the rate of technical change can be 
expressed as;
=  (6.9)
differentiating Equation 6.1 with respect to t, we get.
TA — Pu In(Tjf) H- Pki In(Ajf) +  Pt (6.10)
Equation 6.10 shows that the rate of technical change is both time and com­
pany specific, unless there is Hicks neutral technical change, where p u  =
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Pm  =  0.
6.2.2 DEA Specification
Following the technique presented in Parker and Wu (1998), which ignored 
the time-series aspect, each observation in the panel will be treated as an 
individual D M U  in one cross section. Therefore, in this case of a balanced 
panel data for four gas companies for thirteen periods, it means that there 
will be 52 DM Us in total. Similar to the data specification in SFA, it is 
assumed that these integrated gas companies used two inputs (number of 
employees and lengths of pipeline) to produce a single output (volume of 
total gas sold), with three environmental variables: concentration of the gas 
market, time trend and company’s ownership.
In addition, as mentioned earlier, the property on the returns to scale of 
the companies observed in the SFA result will be used to help specify the DEA 
model in this analysis. For instance, suppose that SFA finds that the gas com­
panies faced increasing return to scale (1RS), the constraint of non-decreasing 
returns to scale (NDRS), which is equivalent to 1RS, will be imposed in the 
DEA model. And vice versa, if SFA finds decreasing returns to scale (DRS), 
the constraint of non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS), which is equiva­
lent to DRS, will be imposed in the DEA model. Furthermore, the three 
environmental variables will be included in the DEA as non-discretionary 
inputs, which is the second group of methods described in Section 5.3.2 of 
Chapter 5, following the techniques adopted by many previous studies on 
efficiency in gas industries. Given all these statistic information that will be
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obtained from SFA results, the output-oriented DEA model in Equation 5.18 
in Chapter 5 will be modified accordingly, as shown in Section 6.3.2.
Extending from the DEA, in response to the lack of statistical inferences 
in the technique, bootstrapping is applied to DEA to provide statistical con­
fidence intervals to the DEA efficiency scores. The bootstrapping is under­
taken using the Simar and Wilson’ s suggested procedures, as outhned in 
Chapter 5. The bootstrapped DEA results wifi be shown in Section 6.3.4.
6.3 R esu lts and D iscussions
6.3.1 Comparative Technical Efficiency: SFA
In accordance with the methods presented in Section 6.2.1, initially the gen­
eral model given by Equations 6.1 and Equation 6.2 were estimated and the 
four tests outlined above were undertaken using the likelihood ratio (LR) 
test. In all four cases the null hypotheses are clearly rejected. For test (I), 
constant returns to scale with non-neutral technical change are rejected with 
a LR statistic of 91.06 being greater than the x i  5% critical value of 9.49. 
For test (II), Hicks neutral technical progress is rejected with a LR statistic 
of 24.48 being greater than the x i  5% critical value of 5.99. For test (HI), 
constant returns to scale with Hicks neutral technical efficiency are rejected 
with a LR statistic of 89.27 being greater than the x j  5% critical value of
9.49. Finally, for test (IV), the absence of technical inefficiency/OLS model 
is rejected with a LR statistic of 103.98 being greater than the x l  5% critical 
value of 15.51. Therefore, the results for this estimation with non-constant
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returns to scale are given as Specification SFA-O-S^ in Table 6.1,
Table 6.1: Non-CRS Production Function Estimates
Specification SFA-O-S. 
Non-neutral Technical Change
Specification SFA-O-NS. 
Non-neutral Technical Change
Coefficients Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Po 17,1236 111.7903 16.9366 205.1589
Pl 0.3727 7.5778 0.3487 15.1533
Pk 0.1814 4.6044 0.2221 11.8850
pLt -0.0289 -3.2066 -0.0245 -6.5449
Pki 0.0158 2.9518 0.0106 3.9737
Pt 0.1726 4.7720 0.1855 15.9207
do 0.2523 0.0362 1.7450 4.2430
dsTRUCT -0.2082 -0.2272 -2.0299 -2.3066
dit -0.4040 -0.6873 -0.2656 -5.4701
d2t 0.1218 0.2226 -0.0466 -0.5759
dst 0.1805 0.2580 0.0857 2.4690
d4t -0.4770 -0.4124 -0.3495 -11.8334
dsTATE -0.5338 -0.1393 — —
0.5416 0.1992 0.2072 4.9856
7 0.9991 499.9914 0.99665 1621.4561
Log-likelihood 1.4195 23.6029
The estimated coefficients for the environmental variables (Ss) show that 
individually all of them are not significant; even though as test (IV) above 
shows collectively the environmental effects (concentration of the market, 
time and company’s ownership) are statistically significant. In other words, 
the results suggest that the inefficiency effects in Specification SF A -O S  are 
related to these effects despite the individual statistical results, but it is
difficult to distinguish between them. That said, the sign of S s t r u c t  is as
^Regarding the names of specification used in this thesis, it is noted that the first 
part will be either SFA or DEA, as it represents the technique use to estimate technical 
efficiency. The second part, which will be either ‘J’ or ‘O’, indicates whether the technique 
is input-oriented or output oriented, respectively. Finally ‘5 ’ in the final part implies that 
Es t a t e  0, whereas ‘JV5’ would imply that Ôs t a t e  =  0.
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expected despite its insignificance, whereas the sign of ô  s t a t e  is contrary 
to that expected. Therefore, some experimentation was undertaken and the 
dsTATE was assumed to be zero so that Equation 6.2 becomes,
4
fJ-it =  <^0 +  SstructSTRU C T it 4- djtdjt * t  (6.11)
i= i
The restricted version of the model. Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.11 were 
estimated and again subjected to the four log-likelihood ratio tests outlined 
above^. Again all four tests clearly reject the null hypothesis. For test (I), 
constant returns to scale with non-neutral technical change are rejected with 
a LR statistic of 20.88 being greater than the x l 5% critical value of 9.49. 
For test (II), Hicks neutral technical progress is rejected with a LR statistic 
of 31.14 being greater than the xl 5% critical value of 5.99. For test (HI), 
constant returns to scale with Hicks neutral technical change are rejected 
with a LR statistic of 23.55 being greater that the x l 5% critical value of
9.49. And finally, for test (IV), the absence of technical inefficiency/OLS 
model is rejected with a LR statistic of 148.35 being greater than the x? 
5% critical value of 14.07. Therefore the results are given as Specification 
SFA-O-NS in Table 6.1 and it can be seen that in this case most of the 
environmental variables are significant^. Therefore, Specification SFA-O-NS 
is the preferred model and will be the basis of the following discussion.
Although test (IV) is modified slightly since D st a t e  i s  set to zero in the ^unrestricted 
modeV,
®Given that '£’ is used as a proxy for technological progress in the production frontier 
and as an environmental variable for each company, further tests were also undertaken. 
The LR statistic for eliminating t from the production function is 55.68 being greater 
than the the x l 5% critical value of 7.81, thus rejects the restriction. The LR statistic 
of eliminating the t as the environmental variable is 82.5 being greater than the xl 5% 
critical value of 9.49, thus rejects the restriction.
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The statistics for Specification SFA-O-NS show that all factors in the 
stochastic production frontier are significant. The production frontier has 
decreasing returns to scale, os e — Pl + Pk  + Pu + Pm = 0.56. This result 
is rather unexpected, since normally gas transportation, which is a network 
industry, is assumed to have increasing returns to scale and enjoy economies 
of scale® (Newbery, 2000). The elasticity of inputs can be calculated, as 
shown in Equation 6.6 and Equation 6.8. The results show that the average 
labour elasticity was equal to 0.18, whereas the average capital elasticity 
was equal to 0.30. Furthermore, the estimate of Pki suggests that, there was 
technical progress due to the improvement in the quahty of capital—since the 
results suggest that output increased about 1 percent per year. In contrast, 
the estimated negative sign of Pu  indicates that there was technical regress, 
around 2.5 percent per year, possibly caused by poorer quality of labour force 
during the sample period. At first sight the positive coefficient of pt suggests 
that overall, there was neutral technical progress of just over 18 percent per 
year. However, the interpretation of this coefficient should be undertaken
®The different results in terms of returns to scale found here could be due to a number 
of factors. Decreasing returns to scale might be a result of the presence of some fixed 
input (Varian, 1992) (pp. 16). Furthermore the production frontier tends to represent 
the characteristics of the companies on the frontier, which in this case seems to be PTT. 
Perhaps, therefore, the result of decreasing returns to scale comes from the period 1984 to 
1995 when PTT did not expand the length of pipeline. In other words, there was no change 
in the amount of input but an increase in output. This might indicate overinvestment of in 
the network by PTT if there was no need for an expansion for such a long period of time. 
Thus it was able to expand output with expanding input hence the result of decreasing 
returns to scale in the production frontier. Alternatively, the decreasing returns to scale 
might be a result of the absence of some inputs. For instance, since the size of pipeline’s 
diameter can not be replicated, it can be argued that by assuming the length of the pipeline 
represents the capital, this might be not be truly representative of the actual capacity of 
the pipeline network as well as the actual cost of the company. Despite this unexpected 
result of decreasing returns to scale, it should be noted that the relative performance 
between the companies, which is the main objective of this study can still be examined.
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with some care given its sign and magnitude is dependent upon the units 
of measurement chosen. See Hunt and Lynk (1993) for more detail on the 
issue. However, as shown in Equation 6.10, following Kumbhakar and Lovell 
(2000), the rate of technical change is given by /3x,tln(Lif) +  ln( A^t) +  A
so that actually technical progress was on average 7.4 percent per year.
As mentioned earher, the estimated coefficients for the inefficiency effects 
suggest the direction and magnitude of the effect on the factors on companies’ 
efficiency. The estimated negative sign and the value of market concentration 
coefficient, S s t r u c t , imply that the concentration of market had a positive 
effect on the level of technical efficiency during the sample period. This is 
to be expected, as discussed above. Furthermore, the estimates of the time 
trend for each company (^u, Ô2t, S^t, S^) suggest a mix of both improvement 
and decline in technical efficiency of the companies during the thirteen-year 
period. More specifically, the negative sign in PTT, Petronas and British 
Gas indicates the improvement of technical efficiency in these companies, 
whereas the positive sign for Osaka Gas implies a shght decline in technical 
efficiency of the company over the sample period. Finally, it should be noted 
that the estimate of the variance parameter, 7 , is very close to one. This 
indicates that most of the error terms are derived from the inefficiency effect, 
not from the noise.
The technical efficiency scores based on Specification SFA-O-NS in Table
6.1 are presented on an annual basis in Figure 6.1 and the average technical 
efficiency scores for each company over the thirteen-year period are shown in 
Table 6.2. Four key points of discussion can be observed from these results.
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Figure 6.1: Comparative SFA technical efficiency during 1984-1996
Firstly, on average, British Gas was technically efficient compared with the 
other companies, with PTT the second efficient company estimated to be only 
1 percent less technically efficient than British Gas, followed by Petronas and 
Osaka Gas respectively.
Secondly, these results suggest that P T T ’s technical efficiency varied con­
siderably from around 69 to 98 percent, compared with British Gas, whose 
level of technical efficiency was more stable—ranging between 83 and 99 per­
cent. A dramatic change in technical efficiency is estimated for Petronas, 
where the efficiency is estimated to vary from 26, when the industry effec­
tively began in 1984/85, to 98 percent in 1996/97. For Osaka Gas, there was 
no significant change in its technical efficiency—moving between 16 and 20 
percent throughout the period.
Thirdly, it is noticeable that the technical efficiency of British Gas dropped
201
Table 6.2: The average SFA technical efficiency of each company
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Average TE (%) 90.89 79.58 18.03 91.57
during 1987 and 1992 from around 97 to 83 percent’^ , before beginning to rise 
considerably and becoming technically efficient in 1996. The decrease in the 
technical efficiency during 1987 and 1992 might be related to British Gas’s 
privatisation in 1986 and the price regulation during the period. Without 
any structural reform, British Gas was privatised and became not only a 
private integrated monopoly but also had a monopsony position in purchas­
ing natural gas from the North Sea. Besides, the price cap regulation on 
British Gas’s gas transportation, during 1987—1992, allowed full cost pass 
through of gas costs due to the existing long-term contracts that could not 
be changed. Since the price control applied on the average revenue of the 
company, it can be argued that it allowed the cross-subsidisation between the 
new high-cost gas contracts and the old cheaper contract (Yarrow, 1991). In 
addition, the RPI-X price cap was arguably loose, as the level of X chosen 
appeared low (Armstrong et al., 1994). As a result, such price control for­
mula seemed to weaken the incentives for British Gas to cut costs and hence 
to perform efficiently. If the drop was caused by the loose price cap, then 
the increase in technical efficiency since 1992 was likely to be related to the 
revised price control in 1992 which tightened the cap in addition to a series 
of policies towards increased liberalisation®.
^The decrease in British Gas’s technical efficiency during 1987-1992 is consistent with 
the result of Boussofiane et al. (1997).
®The liberalisation policy was for instance, reducing the limit of British Gas’s franchise
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Fourthly, it can be observed that even though British Gas’s market was 
much less concentrated than P T T ’s®, which therefore required much more 
investment on both pipeline and labour force, [see Section 6.2.1], British 
Gas’s technical efficiency was high compared with the P T T ’s. In contrast, if 
PTT were to expand its market to the residential and commercial sector and 
hence the market became less concentrated, the results suggest that it would 
be a challenge to maintain its technical efficiency given the relative position 
of British Gas and PTT  in the results. PTT  will therefore need to carefully 
consider its future investment and input management if it wants to maintain 
its technical efficiency. This issue will be examined more in Ghapter 8.
Experim entation on th e SFA m odel
To examine the robustness of the results in the previous section, SFA is 
undertaken under another three different groups of specification, as follows.
A common tim e effect on technical efficiency
Firstly, it is assumed that the effect of time on the gas company’s tech­
nical efficiency is the same for each company and there is also the effect of 
the company’s ownership on its technical efficiency. Hence, Equation 6.2
to 2,500 therm s in 1992, ensuring that other gas suppliers would be able to acquire at 
least 60 percent of gas supply to customer by 1995 and the unbundling of British Gas’s 
gas transmission and distribution from its supply service in 1996 [see i.e Newbery (2000) 
for more details].
®More than half of gas in the UK is consumed by numerous small residential and 
commercial customers, whereas more than 80 percent of gas in Thailand is consumed by 
a few large power plants.
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becomes,
=  0^ “k à STRUCT S T  RU CTit +  t  +  ^stateD stateui (6.12)
where, t  is a common time effect on the gas companies’ technical efficiency. 
Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.12 were re-estimated. The log-likelihood ratio 
test rejects the assumption of Hicks neutral technical change with a LR 
statistic of 8.84 being greater than the 5% critical value of 5.99. In addition 
the test for the absence of technical inefficiency/OLS model is rejected with a 
LR statistic of 94.19 being greater than the 5% critical value of 11.07. As 
a result the estimates of the non-neutral technical change model are shown 
in Table 6.3 and the technical efficiency scores are plotted in Figure 6.2.
In addition, to be consistent with the preferred model (Specification SFA- 
O-NS)^ a non-neutral technical change with a common time effect but with­
out the effect of company’s ownership {5state  =  0) is also examined. With 
this specification, Equation 6.11 becomes,
fJ'it = <^0 + 5STRUCT ST RU CTit +  S f t .  (6.13)
SFA estimated Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.13. The log-likelihood ratio 
test rejects the assumption on Hicks neutral technical change with a LR 
statistic of 14.62 being greater than the x l  5% critical value of 5.99. And 
as for the test for the absence of technical inefficiency/OLS model, it is also 
rejected with a LR statistic of 87.31 being greater than the x l  5% critical 
value of 9.49. Hence, the estimates of the non-neutral technical change model
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Table 6.3: Non-CRS Production Function Estimates with a Common Time
Effect on Technical Efficiency
S ST ATE 7^  0. 
Non-neutral Technical Change
SsTATE =  0. 
Non-neutral Technical Change
Coefficients Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Po 17.0768 4376.5848 16.7698 205.7494
Pl 0.2986 174.4402 0.3673 17.4008
Pk 0.2490 163.9876 0.2288 4.2414
Pu -0.0127 -44.4569 -0.0242 -5.2638
Pm 0.0069 28.2107 0.0095 1.0272
Pt 0.1344 144.5027 0.1916 6.2291
So 0.3890 0.6827 2.4904 2.3446
Ss t r u c t 2.1631 2.3757 -5.9194 -4.1551
St -0.0995 -1.7371 0.0358 0.4370
SsTATE -9.0852 -8.0837 — —
1.3713 6.0246 0.6800 5.8920
7 0.9999 31503070 0.9999 23129.662
Log-likelihood -3.4758 -6.9163
are shown in Table 6.3 and the technical efficiency scores obtained from the 
model are presented in Figure 6.3.
From Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3, it can be seen that generally the shapes 
of the technical efficiency curve for each company are similar to those found 
in Figure 6.1; even though quantitatively, their technical efficiency scores 
are different. Nonetheless, from their estimates, S s t r u c t  is  positive, unlike 
those found in Model SFA-O-S and Model SFA-O-NS, This implies that 
the concentration of market had a negative effect on the level of technical 
efficiency during the sample period, which is not as expected, [see Section
6.2.1 for more discussion on the issue]. In addition, by imposing that these 
four companies had a common time trend (in Equation 6.12 and Equation 
6.13), it assumes that during the estimated period the companies faced sim-
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Figure 6.2: Technical efficiency from a common time-effect SFA model with 
the effect from company’s ownership
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Figure 6.3: Technical efficiency from a common time-effect SFA model with­
out the effect from company’s ownership
liar situations and were suffered from similar problem. Thus their efficiency 
was similarly affected by time, which is unlikely in practice given that these 
companies were operating under different environments. Taking everything
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into account, comparing the models with a common time trend in this section 
with those in the previous section, the Model SFA-O-S and Model SFA-O-NS 
presented in the previous section are still more preferable.
From technical efficiency obtained in this section, as well as from Model 
SFA-O-S and Model SFA-O-NS^ it can be observed that efficiency scores of 
Osaka Gas appeared to be relatively less than those of the other companies 
and remain that way throughout the period. Aiming to examine the effect of 
Osaka Gas on the results of the other companies, PTT in particular and their 
robustness, in the next two groups of experiments, the data of Osaka Gas 
are excluded from the original data set. Firstly, similar to Model SFA-O-S 
and Model SFA-O-NS^ it allows the effect of time on technical efficiency to 
be varied from-company-to-company. Then in the second group, similar to 
the model examined in this section, it is assumed that the effect of time on 
technical efficiency is the same for every company.
Various Tim e Effects W ithout Osaka Gas^s D ata
Without the data of Osaka Gas, there are three comparative gas com­
panies. Therefore, when the effects of time on their technical efficiency are 
allowed to be vary ffom-company-to-company, therefore Equation 6.2 be­
comes,
3
F it =  <^ 0 +  ^s t r u c t S T R U C T u  -f- ^  ] ^ jtd j  • 1 4- Ss t a t e D s t a t e u  ^ (6.14)
i=i
where unlike those in Equation 6.2, here di, ^2, ds indicate PTT, Petronas 
and British Gas, respectively. Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.14 were re­
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estimated subject to the four log-hkelihood ratio tests outlined in Section 
6.2.1. The results show that all four tests clearly reject the null hypothesis. 
For test (I), constant returns to scale with non-neutral technical change are 
rejected with a LR statistic of 105.14 being greater than the x ï  5% criti­
cal value of 9.49. For test (II), Hicks neutral technical progress is rejected 
with a LR statistic of 11.26 being greater than the x i 5% critical value of 
5.99. For test (III), constant returns to scale with Hicks neutral technical 
change are rejected with a LR statistic of 34.6 being greater than the x ï  
5% critical value of 9.49. And finally, for test (IV), the absence of technical 
inefficiency/ OLS model is rejected with a LR statistic of 41.91 being greater 
than the x? 5% critical value of 14.07. As a result, the non-neutral technical 
change is the preferred model. Its results are presented in Table 6.4 and its 
technical efficiency scores are shown in Figure 6.4.
Then it is assumed that there is no effect from the ownership of the 
company on its technical efficiency: ô s t a t e  = 0. Equation 6.14 are rewritten 
as,
3
Fit =  0^ +  ^ s tr u c tS T R U CTit 4- ^jt^j ' (6.15)
3 =1
Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.15 were estimated subject to the four log- 
likelihood ratio tests. The results show that all four tests clearly reject the 
null hypothesis. For test (I), constant returns to scale with non-neutral tech­
nical change are rejected with a LR statistic of 105.18 being greater than the 
x l 5% critical value of 9.49. For test (II), Hicks neutral technical progress 
is rejected with a LR statistic of 15.6 being greater than the x l 5% critical
208
Table 6.4: Non-CRS Production Function Estimates with different time ef­
fects but without Osaka Gas’s data
SsTATE 7^  0 
Non-neutral Technical Change
SSTATE =  0 
Non-neutral Technical Change
Coefficients Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
A) 16.9491 143.6064 16.9969 72.2185
Pl 0.3487 75.3553 0.3389 5.6237
Pk 0.2206 9.5366 0.2237 7.5607
pLt -0.0238 -6.8118 -0.0231 -3.6224
Pki 0.0106 3.2151 0.0105 2.1812
Pt 0.1806 6.5239 0.1767 16.3858
So 0.5068 0.7284 0.1248 0.0804
SsTRUCT -0.1010 -0.1496 -0.0189 -0.0084
Sit -0.0740 -1.4245 -0.0946 -0.5802
S2t 0.0058 0.2376 -0.0013 -0.0162
Sot -0.0790 -1.0615 -0.0527 -1.2772
SsTATE -0.3406 -0.4568 — —
0.0687 3.2930 0.0732 4.2528
7 0.9999 16366.405 0.9999 10002172
Log-likelihood 25.9888 27.5705
value of 5.99. For test (III), constant returns to scale with Hicks neutral 
technical change are rejected with a LR statistic of 14.84 being greater than 
the 5% critical value of 9.49. And finally, for test (IV), the absence of 
technical inefficiency/OLS model is rejected with a LR statistic of 45.07 be­
ing greater than the x l  5% critical value of 12.59. As a result, the estimates 
of the non-neutral technical change are presented in Table 6.4. Its technical 
efficiency scores are shown in Figure 6.5.
From both Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5, it can be observed that the shapes 
of technical efficiency curve of PTT, Petronas and British Gas, are similar to 
their curve obtained from the preferred model in Figure 6.1, despite the data 
of Osaka Gas are excluded. These results show the robustness of the SFA
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Figure 6.4: Technical efficiency from a varying time-effect SFA model with 
the effect from company’s ownership (excluding Osaka Gas’s data)
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Figure 6.5: Technical efficiency from a varying time-effect SFA model with­
out the effect from company’s ownership (excluded Osaka Gas’s data)
technical efficiency scores obtained from this experiment comparing with the 
results of Model SFA-O-S and Model SFA-O-NS, which similarly allow the
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time effect on efficiency to be varied from-company-to-company. In spite 
of the absence of Osaka Gas’s data, the relative positions between the three 
remained companies are not significantly changed.
A Com m on Tim e Effect W ithout Osaka Gas D ata
The last group of experiments investigates the case of a common time 
effect on the gas companies’ technical efficiency, which is similar to the first 
experiment, but without the Osaka Gas’s data. Following the same pro­
cedures as the previous experiments, firstly it is assumed that there is the 
effect of the company’s ownership on its technical efficiency. Equation 6.1 
and Equation 6.12 were re-estimated subject to the four log-likelihood tests 
outlined in Section 6.2.1. For test (I), constant returns to scale with non­
neutral technical change are rejected with a LR statistic of 32.22 being greater 
than the x l  5% critical value of 9.49. For test (II), Hicks neutral technical 
progress is rejected with a LR statistic of 14.52 being greater than the x l  
5% critical value of 5.99. For test (III), constant returns to scale with Hicks 
neutral technical change are rejected with a LR statistic of 23.6 being greater 
than the x l  5% critical value of 9.49. And finally, for test (IV), the absence 
of technical inefficiency/OLS model is rejected with a LR statistic of 45.73 
being greater than the x l  5% critical value of 11.07. In consequence, the 
estimates of the non-neutral technical change are shown in Table 6.5 and its 
technical efficiency scores are plotted in Figure 6.6.
Then it is supposed that there is no effect from the ownership of the
^^Model SFA-O-S and Model SFA-O-NS have the similar specifications to those in this 
experiment except including the data of Osaka Gas.
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Table 6.5: Non-CRS Production Function Estimates with a Common Time 
Trend
E s ta te  0. 
Non-neutral Technical Change
E s ta te  =  0. 
Non-neutral Technical Change
Coefficients Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
^0 16.9577 132.3787 16.7974 119.8605
Pl 0.3514 11.6794 0.3560 8.2574
(3k 0.2166 7.9463 0.2295 6.5927
Pht -0.0236 -4.5327 -0.0272 -3.4594
Pki 0.0107 3.0176 0.0105 1.8520
Pt 0.1798 6.7144 0.2096 8.7767
-0.4071 -0.7437 0.0836 0.1971
^STRUCT 0.2119 0.1610 0.0089 0.0092
-0.0463 -0.6785 -0.0368 -0.5920
Es t a t e 0.1197 0.1548 — —
0.1345 2.3629 0.0952 1.4682
7 0.9999 191231.51 0.9883 27.3759
Log-likelihood 27.8992 17.3911
company on its technical efficiency. Equation 6.1 and Equation 6.13 were 
re-estimated again subject to the four log-likelihood tests outlined. For test 
(I) constant returns to scale with non-neutral technical change are rejected 
with a LR statistic of 16.92 being greater than the x l  5% critical value of
9.49. For test (II) Hicks neutral technical progress is rejected with a LR 
statistic of 4.82 being greater than the x i  10% critical value of 4.61. For 
test (III) constant returns to scale with Hicks neutral technical change are 
rejected with a LR statistic of 11.2 being greater than the xl 5% critical value 
of 9.49. And finally, for test (IV) the absence of technical inefficiency/OLS 
model is rejected with a LR statistic of 24.71 being greater than the xl 
5% critical value of 9.49. Hence, the estimates of the non-neutral technical 
change model are presented in Table 6.5 and the technical efficiency scores
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obtained from the model are plotted in Figure 6.7.
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Figure 6.6: Technical efficiency from a common time-effect SFA model with 
the effect from company’s ownership (excluded Osaka Gas’s data)
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Figure 6.7: Technical efficiency from a common time-effect SFA model with­
out the effect from company’s ownership (excluded Osaka Gas’s data)
Similar results can be found here. Like the results from the first two
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groups of experiments, the shapes of curves of technical efficiency of PTT, 
Petronas, and British Gas obtained here are similar to those found by the 
preferred model presented in Figure 6.1. There is no significant change in 
the relative positions of efficiency scores of the three companies, in spite of 
the change in data set. Therefore this again suggests the robustness of the 
SFA results.
Table 6.6: Technical Efficiency Scores Correlations across the Experiments
Common Tim e Trend Various Tim e Trend Common Tim e Trend
Specifi­ Preferred with OSK W ith OSK W ithout OSK
cations Model
(SFA-O-NS)
à s T A T E  i=- 0 
(n3es)
E s t a t e  =  0 
(n2e)
E s t a t e  0 
(jn5es)
E s t a t e  =  0 
(jn4e)
E s t a t e  0 
(jn3es)
à s T A T E  — 0 
(jn2e)
SFA-O-NS 1.0000
nSes 0.8557 1.0000
n2e 0.9573 0.8894 1.0000
jnSes 0.9953 0.8842 0.9588 1.0000
jn4e 0.9953 0.8835 0.9528 0.9989 1.0000
jn3es 0.9953 0.8842 0.9588 1.0000 0.9989 1.0000
jn2e 0.9927 0.8267 0.9510 0.9817 0.9819 0.9817 1.0000
Taking everything into account, the results of all three groups of exper­
iments suggest the robustness of the SFA results obtained by the preferred 
model (Model SFA-O-NS), In spite of the difference in specifications (i.e a 
common or varying time-effect, with or without the effect of ownership and 
with or without Osaka Gas’s data), they all suggest similar results. Sim­
ilar shapes of the efficiency curves of each company can be obtained by 
whichever SFA models. Moreover, the relative positions of the efficiency 
scores among the companies, obtained from these specifications, are also 
similar, even though quantitatively the scores are slightly changed. This 
observation has been confirmed by very high correlations between the
is noted that the statistics represent only the correlations of technical efficiency of
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technical efficiency scores obtained from the experiments and those from the 
preferred models. As shown in Table 6.6, the correlations of the efficiency 
scores across the specifications are varying between 0.83 and 0.99. In the 
next section, technical efficiency of these four gas companies are measured 
using a different technique—the non-parametric DEA.
6.3.2 Comparative Technical Efficiency: DEA
Following the technique presented in Section 6.2.2, two groups of DEA models 
based on two different assumptions on returns to scale are employed in this 
section. The first group, as discussed in Section 6.2.2, takes the information 
on returns to scale from SFA results and uses it to specify the DEA model. 
Given that SFA results in Section 6.3.1 suggest the evidence of decreasing 
returns to scale, the constraint of non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) is 
therefore imposed in this group of DEA models, [see Section 5.3.2 in Chapter 
5]. The other group of model is assumed constant returns to scale (CRS) 
and therefore CRS DEA model is used.
For each group, two specifications, varying the environmental variables 
included in the model, are examined. The first is assumed that the owner­
ship of the companies might have an impact on their levels of technical effi­
ciency, which is compatible with the initial SFA model, where Ôs t a t e  ïh  0 -  
In consequence, under this specification, three environmental variables —i.e 
technical trend {T IM E ), concentration of a gas market {STRU C T) and be-
three companies; PTT, Petronas and British Gas across several specifications, since in the 
last four experiments the data of Osaka Gas are excluded from the analyses.
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ing state ownership { D s t a t e ) —are included as non-discretionary inputs^^. 
The models under specification will be referred to as DEA-NIRS-O-S under 
non-increasing returns to scale and DEA-CRS-O-S under constant returns 
to scale. The second specification assumes no effect of the ownership of the 
company on its technical efficiency, which is similar to the preferred SFA 
model discussed in the previous section {Ss t a t e  = 0) and hence only two 
environmental variables (time trend and concentration of the gas market) 
are included. The models with only these two environmental variable will 
be referred to as DEA-NIRS-O-NS under non-increasing returns to scale 
constraint and DEA-CRS-NS under constant returns to scale constraint.
To evaluate output-oriented technical efficiency (ÿ), the DEA subject to 
non-increasing returns to scale (NIRS) solves,
max 4> (6.16)
s.t Xi — XA >  0,
“■02/i +  YA > 0 ,
Zi — ZA ^  0,
N l'A  <  1,
A > 0
where, Z is a vector of environmental variables. For Specification DEA-NIRS- 
O-S, Z is a 3 X 52 vector consisting of three rows environmental variables: 
T I M E ,  ST R U C T  and E s t a t e - In contrast, for Specification DEA-NIRS-
Including environmental variables as a non-discretionary input or non-discretionary 
output is the second method described in the Section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5.
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0-NS, Z is a 2 X 52 vector consisting of two rows of environmental variables: 
T I M E  and STR U C T. The constraint Nl^A <  1 indicates non-increasing 
returns to scale.
As for the CRS models, output-oriented DEA solves,
max 0  (6.17)<f),X
s.t Xi — XA > 0,
—02/f+YA > 0 ,
Zi — ZA > 0,
A > 0 .
Similar to the NIRS models, Z in Equation 6.17, is a vector of environmental 
variables and for Specification DEA-CRS-O-S, Z is a 3 x 52 vector consisting 
of three rows environmental variables: T I M E ,  ST R U C T  and E s t a t e - On 
contrary for Specification DEA-CRS-0-NS, Z is a 2 x 52 vector consisting of 
two rows of environmental variables: T I M E  and STRU C T.
Under the non-increasing returns to scale constraint, technical efficiency 
scores obtained from Specification DEA-NIRS-O-S when there is an effect 
from the company’s ownership and Specification DEA-NIRS-O-NS when the 
effect is assumed zero, are presented year-by-year in Figure 6.8 and Figure 
6.9, respectively. Their average technical efficiency scores over the thirteen- 
year period from both specifications are shown in Table 6.7 and Table 6.8, 
respectively. As for the technical efficiency score obtained from those Spec­
ification under constant returns to scale (Specification DEA-CRS-O-S and
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Specification DEA-GRS-O-NS with and without the impact from the com­
pany’s ownership, respectively) are shown in Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11. 
The companies’ average technical efficiency scores are presented in Table 6.9 
and Table 6.10.
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Figure 6.8: DEA technical efficiency during 1984-1996 (DEA-NIRS-O-S)
Table 6.7: Average technical efficiency: DEA-NIRS-O-S
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Average TE (%) 92.98 83.63 39.20 95.78
Table 6.8: Average technical efficiency: DEA-NIRS-O-NS
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Average TE (%) 92.98 83.63 32.75 95.76
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Figure 6.9: DEA technical efiiciency during 1984-1996 (DEA-NIRS-O-NS)
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Figure 6.10: DEA technical efficiency during 1984-1996 (DEA-CRS-O-S)
In general, it can be observed that all four specifications provide very 
close results. Figure 6.8 to Figure 6.11 suggest that for each company, simi-
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Figure 6.11: DEA technical efficiency during 1984-1996 (DEA-CRS-O-NS)
Table 6.9: Average technical efficiency (DEA-CRS-O-S)
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Average TE (%) 92.98 83.63 39.20 95.73
Table 6.10: Average technical efficiency (DEA-CRS-O-NS)
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Average TE (%) 92.85 83.63 32.75 95.73
Table 6.11: Output-oriented DEA Efficiency Scores Correlations
Specifications DEA-NIRS-O-S DEA-NIRS-O-NS DEA-CRS-O-S DEA-CRS-O-NS
DEA-NIRS-O-S
DEA-NIRS-O-NS
DEA-CRS-O-S
DEA-CRS-O-NS
1.000000
0.986275
0.999999
0.986286
1.000000
0.986269
0.999999
1.000000
0.986281 1.000000
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lar shapes of the technical efficiency curve can be obtained from every spec­
ification. Furthermore, the average efficiency scores of each company are 
similar across all specifications. This observation is confirmed by very strong 
correlations found between the efficiency scores estimated by the four speci­
fications, as shown in Table 6.11. In other words, the results indicates there 
is no material difference between technical efficiency scores either they are 
estimated under constant returns to scale or non-increasing returns to scale, 
with or without the effect of the company’s ownership (the variable Dstate)' 
Regarding the inclusion of D stated it can be argued that the DEA results 
seems to be consistent with the SFA results discussed in the previous section. 
As the SFA results suggested that the variable was statistically insignificant, 
that means whether it is included in the DEA model or not will not signif­
icantly affect the efficiency scores. This reflects in similar results found by 
the DEA models. In consequence, in order to be consistent with the SFA the 
discussion below, therefore, will be based on the DEA-O-NS specification.
From Figure 6.9 and Table 6.8, the results suggest that in general the 
trends of technical efficiency of each company are similar to those obtained 
from SFA. In other words the relative positions of performances are similar; 
even though on average, for all companies, technical efficiency scores are 
higher than their scores obtained from SFA, which can be expected a-priori 
and as noted in Carrington et al. (2002) that the estimated frontier (in this 
case, SFA) bounds the data less tightly than DEA. For instance the averaged 
technical efficiency for Osaka Gas is increased from around 18 percent in SFA 
to 33 percent in DEA. Similar for British Gas the average efficiency increases
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from 90 percent in SFA to 96 percent in DEA.
Following the points of discussion presented in SFA, firstly like the SFA 
results, under DEA, it suggests that British Gas was more technically ef­
ficient than PTT by around 3 percent^^, followed by Petronas and Osaka 
Gas, respectively. Secondly, similar to the SFA results, the DEA results still 
show that during the thirteen years, P T T ’s technical efficiency varied con­
siderably from around 74 to 100 percent, compared with British Gas, whose 
level of technical efficiency was more stable—ranging between 89 and 100 
percent. A dramatic change in technical efficiency of Petronas is still found, 
where the efficiency is estimated to have varied from 42, when the industry 
effectively began in 1984/85, to 100 percent in 1996/97. For Osaka Gas, 
similar to the SFA results, there was no significant change in its technical 
efficiency—varying between 28 and 40 percent throughout the period.
Similar results to the SFA can also be found as the technical efficiency 
of British Gas dropped during 1987/88 and 1992/93 from 100 to around 
89 percent, before beginning to rise considerably and becoming technically 
efficient in 1996. [See Section 6.3.1 for the discussion on these movements.] 
Finally, as pointed out in SFA’s discussion, despite British Gas had much less 
concentrated gas market than PTT had, both British Gas and PTT seemed to 
be technically efficient comparing with other comparative companies during 
the 1984/85-1996/97 period.
SFA, it found that on average British Gas were only 1 percent more technically 
efficient than PTT during 1984-1996, [see Section 6.3.1].
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6.3.3 Comparison of the SFA and DEA results
Table 6.12: Output-oriented Efficiency Scores Statistics
DEA-NIRS-O-NS SFA-O-NS
Mean Scores 0.76 0.70
Std. Error 0.28 0.33
Min. Scores 0.28 0.16
Table 6.13: Output-oriented Efficiency Scores Correlations
DEA-NIRS-O-NS SFA-O-NS
DEA-NIRS-O-NS 1.00
SFA-O-NS 0.98 1.00
Comparing the SFA results with the DEA results, it can be observed from 
the statistics shown in Table 6.12 and Table 6.13 that under output orien­
tation, both techniques give similar results. From Table 6.12, the results 
suggest that on average DEA appears to provide higher scores of technical 
efficiency than SFA—around 6 percent, as expected and discussed in the 
previous section; even though the minimum efficiency score in DEA is con­
siderably higher than that of SFA (around 12 percent). In addition from 
Table 6.13, the results of these two output-oriented techniques suggest a 
strong correlation between them. The correlation between efficiency scores 
obtained from the techniques is quite high—around 0.98.
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6.3.4 Bootstrapped DEA
Aiming to assess and reduce the effect of the sampling noise on the original 
DEA efficiency scores, bootstrapping is applied to the DEA efficiency scores 
for Specification DEA-NIRS-O-NS obtained in the previous section. The 
bootstrapping procedures adopted here follow the suggestion of Simar and 
Wilson (2004), as described in Section 5.3.2 of Chapter 5, using software 
written in ExceF^. The bootstrapping results are shown in Table 6.14 and 
Table 6.15.
Table 6.14 presents the number of times that a particular D M U  is labelled 
as technically efficient from 1000 iterations. It implies that if the DEA results 
suggest that the company is technically efficient, the greater number of times 
that the company appears to be technically efficient, the more confidence is 
given to the DEA result. For instance, consider the performance of PTT in 
1984 and 1996, where the DEA results suggested that PTT  was technically 
efficient. The bootstrapping results appear to support the DEA results, since 
they indicate that PTT was efficient in 713 times out of 1000 (around 71 
percent) in 1984 and around 619 times out of 1000 iterations (62 percent) in 
1996. For the performance of British Gas in 1984 and 1996, the bootstrapping 
results suggest that it was efficient for around 75 percent in 1984 and about 
69 percent in 1996 again consistent with the original DEA results.
In addition. Table 6.14 also provides information on the bias of the aver­
aged bootstrapped DEA efficiency score from the original DEA. In general
^^ The Visual Basic Code written for the bootstrapping Macro in Excel is presented in 
Figure A.l of Appendix A.
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it can be seen tha t for most companies except Osaka Gas, bootstrapping 
implies that DEA scores tended to be overestimated (when the bias^^ was 
negative). In particular, the bootstrapping suggests that for PTT, the DEA 
scores are overestimate, on average, around 14 percent. Similar overestima­
tion is also found for British Gas at around 16 percent. The smallest gap 
between DEA and bootstrapped DEA is Petronas. On average, the bias is 
only 3.5 percent.
Table 6.15 shows confidence intervals—upper and lower percentiles—for 
the efficiency scores. For example, considering PTT in 1984, the results 
suggest that at 95% confidence interval for efficiency of PTT in that year 
can be varied from 0.516 to 1.000, even though the original DEA suggested 
that the company was teclmically efficient in that year. However for PTT, 
despite the original DEA results suggesting that the company was technically 
efficient in 1996, at 95% confidence interval, bootstrapping suggest that PTT 
efficiency can be widely varied from 0.3292 to being technically efficient at 
1. Given the wide range of possible efficiency scores of this performance of 
PTT, it implies that there are still some uncertainties in the original DEA 
results.
6.4 Sum m ary and C onclusion
In this chapter, it is assumed that, given the monopolistic power of the stud­
ied gas companies over the sample period, the gas companies (PTT, Petronas, 
Osaka Gas and British Gas) had a control over the output. In consequence.
®^The bias = Bootstrapped DEA efficiency score -  Original DEA efficiency score
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the techniques for measuring technical efficiency, in this chapter, both DEA 
and SFA, are output-oriented. The first analysis was undertaken by SFA, us­
ing a balanced panel over the period 1984/85 to 1996/97 and Cobb-Douglas 
production function. The results showed that over the period 1984/85 to 
1996/97 PTT performed relatively well compared to the three comparators: 
British Gas, Petronas and Osaka Gas. More specifically, out of the four com­
panies, PTT was estimated to be the second most technically efficient after 
British Gas. In addition, the results have also found that the companies’ 
concentration of gas utilisation had a positive effect oil their technical effi­
ciency, which is particular relevant to PTT given the high proportion of gas 
consumed for power generation in Thailand, [see Chapter 2].
The second analysis was DEA. Using the same technique used in Parker 
and Wu (1998), DEA was applied to the same data set as SFA was. The 
DEA results shown that in general they were similar to those obtained from 
the SFA. The movements of technical efficiency scores of each company were 
similar. Nonetheless, on average, the DEA technical efficiency scores were 
higher than those of SFA. In addition, like the SFA, the DEA results sug­
gested that, during 1984/85-1996/97, out of the four PTT was the second 
most technically efficient after British Gas by around 3 percent. Furthermore, 
bootstrapping was also applied to the DEA efficiency scores, to provide some 
statistic information on the DEA scores. In general, bootstrapping results 
appeared to support the original scores with some evidences of uncertainties 
that lead to the overestimation in the original DEA efficiency scores.
All in all, comparing the results from the two techniques, in spite of
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some slight differences, the results obtained from both techniques seem to be 
robust, as they provided the same trends of efficiency for each gas company. 
The correlation of the efficiency scores from both techniques is very strong. 
Moreover, it found that the DEA provided generally higher efficiency scores 
than the SFA did. In response to the research question stated in Chapter 1, 
using the output-oriented approaches, the results in this chapter show that 
technically PTT performed relatively well even before the introduction of 
policy liberalisation, which primarily aimed to improve efficiency in the Thai 
GSI in 1997.
In the next chapter, it is assumed that the companies were cost minimisers 
and thus had more control on their inputs. As a result, instead of using the 
output-oriented approach as in this chapter, the next chapter will employ the 
input-oriented techniques to examine whether similar conclusion concerning 
the relative efficiency of PTT can be obtained.
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Table 6.14: Bias of the Bootstrapped DEA from the original DEA scores
Companies Years Number tim es of being 100% Bias of Bootstrapped Efficiency Scores
P T T 1984 713 -0.1080
1985 447 -0.1950
1986 319 0.0410
1987 310 -0.1521
1988 279 -0.1957
1989 272 -0.1347
1990 287 -0.0320
1991 308 -0.1667
1992 301 -0.1436
1993 334 -0.1866
1994 472 -0.2079
1995 563 -0.1864
1996 619 -0.1667
A v e ra g e — -0 .1 4 1 1
Petronas 1984 375 0.3641
1985 451 -0.2024
1986 624 -0.1718
1987 428 -0.1890
1988 434 -0.2123
1989 478 -0.0905
1990 672 -0.1496
1991 344 0.2467
1992 324 0.1784
1993 399 0.0901
1994 424 0.0157
1995 406 -0.1753
1996 639 -0.1639
A v e ra g e — -0 .0 3 5 4
Osaka Gas 1984 349 0.4421
1985 397 0.4933
1986 333 0.5069
1987 363 0.4866
1988 329 0.4931
1989 306 0.4622
1990 303 0.4595
1991 308 0.4602
1992 271 0.4210
1993 259 0.4023
1994 281 0.3919
1995 306 0.3956
1996 323 0.3729
A v era g e — 0 .4 4 5 2
British Gas 1984 753 -0.0719
1985 540 -0.1750
1986 440 -0.2025
1987 407 -0.2188
1988 310 -0.2118
1989 330 -0.1114
1990 317 -0.1292
1991 344 -0.2332
1992 289 -0.2192
1993 339 -0.1717
1994 387 -0.1191
1995 470 -0.1018
1996 694 -0.1285
A v era g e — -0 .1 6 1 1
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Table 6.15; Confidence Intervals for NIRS Efficiency Score
Confidence Intervals
Companies Years 99% 97.5% 95% 90%
P T T 1984 0.482 1.000 0.501 - 1.000 0.516 - 1.000 0.545 - 1.000
1985 0.282 - 1.000 0.293 - 1.000 0.303 - 1.000 0.334 - 1.000
1986 0.280 - 1.000 0.285 - 1.000 0.295 - 1.000 0.318 - 1.000
1987 0.278 - 1.000 0.283 - 1.000 0.289 - 1.000 0.320 - 1.000
1988 0.283 - 1.000 0.285 - 1.000 0.295 - 1.000 0.310 - 1.000
1989 0.278 - 1.000 0.282 - 1.000 0.286 - 1.000 0.302 - 1.000
1990 0.281 1.000 0.283 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.306 - 1.000
1991 0.278 - 1.000 0.283 - 1.000 0.288 - 1.000 0.304 1.000
1992 0.277 - 1.000 0.284 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.306 - 1.000
1993 0.281 1.000 0.285 - 1.000 0.296 - 1.000 0.310 - 1.000
1994 0.287 - 1.000 0.298 - 1.000 0.312 - 1.000 0.341 - 1.000
1995 0.307 - 1.000 0.317 - 1.000 0.331 - 1.000 0.366 - 1.000
1996 0.319 - 1.000 0.329 -■ 1.000 0.346 - 1.000 0.388 - 1.000
Petronas 1984 0.283 - 1.000 0.288 - 1.000 0.302 - 1.000 0.333 - 1.000
1985 0.285 - 1.000 0.298 - 1.000 0.310 - 1.000 0.339 - 1.000
1986 0.318 - 1.000 0.326 - 1.000 0.342 - 1.000 0.371 - 1.000
1987 0.285 - 1.000 0.296 - 1.000 0.304 - 1.000 0.334 - 1.000
1988 0.287 - 1.000 0.293 - 1.000 0.305 - 1.000 0.326 - 1.000
1989 0.289 - 1.000 0.298 - 1.000 0.310 - 1.000 0.337 - 1.000
1990 0.327 - 1.000 0.341 - 1.000 0.360 - 1.000 0.403 - 1.000
1991 0.279 - 1.000 0.284 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.306 - 1.000
1992 0.282 - 1.000 0.285 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.319 - 1.000
1993 0.284 - 1.000 0.290 - 1.000 0.301 - 1.000 0.326 - 1.000
1994 0.284 - 1.000 0.292 - 1.000 0.305 - 1.000 0.336 - 1.000
1995 0.282 - 1.000 0.287 - 1.000 0.298 - 1.000 0.325 - 1.000
1996 0.333 - 1.000 0.339 - 1.000 0.355 - 1.000 0.383 - 1.000
Osaka Gas 1984 0.282 - 1.000 0.286 - 1.000 0.297 - 1.000 0.311 - 1.000
1985 0.285 - 1.000 0.292 - 1.000 0.299 - 1.000 0.316 - 1.000
1986 0.282 - 1.000 0.287 - 1.000 0.298 - 1.000 0.320 - 1.000
1987 0.283 - 1.000 0.286 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.310 - 1.000
1988 0.283 - 1.000 0.287 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.310 - 1.000
1989 0.282 - 1.000 0.285 - 1.000 0.296 - 1.000 0.312 - 1.000
1990 0.279 - 1.000 0.283 - 1.000 0.288 - 1.000 0.302 - 1.000
1991 0.278 - 1.000 0.283 - 1.000 0.288 - 1.000 0.306 - 1.000
1992 0.278 - 1.000 0.283 - 1.000 0.287 - 1.000 0.308 - 1.000
1993 0.279 - 1.000 0.283 - 1.000 0.288 - 1.000 0.306 - 1.000
1994 0.278 - 1.000 0.282 - 1.000 0.291 - 1.000 0.305 - 1.000
1995 0.278 - 1.000 0.284 - 1.000 0.295 - 1.000 0.308 - 1.000
1996 0.280 - 1.000 0.284 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.312 - 1.000
British Gas 1984 0.533 - 1.000 0.557 - 1.000 0.583 - 1.000 0.652 - 1.000
1985 0.289 - 1.000 0.295 - 1.000 0.308 - 1.000 0.351 - 1.000
1986 0.293 - 1.000 0.299 - 1.000 0.308 - 1.000 0.335 - 1.000
1987 0.288 - 1.000 0.296 - 1.000 0.305 - 1.000 0.320 - 1.000
1988 0.282 - 1.000 0.289 - 1.000 0.300 - 1.000 0.321 - 1.000
1989 0.281 - 1.000 0.285 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.312 - 1.000
1990 0.282 - 1.000 0.285 - 1.000 0.290 - 1.000 0.306 - 1.000
1991 0.283 - 1.000 0.286 - 1.000 0.291 - 1.000 0.306 - 1.000
1992 0.279 - 1.000 0.284 - 1.000 0.291 - 1.000 0.307 - 1.000
1993 0.280 - 1.000 0.286 - 1.000 0.296 - 1.000 0.310 - 1.000
1994 0.277 - 1.000 0.282 - 1.000 0.294 - 1.000 0.316 - 1.000
1995 0.283 - 1.000 0.289 - 1.000 0.299 - 1.000 0.337 - 1.000
1996 0.382 - 1.000 0.396 - 1.000 0.412 - 1.000 0.490 - 1.000
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Chapter 7
Technical Efficiency in the Thai 
GSI: Input-oriented Approach
7.1 Introduction
This chapter focusses on gas companies as businesses, which are assumed 
to be cost minimisers and have control over inputs. Therefore, unlike the 
previous chapter, this chapter uses the input-oriented approach to assess the 
comparative technical efficiency of the four integrated gas companies, includ­
ing PTT, Petronas, Osaka Gas and British Gas, over the period 1984/85- 
1996/97. However, to be consistent with the analyses in Ghapter 6, in this 
chapter, following the data specification presented in Chapter 4, it is assumed 
that the integrated gas monopolies used two main inputs: number of employ­
ees and length of pipeline (km), to produce only one output—volume of total 
gas sold (measured in therms). In addition, following the specifications of 
the preferred SFA model in Chapter 6, three environmental variables will
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be included in these analyses. Those are time capturing an effect of techni­
cal progress on technical efficiency, the concentration of gas market^ and the 
state ownership.
Similar to Chapter 6, the two main techniques: SFA and DEA are applied 
to the balanced panel data for the four gas companies over the thirteen-year 
period. Specification of these two techniques are presented in Section 7.2. 
Then extending from the DEA, bootstrapping is undertaken to add statistical 
inferences into the non-parametric technique. Results of these analyses are 
presented and discussed in Section 7.3. Finally, Section 7.4 summaries and 
concludes.
7.2 M od el’s Specification  for In tegrated  Gas 
Supply Industries
7.2.1 SFA Specification
Following the concept presented in Section 5.3.3, Chapter 5, an input dis­
tance function for two-input and one-output case, assumed Cobb-Douglas 
technology of the i^  ^ company at the t^^ period can be written as.
ln{Diit) = ao-jr (Xl hi SALEit (7.1)
-\~Pl  In L it +  P k  In K it
-\~Pt ’ t +  Pyt{hi SALEit) • 1 4- Lit) • t  -F /^^((fn Kit) • t;
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It is noted that an input distance function must be linearly homogenous in 
inputs (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000), which implies constant returns to scale 
in the inputs. That is.
P l  +  Pk  +  Pu  +  Pki =  1- (7.2)
Substitute Equation 7.2 into Equation 7.1, the input-distance function can 
be written as.
= <xq-h (Xl hi SALEit (7.3)
+(1 — Pk  — Pu — pKt)  In Lit +  Pk  In Ku 
+Pt • 1 4- Pyt{liLSALEit)' 14- PuO ^ Lit) * i  4- fe i( ln  Ku) • i;
=  OfQ + (Xl In SALEit
4- In Lit +  /?ir[ln Ku — In Lft] 4- /5z,t[ln Lu • i  — In 
4-^K([ln Kit ' t — hi Lit] 4- Pyt hxSALEu • t  Pt ’ t,
or,
-InLit = (Xq (Xi h iSALEi t  (7.4)
+/^ir[InKit ~  In Lff] 4- Pu^xiLu •  ^— In 
4-/^irt[ln Kit • t — hi Lu] 4- Pyt hi SA LE u - 1 -h P t ' t  — hi{Diu).
Using SFA to estimate an input distance function, — hi(Diu) is replaced
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by Vit -  tizt; therefore Equation 7.4 can be rewritten as,
- I n  Lit =  ao + a i l n S  ALEit (7.5)
+^ir[ln Kit ~  In Lu] +  &t[ln L^ • i — In Lu]
+pKt[^ Kit - t  — In Lit] +  Pyt In SALEu ' t  +  P t ' t  +  Vu—Uu.
where,
SA LE u = volume of total gas sold (therms) of the companies at the 
period,
yds, a s  =  unknown parameters to be estimated.
Lit =  number of employees of the company at the period.
Kit = length of pipeline (km) of the company at the period.
Vit =  random error, i.i.d, iV(0,cr^),
Uit = technical inefficiency effects; #(//%(, a^).
Adopting the model of Battese and Coelli (1995), fiu can be defined as,
4
Fit =  <^0 SSTRUCT S T  RU CTit +  ^   ^^jtdj • t -f- Ssta teDstateu (7.6)
i = l
where,
STRU CTit = concentration of gas market faced by the company at the 
period,
233
S)t=i • i = time trend of each company, 
di
=  1, if the company is PTT; 
=  0, otherwise,
d2
d:3
d
=  1, if the company is Petronas;
=  0, otherwise,
=  1, if the company is Osaka Gas; 
=  0, otherwise,
=  1, if the company is British Gas; 
=  0, otherwise,
=  1, if the company is state-owned;
D s t a t e  ^
=  0, otherwise,
i =  (1 =  PTT, 2 =  Petronas, 3 =  Osaka Gas, 4 =  British Gas)
( =  1,2,. .,13 (1984/85 - 1996/97)
and technical efficiency of the company at the period (TEu),
TEit =  £;(exp(-'Wif|eif); = Vu -  Uu (7.7)
Similar to what was discussed in Chapter 6, Equation 7.6 implies that com­
pany’s technical efficiency can be affected by three environmental variables. 
Firstly technical efficiency might be influenced by the concentration of gas
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market {STRUCT)^ in the sense that it is expected a-priori that a more con­
centrated gas market will generally increase (decrease) the level of technical 
efficiency (inefficiency) of the company. Therefore it is expected that 6s t r u c t  
will be negative. Also in the general model, outlined above, a dummy variable 
for state ownership ( D s t a t e )  is included to examine whether the ownership 
has an effect on companies’ technical inefficiency with the expectation that 
dsTATE will be positive (a public-owned company tends to be less efficient 
than a privately-owned company). Finally, an allowance is made for the 
technical inefficiency to be affected over time, but varying from-company- 
to-company. [See more detail in Section 6.2.1, Chapter 6.] This analysis is 
carried out by a software called FRONTIER version 4.1 The result are shown 
in Section 7.3.1.
7.2.2 DE A Specification
Again similar the DEA specification in Chapter 6, the DEA technique used 
here follows the techniques employed by Parker and Wu (1998), which ig­
nored the time-series prospect and each of the observation in the panel will 
be treated as an individual D M U  in one cross-section. In addition, like the 
SEA, it is assumed that these integrated gas companies used the two inputs 
to produce the single output with three environmental variables, which are 
included in the DEA model as non-discretionary inputs [see, data specifi­
cation in Section 7.2.1]. In addition, same as the output-oriented DEA in 
Chapter 6, the property of returns to scale observed from the SEA result will 
be used to specify the DEA model. Moreover, bootstrapping is applied the
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original DEA, in order to perform the sensitivity analysis on DEA. The soft­
ware used to perform both analyses has been written in Excel by the author 
following the guides in Zhu (2003) and Simar and Wilson (2004)’s suggested 
bootstrapping procedures, as shown in Chapter 5.
7.3 R esu lts and D iscussion
7.3.1 Comparative SFA Technical Efficiency
Civen the specification described in Section 7.2.1, firstly Equation 7.5 and 
Equation 7.6 were estimated. The results are shown in Specification SFA-I-S. 
of Table 7.1. However, unlike the stochastic frontier analyses in Chapter 6, 
the likelihood ratio (LR) test for constant returns to scale cannot be under­
taken here. It is because it has been systematically assumed in the process of 
constructing the model. For the inputs, the input distance function requires 
homogenous degree 4-1, implying constant returns to scale, in inputs. As for 
the output, although theoretically there is not such constraint made upon 
outputs; in the study, there is only one output. As for the LR test for the 
null hypothesis of no technical inefficiency in the industry, uu = 0, achieved 
by imposing the restriction 7  =  Jq =  d s t r u c t  =  d u  =  621 =  dst =  ô u  =  
dST ATE  =  0, the absence of technical inefficiency/OLS model is accepted 
with a LR statistic of 5.54 less than the %g 5% critical value of 15.51.
Following the experiment in Chapter 6, the dsTATE was assumed to be 
zero so that Equation 6.2 becomes.
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Table 7.1: Non-neutral Technical Change Production Function Estimates
Specification SFA-I-S. Specification SFA-I-NSl. Specification SFA-I-NS2.
Es t a t e  0 Es t a t e  =  0 Es t a t e = 0, p K t  = 0
Coefficients Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
Oio 18.3415 18.4840 18.4020 9.9031 15.1284 16.8045
a i -1.2636 -36.8385 -1.2579 -18.2263 -1.0510 -24.3099
Pk -0.1176 -1.0972 -0.1417 -1.0334 0.1364 7.1915
A -1.6295 -3.6995 -1.5634 -4.0598 -1.1451 -11.1583
Pyt 0.1148 5.8891 0.1105 5.8996 0.0830 15.7101
p L t -0.1060 -4.0614 -0.1101 -3.4293 -0.0933 -34.8625
p K t 0.0038 0.1831 0.0096 0.4103 — —
d o 0.1873 0.5069 -0.0650 -0.1126 4.1338 30.3661
dsTRUCT -0.0522 -0.0758 0.3492 0.2543 -3.7060 -20.6699
. du -0.2100 -0.6914 -0.3056 -1.8106 -0.1030 -3.9832
d2t 0.0106 0.0740 -0.0454 -0.3419 -0.1183 -4.2613
dst 0.0071 0.1271 0.0059 0.0250 -0.2100 -12.3946
du -0.0273 -0.4608 -0.0463 -0.7259 -0.2535 -16.3854
dsTATE -0.0363 -0.0833 — — — —
0.3454 3.7598 0.4153 1.3693 0.0206 3.4165
7 0.2964 0.5567 0.4845 0.6880 0.6414 4.2299
Log-likelihood -40.3791 -40.9333 37.9285
— 0^ T dsTRUcrSTRU CTu  4- djtdj • t
i=l
(7.8)
This restricted model is referred to as Specification SFA-I-NSl, Equation 7.5 
and Equation 7.8, were estimated. The results are shown in the column of 
Specification SFA-I-NSl of Table 7.1. The LR test for the null hypothesis 
of no technical inefficiency in the industry, Uu =  0, achieved by imposing the
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restriction j  = Ôq = ôs t r u c t  =  d u  = 621 = d^t =  d u  =  0, the absence of 
technical inefficiency/OLS model is still accepted with a LR statistic of 4.43 
less than the xf 5% critical value of 14.07.
Given that the Specification SFA-I-NSl. estimates show that Pki is in­
significant, some experimentation was undertaken and the pKt in Equation 
7.5 was assumed to be zero: Pki = 0. The modified Equation 7.5 and Equa­
tion 7.6 were estimated. The results are presented as Specification SFA-I-NS2  
in Table 7.1. For this restricted model, the test for the null hypothesis for the 
absence of technical inefficiency/OLS model is rejected with a LR statistic 
of 162.83 being greater than the x? 5% critical value of 14.07, suggesting 
the evidences of inefficiency in the companies. In addition, it can be noticed 
that in this case all of the environmental variables are statistically significant. 
Therefore, Specification SFA-I-NS2 is the preferred model and will be the 
basis of the following discussion.
As discussed earlier that the estimated coefficients for the inefficiency 
effects suggest the direction and magnitude of the effect of the factors on 
companies’ efficiency. Similar results to those from output-oriented approach 
(Chapter 6) can be found here. The negative sign of market concentration 
coefficient, dsTRUCT, implies that the concentration of the market had a 
positive effect on the level of technical efficiency during the thirteen years. 
Furthermore, the negative sign of the coefficients of time trend ((^u, d2t, dst, 
du) imply that over the time, every company experienced the improvements 
in technical efficiency, which is slightly different from the result of the output- 
oriented SFA that suggested a mix of both improvements and decline in
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technical efficiency.
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Figure 7.1: Comparative SFA technical efficiency during 1984-1996
Table 7.2: The average technical efficiency of each company using SFA
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
Average TE {%) 93.02 87.31 37.33 45.72
The technical efficiency scores based on Specification SFA-I-NS2 in Table 
7.1 are plotted on an annual basis in Figure 7.1 and the average technical 
efficiency scores for each company over the thirteen-year period are shown in 
Table 7.2. Firstly it should be noted that, in accordance with the restrictions 
mentioned earlier, the efficiency scores estimated from this model is under the 
assumption of constant returns to scale, which arguably might not refiect the 
characteristic of the GSI. Secondly, it can be seen that the trends of technical
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efficiency estimated by the input-oriented SFA are much different from those 
obtained from output-oriented SFA. By thiis model, both British Gas and 
Osaka Gas appeared to be very less efficient at the beginning—only 7 and 
5 percent for British Gas and Osaka Gas, respectively. Nonetheless, their 
performance seemed to improve dramatically over the thirteen period until 
they reached around 99 and 97 percent efficient in 1996/97 for British Gas 
and Osaka Gas, respectively. Furthermore, on average the results suggested 
that PTT was the most technically efficient followed by Petronas, British 
Gas and Osaka Gas, respectively.
7.3.2 Comparative DEA Technical Efficiency
In this section, technical efficiency of PTT is measured comparatively with 
those of the other three gas companies using the input-oriented DEA. Two 
groups of models based on the constraint of returns to scale are analysed here. 
The first group is assumed constant returns to scale (CRS), following the re­
sults of the preferred SFA model obtained in the previous section. Nonethe­
less, this CRS specification is not consistent with those discussed in Chapter 
6, as the preferred output-oriented DEA model is imposed non-increasing 
returns to scale (NIRS) according with the evidence of decreasing returns to 
scale found in the output-oriented SFA. Therefore following the specification 
of the output-oriented approach, the second group of the input-oriented DEA 
model will be subject to the constraint of non-increasing returns to scale.
For each group, similar to the procedure in Chapter 6, two specifications 
based on the environmental variables included in the model will be exam­
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ined. (I) the first specification includes all three environmental variables: 
time trend {TIME) ,  concentration of a gas market (STRU C T) and state 
ownership { D s t a t e )-  On contrary, (II) the second specification includes only 
two environmental variables { T I M E  and STR U C T), as it assumes no effect 
of company’s ownership on its technical efficiency. In addition, it is again 
assumed that the gas companies associated with two inputs, a single output 
and these environmental variables, which will be included in the model as a 
non-discretionary input.
The input-oriented DEA subject to constant returns to scale (CRS) solves,
min 6 (7.9)
0,A ^
s.t 6xi — XA >  0,
~Vi +  YA >  0,
Zj — ZA ^  0,
A > 0
where, Z is a vector of environmental variables. W ith specification (I), Z is 
a 3 X  52 vector consisting three rows of the environmental variables: T I M E ,  
S T R U C T  and D s t a t e -  The model is referred to as Specification DEA-I- 
CRS-S, whereas with specification (II), Z is a 2 x 52 vector consisting two 
rows of the environmental variables: T I M E  and STR U C T. This model is 
referred to as Specification DEA-I-CRS-NS.
In contrast, the input-oriented DEA subject to non-increasing returns to
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scale (NIRS) solves,
mine,\ e
s.t 6xi — XA > 0 ,
~yi T  YA > 0 ,
Zi — ZA > 0 ,
N l'A < 1 ,
A > 0
(7.10)
where, Z is a vector of environmental variables. The constraint N l'A  <  1 
in Equation 7.10 indicates non-increasing returns to scale. The model is 
examined subject to two specifications. Similar to the CRS model, speci­
fication (I) assumes that all three environmental variables are included in 
the model. This model is referred to as DEA-NIRS-S. Another is specifica­
tion (II), which assumes that only two environmental variables { T I M E  and 
STR U C T) are included. This model is referred to as DEA-NIRS-NS. The 
comparative technical efficiency scores of the four specifications are presented 
year-by-year in Figure 7.2 — Figure 7.5. In addition, the average scores over 
the thirteen-year period are shown in Table 7.3.
Figure 7.2 — Figure 7.5 as well as Table 7.3 suggest that all four spec­
ifications provide similar results. In particular, for Osaka Cas and British 
Cas, their average technical efficiency scores remain the same for all specifi­
cations. Even for PTT and Petronas, the difference of their average technical
242
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Figure 7.2: DEA technical efficiency during 1984-1996 (DEA-CRS-I-S)
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Figure 7.3: DEA technical efficiency during 1984-1996 {DEA-CRS-I-NS)
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Figure 7.4; DEA technical efficiency during 1984-1996 (DEA-NIRS-I-S)
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Figure 7.5: DEA technical efficiency during 1984-1996 (DEA-NIRS-I-NS)
244
Table 7.3; Average input-oriented DEA technical efficiency (%)
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
DEA-CRS-I-S 84.72 86.92 14.40 88.72
DEA-CRS-I-NS 81.01 80.33 14.40 88J2
DEA-NIRS-I-S 84.72 86.93 14.40 8&72
DEA-NIRS-I-NS 81.01 80.33 14.40 88.72
Table 7.4; Input-oriented DEA Efficiency Scores Correlations
Gas Company DEA-CRS-I-S DEA-CRS-I-NS DEA-NIRS-I-S DEA-NIRS-I-NS
DEA-CRS-I-S
DEA-CRS-I-NS
DEA-NIRS-I-S
DEA-NIRS-I-NS
1.000000
0.959896
0.898526
0.959891
1.000000
0.968841
0.999999
1.000000
0.968824 1.000000
efficiency scores are small, only 4 and 6 percent, respectively. In addition, 
statistics in Table 7.4 assure that there are very strong correlations among the 
models. Furthermore, comparing the results between the CRS DEA models 
with the NIRS DEA models, it can be seen that when the models are subject 
to the same environmental variables, the results from both models are the 
same. Given that there is no significant difference across the models, the 
following discussion will focus only on the result of the NIRS input-oriented 
DEA, which Ôs t a t e  is assumed to be zero, as its specification is consistent 
with majority of analyses in this thesis—those output-oriented analyses in 
Chapter 6.
Figure 7.5 shows that in general the trends of technical efficiency of each
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company are similar to those obtained from the output-oriented approaches, 
both DEA and SFA, [see Section 6.3 in Chapter 6]. Moreover, on average, the 
result suggested that British Gas was the most technically efficient over the 
period between 1984/85-1996/97 at around 89 percent, followed by PTT, 
Petronas and Osaka Gas, respectively. Furthermore, similar to what have 
found in the output-oriented analyses, the results indicate that PT T ’s tech­
nical efficiency varied considerably from around 41 to 100 percent, compared 
with British Gas, whose level of technical efficiency was more stable—ranging 
between 71 and 100 percent. A dramatic change in Petronas^s technical ef­
ficiency can still be found here, as it moved from around only 32 percent in 
1984/85 to 100 percent in 1996/97. And no significant change has found for 
Osaka Gas’s technical efficiency over the thirteen-year period.
7.3.3 Comparison of the SFA and DEA results
Table 7.5; Efficiency Scores Correlations
Gas Company SFA-O-NS DEA-NIRS-O-NS SFA-I-NS DEA-NIRS-I-NS
SFA-O-NS 1.00
DEA-NIRS-O-NS 0.98 1.00
SFA-I-NS 0.46 0.43 1.00
DEA-NIRS-I-NS 0.95 0.98 0.39 1.00
Table 7.5 compares the input-oriented results from this chapter with the 
output-oriented results from the previous chapter. This shows that all tech­
niques except for the input-oriented SFA provide very similar results. It can 
be seen that even comparing with the same technique—SFA—the correlation
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Table 7.6; Statistics of Efficiency Scores
Gas Company SFA-O-NS DEA-NIRS-O-NS SFA-I-NS DEA-NIRS-I-NS
Mean 0.7002 0.7628 0.6585 0.6612
S.D. 0.3272 0.2813 0.3557 0.3442
Min 0.1647 0.2768 0.0454 0.0965
between the efficiency of the input-oriented and the output-oriented is only. 
0.46. Furthermore, when comparing the input-oriented SFA with the DBA 
both the input-oriented and the output-oriented, the correlations between 
their efficiency scores are only 0.39 and 0.43, respectively. Apart from the 
input-oriented SFA, technical efficiency scores obtained from the other three 
techniques are very close. For instance, the correlation between efficiency 
scores of the input-oriented and the output-oriented DEA is as high as 0.98. 
Similarly, the correlation between the efficiency scores of the output-oriented 
SFA and the output-oriented DEA is 0.98. In addition. Table 7.6 shows some 
other statistics e.g the means, the standard errors of the efficiency scores and 
the minimum scores obtained by the model. In general, it can be observed 
that in both orientations DEA provides higher scores than the SFA. This can 
be found both in the average and the minimum efficiency scores.
7.3.4 Bootstrapped DEA
Extending from the DEA, bootstrapping is performed to provide a sensi­
tivity analysis for the DEA efficiency scores. Similar to bootstrapping in 
the Chapter 6, bootstrapping procedures adopted here are followed the sug-
247
gestion of Simar and Wilson (2004), using the software written in ExceF. 
Bootstrapping results are shown in Table 7.7 and Table 7.8.
> Table 7.7 presents the number of times that a particular D M U  is labelled 
as technically efficient from 1000 iterations as well as the biases of the aver­
aged bootstrapped DEA efficiency scores from their original DEA efficiency 
scores. For instance, consider the performance of PTT in 1984. The results 
show that 526 times out of 1000 (around 53 percent) indicated PTT was 
technically efficient in 1984, as the original DEA efficiency score suggests. In 
addition, for many years (such as 1984, 1985, 1996), bootstrapping results 
indicate that 100 percent of 1000 iterations suggest that British Gas were 
technically efficiency, which was consistent with the DEA efficiency scores. 
Furthermore, from the biases of the averaged bootstrapped DEA efficiency 
scores from the original efficiency scores, they show that, DEA efficiency 
scores of PTT and Petronas tend to be overestimated (as the biases^ were 
mostly negative); while for Osaka Gas, the DEA efficiency scores are underes­
timated. For British Gas, bootstrapping suggests that the DEA performed in 
the previous section was rather accurate, as for many year the biases appear 
to be zero.
Table 7.8 shows confidence intervals—upper and lower percentiles—for 
the efficiency scores. For instance, focussing on the performance of PTT in 
1996, although the DEA efficiency score suggested that the company was 
technically efficient in that years, bootstrapping results implied that at 95%
^The Visual Basic Code written for this bootstrapping Macro in Excel is presented in 
Figure A.l of Appendix A.
^The bias = Bootstrapped DEA efficiency score -  Original DEA efficiency score
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confidence interval, P T T ’s efficiency in 1996 can be varied between 0.291 
and 1.000. Nonetheless for British Gas in such as 1996, at 99% confidence 
interval, bootstrapping result suggested that the firm was technically efficient 
in that year.
7.4 Sum m ary and Conclusion
In this chapter, similar to Chapter 6, comparative technical efficiency of 
four gas companies (PTT, Petronas, Osaka Gas and British Gas) during the 
period 1984/85-1996/97 was measured by SFA and DEA. It was also assumed 
that these gas companies used the two inputs to produce the single output 
and there are three environmental factors that might affect the companies’ 
efficiency. However, unlike the previous chapter, the techniques used in this 
chapter were input-oriented. With the same procedure as that in Chapter 
6, firstly SFA was undertaken. It was found that the results of the input- 
oriented SFA efficiency scores are different from those of the output-oriented 
SFA. As discussed in Section 7.3.3, the correlation between their efficiency is 
only 0.46. This could well be due to the unavoidable restriction of constant 
returns to scale in the input-oriented SFA model. Despite the huge difference 
in terms of efficiency scores, the results fi*om both techniques agree that the 
companies’ concentration of gas utilisation had a positive influence on their 
technical efficiency, which implies the robustness of the SFA results on this 
effect. In addition, both input-oriented and output-oriented SFA have not 
found a significant effect of being state-owned company on the efficiency 
scores.
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Unlike the SFA, efficiency scores obtained from the input-oriented DEA 
and the output-oriented DEA in Chapter 6 are robust. Not only that the 
input-oriented DEA is robust with the output-oriented DEA, it also consis­
tent with the result of the output-oriented SFA. Moreover, similar to the 
SFA results, the DEA results suggest that state ownership did not have 
a significant impact on the companies’ technical efficiency during the pe­
riod 1984/85-1996/97, since their efficiency scores remain very close with 
or without the factor. In addition, from bootstrapping, it implied that the 
input-oriented DEA model is rather accurate, as on average the biases of 
bootstrapped DEA score from the original one are small. In addition, partic­
ularly for British Gas, for many years, bootstrapping results suggested that 
the DEA efficiency scores is correct with a zero bias and 1000 out of 1000 
times that British Gas appeared to be efficient in those years.
In summary, with regard to preferred techniques, in the case of input- 
orientation, DEA seems to be more preferable. It is because of its consis­
tency with respect to the results of those output-oriented analyses as well as 
a support from bootstrapping on its accuracy. However, regardless the quan­
titative difference in the technical efficiency scores from both techniques, it 
can be observed that they have suggested some common results. Firstly, 
both SFA and DEA have found that PTT performed relatively well com­
pared with the three benchmark companies during the sample period. In 
addition their results commonly implied that among these four gas compa­
nies, the status of their ownership had no significant effect on the companies’ 
technical efficiency during 1984-1996. Moreover, they suggested that there
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was evidence of a significant positive influence of the concentration of the 
gas market on the companies’ technical efficiency. This effect is in favour 
of PTT given the high proportion of gas consumed by power generation in 
Thailand, in the sense that it can be argued that the result of high technical 
efficiency in PTT was contributed by the high concentration in the Thai gas 
market^. This effect of the concentration of the gas market on P T T ’s tech­
nical efficiency will be investigated using counter-factual experiments in the 
next chapter.
*See the discussion on the pattern of gas utilisation in Thailand in Chapter 2
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Table 7.7: Bias of the Bootstrapped DEA from the original DEA scores
Companies Years Number of tim es being 100% . Bias of Bootstrapped Efficiency Scores
PT T 1984 526 -0.1546
1985 293 -0.3263
1986 92 -0.0833
1987 183 -0.3089
1988 222 -0.3770
1989 147 -0.2193
1990 97 -0.2127
1991 166 -0.3346
1992 149 -0.3018
1993 213 -0.3365
1994 291 -0.4026
1995 346 -0.3528
1996 392 -0.2785
A v era g e — -0 .2 8 3 8
Petronas 1984 24 -0.0984
1985 241 -0.4634
1986 275 -0.4192
1987 253 -0.4668
1988 259 -0.4641
1989 259 -0.3415
1990 322 -0.2970
1991 25 -0.1846
1992 62 -0.1882
1993 103 -0.2877
1994 156 -0.3374
1995 230 -0.4387
1996 669 -0.1329
A v e ra g e — -0 .3 1 6 9
Osaka Gas 1984 4 -0.0476
1985 4 -0.0345
1986 0 -0.0077
1987 2 0.0144
1988 1 0.0179
1989 2 0.0159
1990 1 0.0288
1991 3 0.0330
1992 7 0.0439
1993 4 0.0206
1994 13 0.0332
1995 11 0.0351
1996 20 0.0371
A v era g e — 0 .0 1 4 6
British Gas 1984 1000 0.0000
1985 1000 0.0000
1986 1000 0.0000
1987 1000 0.0000
1988 298 -0.2463
1989 169 -0.3279
1990 149 -0.3440
1991 1000 0.0000
1992 293 -0.0701
1993 207 -0.2369
1994 252 -0.2625
1995 280 -0.2241
1996 1000 0.0000
A v era g e — -0 .1 3 1 7
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Table 7.8: Confidence Intervals for NIRS Efficiency Score
Confidence Intervals
Companies Years 99% 97.5% 95% 90%
PT T 1984 0.411 - 1.000 0.442 -  1.000 0.477 - 1.000 0.534 1.000
1985 0.114 - 1.000 0.121 -  1.000 0.133 - 1.000 0.163 - 1.000
1986 0.073 - 1.000 0.076 -  1.000 0.082 - 1.000 0.089 - 0.953
1987 0.106 - 1.000 0.114 -  1.000 0.123 - 1.000 0.142 - 1.000
1988 0.118 - 1.000 0.124 -  1.000 0.136 - 1.000 0.149 - 1.000
1989 0.096 - 1.000 0.101 -  1.000 0.107 - 1.000 0.120 - 1.000
1990 0.084 - 1.000 0.086 -  1.000 0.092 - 1.000 0.101 - 0.983
1991 0.101 - 1.000 0.109 -  1.000 0.117 - 1.000 0.129 - 1.000
1992 0.094 - 1.000 0.099 -  1.000 0.107 - 1.000 0.119 - 1.000
1993 0.099 - 1.000 0.108 -  1.000 0 .1 1 4 - 1.000 0.131 - 1.000
1994 0.150 - 1.000 0.162 -  1.000 0.176 - 1.000 0.194 - 1.000
1995 0.150 - 1.000 0.162 -  1.000 0.175 - 1.000 0.203 - 1.000
1996 0.245 - 1.000 0.267 -  1.000 0.291 - 1.000 0.340 - 1.000
Petronas 1984 0.055 - 1.000 0.058 -  0.979 0.060 - 0.748 0.065 - 0.564
1985 0.127 - 1.000 0.138 -  1.000 0.156 - 1.000 0.180 - 1.000
1986 0.199 - 1.000 0.214 -  1.000 0.235 - 1.000 0.263 - 1.000
1987 0.122 - 1.000 0.131 -  1.000 0.152 - 1.000 0.185 - 1.000
1988 0.114 - 1.000 0.129 -  1.000 0,148 - 1.000 0.172 - 1.000
1989 0.107 - 1.000 0.115 -  1.000 0.128 - 1.000 0.149 - 1.000
1990 0.272 - 1.000 0.290 -  1.000 0.317 - 1.000 0.362 - 1.000
1991 0.072 - 1.000 0.075 -  0.986 0.079 - 0.868 0.083 - 0.740
1992 0.081 - 1.000 0.086 -  1.000 0.090 - 1.000 0.097 - 0.888
1993 0.090 - 1.000 0.095 -  1.000 0.104 - 1.000 0.112 - 1.000
1994 0.103 - 1.000 0.108 -  1.000 0.114 - 1.000 0.126 - 1.000
1995 0.110 - 1.000 0.124 -  1.000 0.137 - 1.000 0.152 - 1.000
1996 0.279 - 1.000 0.301 -  1.000 0.328 - 1.000 0.411 - 1.000
Osaka Gas 1984 0.042 - 0.858 0.044 -  0.681 0.047 - 0.546 0.050 - 0.462
1985 0.036 - 0.741 0.037 -  0.567 0.040 - 0.489 0.042 - 0.389
1986 0.027 - 0.600 0.028 -  0.478 0.030 - 0.411 0.032 - 0.309
1987 0.023 - 0.678 0.025 -  0.482 0.028 - 0.391 0.031 - 0.299
1988 0.023 - 0.610 0.025 -  0.478 0.027 - 0.369 0.030 - 0.293
1989 0.026 - 0.684 0.029 -  0.561 0.031 - 0.471 0.035 - 0.362
1990 0.026 - 0.687 0.029 -  0.594 0.031 - 0.493 0.036 - 0.363
1991 0.027 - 0.785 0.030 -  0.606 0.033 - 0.505 0.037 - 0.390
1992 0.029 - 0.888 0.033 -  0.711 0.036 - 0.580 0.042 - 0.463
1993 0.034 - 0.888 0.036 -  0.679 0.040 - 0.585 0.044 - 0.444
1994 0.036 - 1.000 0.040 -  0.881 0.044 - 0.680 0.049 - 0.500
1995 0.036 - 1.000 0.040 -  0.816 0.045 - 0.678 0.052 - 0.543
1996 0.041 - 1.000 0.044 -  0.938 0.048 - 0.752 0.054 - 0.571
British Gas 1984 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 -  1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 - 1.000
1985 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 -  1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 - 1.000
1986 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 -  1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 - 1.000
1987 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 -  1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 —1.000
1988 0.109 - 1.000 0.119 -  1.000 0.137 - 1.000 0.165 - 1.000
1989 0.104 - 1.000 0.108 -  1.000 0.113 - 1.000 0.123 - 1.000
1990 0.100 - 1.000 0.105 -  1.000 0.111 - 1.000 0.120 - 1.000
1991 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 -  1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 - 1.000
1992 0.096 - 1.000 0.105 -  1.000 0.121 - 1.000 0.144 - 1.000
1993 0.100 - 1.000 0.109 -  1.000 0.124 - 1.000 0.148 - 1.000
1994 0.101 - 1.000 0.111 -  1.000 0.120 - 1.000 0.135 1.000
1995 0.103 - 1.000 0.112 -  1.000 0.128 - 1.000 0.162 1.000
1996 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 -  1.000 1.000 - 1.000 1.000 - 1.000
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Chapter 8
Further Analysis: Productivity  
Change and Counter-Factual 
Experiments
8.1 Introduction
This chapter extends from the measured technical efficiency by considering 
two types of analyses. The first analysis aims to assess the change in produc­
tivity of the four gas companies (PTT, Petronas, Osaka Gas and British Gas) 
over the period 1984/85 thru 1996/97. As discussed in Chapter 5, efficiency 
can be related to the change in productivity, in the sense that the change in 
efficiency is one of the causes for the productivity change. Several measures 
can be used to evaluate the change in productivity; but the Malmquist Pro­
ductivity Index (MPI), which captures the change in productivity between 
two periods, is utilised here. Following the discussion in Chapter 5, the MPI
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can be decomposed into three effects: the Efficiency Change Effect (TEA)  
representing the better or the poorer performance of the company overtime, 
the Technical Change Effect {TA) reflecting the effect on productivity due 
to the advances in technology and scale economies (SC).
The MPI and its components can be measured by either the DEA-hke 
or the parametric techniques, [see Section 5.4.1 in Chapter 5]. However, 
in this case the data set is small so there are not enough cross-sectional 
observations to run and obtain the appropriate DEA estimates. Besides the 
DEA technique of Parker and Wu (1998) employed for measuring technical 
efficiency in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 is not applicable as it ignores the time- 
series prospect in the data set, which is of interest here. Therefore in this 
chapter, only the output-oriented parametric technique is used to estimate 
the MPI. The parametric technique—its specification and the results—will 
be presented and discussed in Section 8.2.
The second analysis extends the SFA results in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. 
It explores the effect of the concentration of the gas market on P T T ’s tech­
nical efficiency using counter-factual experiments. As suggested by the SFA 
results, the concentration of gas utilisation had a positive effect on technical 
efficiency (i.e it tended to increase a company’s technical efficiency^). In con­
sequence, it can be argued that the result of a high level of relative efficiency 
found for PTT, whose market was very concentrated^, is partially derived 
from this effect. The first experiment aims to investigate how P T T ’s techni-
S^ee more discussion on this in Section 4.2.3, Chapter 4.
^More than 80 percent of gas in Thailand is consumed by a few large power plants, [see 
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2].
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cal efficiency would have been affected if during 1984/85-1996/97, PTT. faced 
another type of gas market—the less concentrated gas market in the sense 
that there was a larger share of gas consumed in the Thai residential and 
commercial sector compared with the total gas consumption in the country.
To examine this, a pseudo PTT is created. Its data are constructed 
under two scenarios. The first scenario assumes that in response to this 
change in the type of gas market, PTT would have increased the length 
of its pipeline, particularly the distribution pipeline, while its numbers of 
employees remained the same. The second scenario assumes that in response 
to the change, the company would have increased both its length of pipeline 
and its number of employees. The details of each scenario are described in 
Section 8.3.1. Using the preferred output-oriented SFA model in Chapter 6, 
technical efficiency of the pseudo PTT, under each scenario can be compared 
with that of the original company and hence the effect of pattern of the 
gas market (or concentration of the gas market) on P T T ’s efficiency can be 
studied. The results are presented and discussed in Section 8.3.2.
The second counter-factual experiment, instead of simulating the new de­
mand from the residential and commercial sector for PTT and hence moving 
the company toward the less concentrated gas market, it assumes that gas 
demand from the residential and commercial sector of Osaka Gas and British 
Gas were removed. In consequence, the gas market faced by Osaka Gas and 
British Gas would have been more concentrated, which would have been
similar to those faced by PTT and Petronas^. Given the advantage of PTT
^See Section 4.4, Chapter 4 for the concentration of gas market actually faced by each 
company.
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over British Gas and Osaka Gas in terms of the pattern of gas utilisation, 
this experiment tries to eliminate this advantages of PTT and hence aims to 
evaluate how technically efficient PTT might have been comparatively with 
that of the two companies if they faced similar type of gas market. As a 
result, pseudo companies for British Gas and Osaka Gas, whose performance 
reflecting what might have been performance of British Gas and Osaka Gas 
if they served industrialised market, are created. Their data are constructed 
following a procedure presented in Section 8.4.1. Similar to the first experi­
ment, the data of the pseudo companies are added into the original data set. 
Again adopting the preferred output-oriented SFA model, technical efficiency 
of the pseudo companies can be compared with that of PTT as well as their 
actual companies. The results are discussed in Section 8.4.2. Finally, Section 
8.5 offers a summary and conclusion from all analyses.
8.2 P rod u ctiv ity  Change
8.2.1 M odel’s Specification
In this analysis, the Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) capturing the 
changes in productivity of the four gas companies during 1984-1996 is es­
timated using the output-oriented parametric technique. In particular, the 
preferred output-oriented SFA model (SFA-O-NS) outlined in Section 5.4.3 
in Chapter 5 is adopted. Equation 6.1, Equation 6.11 and Equation 6.3 of 
the preferred model are estimated. The MPI capturing the change in produc­
tivity between two periods and its decomposed elements: efficiency change
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(TEA), technical change (TA) and scale economies (SC) can be estimated 
directly from the SFA results, which can be described as follows.
The rate of change in productivity of the company between the and 
the period (TFPs^t,i) is the sum of the three factors measured between 
the two period as shown in Equation 5.108, which can be rewritten as,
TFPs^t,i =  TA(^s,t;i) +TEA(^s,t]i) +  SCAf^s^i)’
The first factor—the contribution of technical change on the change in pro­
ductivity (TA)—can be measured by Equation 5.102, which can be derived 
directly from a production frontier. Given that in this case Equation 6.1 is 
the production frontier, the rate of the contribution of technical change to 
the change in productivity between period s and t {TA( s^,t-,i)) is,
TA(^ s,t]i) =  {[Pit fil Lis +  Pki lu Kis +  A] x
[ P h t  lu L i t  +  P m  lu F u  T A ] • (8.1)
Regarding the second factor—the contribution of efficiency change on the 
productivity change (TEA)—as shown in Equation 5.105 can be calculated 
from the SFA technical efficiency scores obtained in Chapter 6. Rewriting 
Equation 5.105, the rate of efficiency change between period s and period t 
(TEA(g,f.q) is given by;
T E A , , ,  =  1 1 - 1 .
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Finally, for the contribution of scale economies to the change in produc­
tivity can be measured by Equation 5.107, which, similar to the technical 
change effect, can be derived from the production frontier. Given that the 
production frontier is Equation 6.1, the rate of scale effect on productivity 
change between the period and the period can be expressed as,
^  [(e* -  l ) ( - f y  +  -  l)(" f -  ln < ]. (8.2)
n=L,K
where =  L ^K  are labour elasticity (e^) and capital elasticity at 
the period. and can be calculated using Equation 6.6 and Equation 
6.8 in Chapter 6, respectively, +
8.2.2 Results of M PI
The productivity change and their factors indices are calculated as outlined 
in the previous section. For each company, the indices are summed accumu­
latively year-by-year and plotted in Figure 8.1. In general, it can be seen 
that every company experienced the growth in productivity during the pe­
riod 1984/85-1996/97. And for all companies except Petronas, the growth 
was primarily driven by the technical progress.
In particular. Figure 8.1a shows that from 1987/88 to 1995/96 the pro­
ductivity of PTT grew by around 92 percent. The growth was clearly driven 
by the technical progress. Nonetheless, it can be observed that between 
1995/96 and 1996/97, it declined dramatically, which appears to come about 
primarily by the scale effect and partly by the drop in its technical efficiency
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Figure 8.1: Productivity Changes and the effects during 1984/85-1996/97
during the period. The decrease in its productivity might be a result of the 
significant increase in its length of the pipeline in 1995/96 after it was fixed 
for over the first twelve years of the studied period.
Regarding Osaka Gas and British Gas, Figure 8.1c and Figure 8.Id il­
lustrate the continuous improvement in productivity of both companies— 
around 70 percent overall. In addition, British Gas in particular, its pro­
ductivity seems to accelerate significantly after 1992. It is apparent that the 
progress was dominantly driven by the progress in technology, while the scale
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effect as well as the efficiency change effect played the minor roles.
In contrast to the other companies, the change in productivity of Petronas 
fluctuated dramatically over the period mainly affected by the scale effect 
and efficiency change effect. Prom 1984/85 to 1990/91, there was a significant 
growth in its productivity related to a significant improvement in its technical 
efficiency. Nonetheless, after that its productivity began to decline, which 
could be a result of the scale effect before picking up again during 1991/92- 
1995/96.
It is useful to compare the change in productivity presented here from 
the MPI with the results of the single-factor productivity presented in Fig­
ure 4.5, Chapter 4. In general, for each company, the movement of total 
productivity obtained by MPI is similar to the sample labour productivity. 
This suggested that during 1984/85-1996/97, the change in total productiv­
ity was more infiuenced by labour productivity than by capital productivity. 
The similarity can be seen in the case of PTT and Petronas, where there were 
significant changes during the period. Focussing on PTT, the shape of the 
movement of total productivity is similar to that of the labour productivity , 
particularly the considerable decline during 1995/96—1996/97; even though 
the slight drop in productivity in the early years of the sample seems to be 
attributed to the noticeable decrease in the company’s capital productivity. 
As for Petronas, again the movement the total productivity is similar to that 
of the labour productivity, particularly the rise from 1984/85 until it reached 
the peak in 1990/91 and the dramatic decline during 1990/91-1991/92.
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8.3 C ounter-factual E xperim ent: w hat if  P T T
faced a less concentrated  gas m arket
Similar to the other analyses in this thesis, firstly it is assumed that the inte­
grated gas company uses two inputs—the number of employees and the length 
of pipeline {km)—to produce a single output, which is the total amount of 
gas sold (therms). In addition, following the preferred output-oriented SFA 
model in Chapter 6 (SFA-O-NS), it is assumed that there are two environ­
mental variables that might affect the companies’ efficiency. Those are (1) 
concentration of the gas market and (2) time trend, which is allowed to be 
varied from company-to-company.
As mentioned in Section 8.1 , this counter-factual experiment aim s to 
examine how P T T ’s technical efficiency would have been affected, if during 
1984/85-1996/97 the company faced a less concentrated gas market. In order 
to investigate this, a pseudo company is created. Performance of the pseudo 
PTT reflects the possible behaviour of PTT, suppose the company faced the 
less concentrated gas market.
To construct the data for the pseudo PTT, it is assumed that there was 
an additional demand for natural gas from the residential and commercial 
sector; furthermore, in response to this additional demand, it is assumed 
that PTT would have reacted in two different ways. (I) it is assumed that 
PTT would have invested more on pipeline, the distribution pipeline in par­
ticular. This assumption is based on the fact that effectively there is no 
distribution pipeline network in Thailand, given most of gas is consumed in
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power plants. However, it is assumed that its number of employees would 
have been remained the same. This response is referred to as Scenario A 
in the experiments. Alternatively, (II) PTT would have both expanded its 
distribution pipeline and increased its number of employees. This is referred 
to as Scenario B  in the experiments.
For each scenario, after the data for the pseudo PTT  are constructed, 
they are added to the original data set as the fifth company. Using the 
preferred output-oriented SFA model in Chapter 6, technical efficiency of the 
pseudo company is compared with that of the original PT T  and hence the 
effect of concentration of the gas market on P T T ’s technical efficiency can be 
investigated. In the next section, the details of each scenario and algorithms 
for constructing the data for the pseudo PT T  are described. Then in Section 
8.3.2, the results are presented and discussed.
8.3.1 Scenarios 
Scenario  A: L  is fixed
To construct the data for the pseudo PTT under Scenario A, firstly it is 
assumed that the demand for natural gas in Thailand during 1984-1996 had 
stepped increased by 20, 30, . . . ,  100, and 110 percent of the original gas sold 
for each year, respectively. This additional demand is assumed to be from the 
residential and commercial sector. This implies that the larger the demand 
in the residential and commercial sector, the less concentrated the market 
becomes. Therefore, as the demand in the residential and commercial sector 
gradually increases, the trend of the effect of concentration of market on
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P T T ’s technical efficiency, as the market became less and less concentrated 
can be studied. As mentioned earlier, in response to the additional demand 
in the residential and commercial sector, in Scenario A, it is assumed that 
PTT would have expanded its low-pressured distribution pipeline, while its 
number of employees would have remained the same. The data for the psedo 
PTT under this scenario are constructed using the procedures presented in 
the Algorithm 1, which, for simplicity, considers only when the additional 
demand from the residential and commercial sector assumed to increase by 
20% of the original gas total sold in each year.
Algorithm  1: Simulating D ata for th e pseudo P T T  (Scenario A)
1. Firstly, suppose the volume of gas sold increased by 20 percent of the 
original total gas sold {SALEpTT,t)-> so that for the period, the new 
total volume of gas sold by the pseudo company, referred to as P T T  (A): 
NewSALEt,  can be expressed as,
New SALEt = 1.20 x SALEppp^i. (8.3)
2. Since the additional demand is assumed to be from the residential and 
commercial sector, the volume of gas sold in this sector would be dif­
ferent from the original sectoral demand. Hence, the new volume of 
gas sold to this sector (NewRk,Ct) is equal to,
NewRSzCt — 0.2 x SALEppp f -f- RSzCppp^t, (8.4)
where RSzCpTT,t is the original volume of gas consumed in the residen-
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tial and commercial sector at the f "  period.
3. As mentioned earlier, by increasing the proportion of the gas demand 
from the residential and commercial sector, the market would have 
become less concentrated. Therefore the new concentration of the gas 
market would be.
NewSTRUCTt = # ewjZ&C, ^
N ew SALE t
4. Since effectively there was no distribution pipeline network in Thailand, 
in the scenario, it is assumed that PTT would have had to invest in 
the new distribution pipeline by expanding its distribution pipeline at 
the same amount of distribution pipeline as British Gas used to serve 
a unit of gas sold in the residential and commercial sector.
DiSBG,t
BG,t
(8.6)
where DisBG,t denotes the length of British Gas’s distribution line at 
the period and RSzCBG,t denotes the amount of gas sold by British 
Gas in the residential and commercial sector. The ratio indicates, on 
average, how much of the distribution pipehne British Gas used to serve 
one unit of gas demand in residential and commercial sector, which was 
varied over the thirteen years as shown in Figure 8.2.
5. Using the ratio in Equation 8.6, the additional distribution pipeline 
network NewDist that PTT might have needed to invest can be con-
265
2DE-05
16E-05
12E-05
8DE-06
4DE-05
O.OE+00 T I I I I I I-------------1------------1------------1 I—~ I
BG84 BG85 BG86 BG87 BG88 BG89 BG90 BG91 BG92 BG93 BG94 BG95 BG96
Figure 8.2: Amount of distribution pipeline (km) used by BG per unit of 
gas sold in residential and commercial sector {therms)
structed,
NewDist =  NewRSzCf x
Dis BG,t
BG,t
(8.7)
6. Therefore, the new total length of pipeline {NewKt) of the pseudo PTT 
would be
NewKf, — NewDisi T (8.8)
7. Repeat Step (l)-(6) for t = 1 , . . . , 13  times to construct the perfor­
mances of the pseudo PTT over the period 1984-1996, under this sce­
nario.
In consequence, it can be observed that comparing with the original PTT, 
the pseudo PTT (under this scenario is referred to as P T T  {A)), has different
266
volumes of gas sold (NewSALEt), different total length of pipehne (NewKt) 
but the same number of employees (LpTT,t)'^- The data of P T T  (A) will be 
added to the original data set, as the fifth company. At each step of the 
demand expansion, this new data set is analysed using the preferred output- 
oriented SFA model [See Section 6.3.1 in Chapter 6].
The procedures are to be repeated as the additional demand from the 
residential and commercial sector assumed to stepped increase by 20, 30, 40,
. . . ,  100 and 110 percent® of the each year P T T ’s original gas sale respec­
tively. This is aimed to examine the effect of concentration of the gas market 
on P T T ’s technical efficiency. The results of this experiment are shown in 
Section 8.3.2.
Scenario B; B o th  K  an d  L  a re  changed
Similar to Scenario A, it is assumed that the demand on natural gas in 
Thailand during 1984-1996 had gradually increased by 20, 30, . . . ,  100, and 
110 percent of the original gas sold at each year, respectively. The additional 
demand is assumed to be from the residential and commercial sector. In 
response to this additional demand, it is assumed that PTT would have 
expanded its distribution pipeline, as well as its numbers of employees, which 
is unlike Scenario A where the numbers of employees were held fixed. The 
new employees are assumed to be needed for serving the new customers in
I^t is noted that in Scenario A, the numbers of employees were assumed to remain the 
same.
®It is noted that the increase in the gas demand from the residential and commercial 
sector stops when it reaches 110 percent of the original total gas sold, since at this point, 
the market the pseudo PTT assumed to face, would be as concentrated as the UK gas 
market that British Gas actually faced.
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the residential and commercial sector and also operating and maintenance of 
the new distribution pipeline.
To construct the data for the pseudo PT T  under Scenario B, for the data 
on the new distribution pipeline needed to be invested, the procedures are 
followed what presented in the Algorithm 1. Nonetheless, the data on the 
additional numbers of employees needed for serving the additional demand 
are constructed following the procedures shown in Algorithm 2. Again for 
simplicity, the procedures consider only the case when the additional demand 
from the residential and commercial sector is assumed to be accounted for 
20% of the original total gas demand in each year.
Algorithm  2; Sim ulating D ata for the pseudo P T T  (Scenario B)
1. Follow steps (l)-(6) of the Algorithm 1 to construct NewKt.
2. In addition, to simulate how much more employees PTT might have 
needed if the company faced the increase in demand in residential and 
commercial sector, in this study, it is assumed that PTT would have 
used the same amount of labour forces per the length of pipeline as 
British Gas did: {LBG,t/KBG,t), which was varied from-year-to-year, as 
shown in Figure 8.3.
3. Using the ratio in (2), the additional employees that PTT might have 
wanted to employed, at the period (AddLt) would be equal to.
AddLt = NewDist x (8.9)
KBG,t
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Figure 8.3: Amount of number of employees used by BG per unit length of 
its pipeline {hm)
4. As a result, the new total number of P T T ’s employee at the period 
(NewLt), under Scenario B would be.
NcwLt — AddLt T  Lppp t^ (8 .10)
where, LpTT,t is the actual number of P T T ’s employees at the period.
5. Repeat Step (l)-(4) for t  = 1 , . . . ,  13 times to construct the possible 
performances of PTT over the period 1984-1996, under this scenario.
In consequence, it can be observed that comparing with the original PTT, 
the data of the pseudo PTT—in which this Scenario the company is referred 
to as P T T {B )—are all different from those of the PTT: the simulated volume 
of PT T ’s gas sale (NewSALEt),  total length of P T T ’s pipeline (NewKt) and 
number of employees (NewLt). The data of P T T (B )  will be included in the 
data set as of the fifth company. Similar to Scenario A, at each step of the
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demand expansion, this new data set is analysed using the preferred output- 
oriented SFA model [see Chapter 6].
The SFA are to be conducted repeatedly as the additional demand in 
the residential and commercial sector assumed to increase by 20, 30, 40, 
.. 100 and 110 percent of the P T T ’s original gas sold at particular year,
respectively. As a result, the positions of efficiency scores of the pseudo 
company relatively with the original PT T  can be used to examine the effect 
of concentration of the gas market on its technical efficiency. The results are 
shown and discussed in Section 8.3.2.
8.3.2 Results and Discussion  
Scenario A ’s R esults
Table 8.1: Average technical efficiency by Scenario A.
NewSALEt Increase by PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas PTT(A)
20% 0.89 0.79 0.18 0.92 0.60
30% 0.89 0.78 0.18 0.93 0.59
40% 0.90 0.57 0.18 0.84 0.90
50% 0.91 0.65 0.18 0.86 0.79
60% 0.91 0.60 0.18 0.83 0.92
70% 0.91 0.61 0.18 0.83 0.93
80% 0.91 0.64 0.18 082 0.90
90% 0.83 0.56 0.17 0.85 0.90
100% 0.83 0.62 0.18 0.91 0.84
110% 0.81 0.56 0.17 0.86 0.91
Table 8.1 shows the average technical efficiency at each step of the in­
crease in gas sold under Scenario A. Moreover, focussing only on PTT and
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Figure 8.4: The differences between the technical efficiency of the pseudo 
PTT: PTT(A), and that of original PTT
the pseudo company {PTT{A))^ Figure 8.4® shows the mean, the maximum 
and the minimum differences of the technical efficiency scores of PTT  and 
of P T T  (A). It appears that as the demand in residential and commercial 
sector is assumed to be increased by a small proportion, the requirement 
for new investment in distribution pipeline could have depressed the pseudo 
P T T ’s technical efficiency. For example, if the demand in the residential 
and commercial sector is assumed to be increased by 20 and 30 percent of 
the original gas sold, the results suggest that the average technical efficiency 
scores of P T T  {A) would be 29 and 30 percent lower than the technical ef­
ficiency of PTT, respectively. However, as the proportion of gas sold in the 
residential and commercial sector is assumed to be larger, the gap between
®Note the changes do not increase monotonically since the production frontier is re- 
estimated at each stage and hence changes.
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the technical efficiency of the two companies gets smaller. At the 40 to 60 
percent increase, the pseudo company appears to be on average equally tech­
nically efficient to the original PTT. Then as the proportion of the gas sale in 
the residential and commercial sector was assumed to be larger than this, the 
results indicate that the pseudo PTT {PTT(A))  would have become more 
technically efficient than the original PTT.
In sum, the results suggest that under Scenario A, at first with a small 
proportion of the gas consumed in the residential and commercial sector, 
the pseudo company {PTT(A))  would have been less technically efficient 
compared with the actual company PTT. However, as the proportion of gas 
consumed in the residential and commercial sector gets larger, it is possi­
ble that P T T  {A) would have become more technically efficient comparing to 
PTT. This could be interpreted that, giving PTT has a very small amount of 
distribution pipeline due to the highly concentrated gas market the company 
actually faced, the requirement of new investment in the distribution net­
work^ would increase amount of inputs used by the company significantly. 
Therefore this might cause technical inefficiency in PTT. In other words, 
with the relative small increase in output (total gas sale) compared with a 
huge amount of new distribution line to be laid, PTT{A)  appeared to be 
technically inefficient compared with PTT. The evidence of this inefficiency 
can be found in the case of 20 and 30 percent increase in gas sold.
Nonetheless, as the proportion of the gas demand in the residential and
^Basically, a distribution pipeline network consist of low-pressured small pipelines. 
Comparing to the high-pressured pipeline network, given the same amount of demand, 
the distribution network naturally requires the larger amount of pipeline, in order to serve 
numerous small customers.
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commercial sector is assumed to become larger, the utilisation of the pipe (the 
amount of gas sale proportional to the amount of the distribution pipeline) 
would have been maximised. In consequence, the technical efficiency scores 
of the pseudo company— P T T  (A)—would have been improving and finally 
would become more technically efficient than the original PTT. The results 
imply that although facing the new investment on distribution pipeline when 
the market became less concentrated, PTT  could have retained or even im­
proved its technical efficiency. However, this could have happened, only when 
the market became much less concentrated; moreover under the assumption 
of unchanging number of employees, which as discussed earlier could be done 
by contracting out.
Scenario B s R esults
Table 8.2 shows the average technical efficiency at each stepped increase 
under Scenario B. It can be observed that unlike those of P T T  (A) in Scenario 
A where the efficiency scores of the pseudo company would have become 
more efficient than the actual company when the market became much less 
concentrated, the technical efficiency scores of P TT{B )  are estimated to be 
much lower than those of PTT. This implies that, under this scenario, where 
the company would expand both of its inputs to meet the new demand, as 
the gas market became less concentrated, the new investments that would 
put in for serving the new demand in the residential and commercial sector 
would reduce the company’s technical efficiency considerably.
Furthermore, focussing only on PTT and PTT{B),  Figure 8.5 presents
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the mean, the maximum and the minimum differences between the techni­
cal efficiency of PTT  and its pseudo company under Scenario B. It can be 
observed that technical efficiency of P TT{B )  is estimated to be much lower 
than that of PTT. Moreover, unUke in the Scenario A, the results suggest 
that it would have remained lower as the gas market is assumed to be less 
and less concentrated (the proportion of gas sold in the residential and com­
mercial sector assumed to be larger). In addition, it is apparent that the 
gap between P T T (B )’s technical efficiency scores and the original P T T ’s is 
estimated to be wider, as the market would get less concentrated. In sum, it 
seems that despite the attem pt to maximise the pipeline utilisation, which 
did improve the company’s efficiency in Scenario A, with the expansion in 
both inputs, the technical efficiency the PTT would get worsen comparing 
with its actual technical efficiency scores.
Table 8.2: Average technical efficiency under Scenario B.
NewSALEt Increase by PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas PTT(B)
20% 0.89 0.78 0.18 0.93 0.47
30% 0.90 0.48 0.19 0.84 0.47
40% 0.87 0.77 0.18 0.94 0.42
50% 0.87 0.75 0.18 0.90 0.40
60% 0.88 0.78 0.18 0.93 0.40
70% 0.87 0.78 0.18 0.94 0.40
80% 0.90 0.78 0.18 0.92 0.40
90% 0.89 0.78 0.18 0.90 0.41
100% 0.90 0.76 0.18 0.91 0.40
110% 0.90 0.79 0.18 0.92 0.41
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PTT(B), and that of the original PTT
8.4 C ounter-factual Experim ent: w hat if  B ritish  
G as and Osaka Gas faced industrialised  
gas m arket
Similar to the first counter-factual experiment, the preferred output-oriented 
SFA model of two inputs, a single output and two environmental variables 
in Chapter 6 is adopted. As mentioned in the introduction, this experiment 
aims to try  to reduce the advantage of PTT over British Gas and Osaka Gas 
in terms of the pattern of its gas utilisation following the SFA result. Con­
sequently, the pseudo companies of British Gas and Osaka Gas are created. 
Their performance refiects what might have been the behaviour of British 
Gas and Osaka Gas if they faced the highly concentrated gas market like
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PTT and Petronas did.
To construct data for the pseudo companies, it is assumed that the de­
mands from the residential and commercial sector of British Gas and Osaka 
Gas are removed. If there was no demand in the residential and commercial 
sector, the companies would never have been required to invest on distribu­
tion line as well as some employees. Therefore, some distribution pipeline 
and employees will be proportionately removed from the original input used 
by the actual companies as well. This experiment is referred to as Scenario 
G in this study and the details on constructing the data for the pseudo 
companies are presented the next section. Then the constructed data of the 
pseudo companies are added to the original data set as the 5*^  and the 6*^  
companies. Using the preferred output-oriented SFA model in Chapter 6, 
the relative technical efficiency of these companies can be evaluated. The 
efficiency scores of the pseudo British Gas, as well as those of pseudo Osaka 
Gas can be compared to the scores of their original companies to examine 
whether the companies might have been performed better if they were to 
focus only on industrial customers. In addition, the efficiency score of the 
pseudo British Gas can be compared to those of PTT to investigate how 
technically efficient PTT would have appeared to be, if the company was 
compared to the other gas companies with similar structure and subject to 
similar type of market. The results are presented and discussed in Section 
8.4.2.
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8.4.1 Scenario C
Firstly, it is noted that for simphcity here it focusses only on constructing the 
data for the pseudo British Gas. As mentioned earlier, it is assumed that the 
demand for gas of British Gas in the residential and commercial sector was 
stepped removed to 60, 50, .. . ,  10, 5, 2.5 and 0 percent of the actual sectoral 
demand. This implies that as the amount of demand in the residential and 
commercial sector is assumed to decrease, the level of concentration of the 
UK gas market is assumed to be increased, as most of the gas is assumed to 
be consumed in the industrial consumers. Hence, the gas market faced by the 
pseudo British Gas would have been similar to the P T T ’s gas market. Under 
these circumstances, it is assumed that the pseudo British Gas would have 
invested less both in terms of distribution pipeline and employees compared 
with its actual company. The data of the pseudo British Gas (as well as Osaka 
Gas) are constructed following the Algorithm 3, which again for simplicity 
will be considered only when the demand for the gas of British Gas in the 
residential and commercial sector is assumed to be reduced to 60 percent of 
the actual sectoral demand.
A lgorithm  3: Simulating D ata for the pseudo British Gas and Os­
aka Gas (Scenario C)
1. Firstly, suppose that the demand in the residential and commercial sec­
tor of British Gas reduced to 60 percent of the actual sectoral demand 
and hence the new demand in the residential and commercial sector of
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the pseudo British Gas [BG(I)] can be expressed as,
N ew R hC t = 0.6 x RSzCBG,t’ (8.11)
2. Therefore the new total gas demand of BG(I) is equal to,
NewSA.LEf; =  NewRSzCt -b LARGEsCjti (8.12)
where LARGEBo,t is the amount of gas sold to industrial consumers 
and power plants by the actual British Gas.
3. The new concentration of gas market faced by BG(I) would be,
m ^ S T S U C T ,  ■ (O S )
4. Assume that the amount of distribution line used to served per unit of 
gas is constant. Therefore as the amount of gas sold is assumed to be 
reduced to 60 percent, the amount of distribution line is also assumed 
to be proportionately contracted to 60 percent of the actual amount of 
distribution line used by the actual British Gas:
NewDist = 0.6 x DisBG,t^ (8.14)
5. Hence, the new total amount of pipeline used by the pseudo British
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Gas would be,
NewKt = NewDist + T ru n k  bg,u (8.15)
where. T runkbg,i is the amount of high-pressured pipeline of the actual 
British Gas.
6. It is assumed that the amount of employees the pseudo British Gas 
would have used to operate the unit length of pipeline is the same as 
that of the actual British Gas: L bg.iI E bg.ù as a result the new amount 
of employees hired by the pseudo British Gas would be.
NewLt = X N e w K f  (8.16)
R bg.i
7. Repeat Step (l)-(6) for t  =  1 , . . . ,  13 times to construct the perfor­
mances of the pseudo British Gas [BG(I)] over the period 1984-1996, 
under this scenario.
8. Repeat Step (l)-(7) using Osaka Gas’s data to construct the perfor­
mance of the pseudo Osaka Gas—which is referred to as OSK(I) in this 
experiment.
Consequently, the data of both BG(I) and OSK(I) are included into the 
original data set and the new data set is re-estimated using the preferred 
output-oriented SFA model. The whole procedures are to be repeated as the 
demand from the residential and commercial of both British Gas and Osaka
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Gas was assumed to be reduced to 60, 50, . . . ,  10, 5, 2.5 and 0 percent^ of 
the actual sectoral demand, respectively.
8.4.2 Results and Discussion
Table 8.3; Average technical efficiency under Scenario C.
N ewD is PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas OSK(I) BG(I)
60 % DisBG 0.96 0.83 0.39 0.96 0.39 0.96
50 % DisBG 0.94 0.68 0.29 0.89 0.30 0.90
40 % DisBG 0.86 0.72 0.18 0.87 0.17 0.86
30 % D isbg 0.96 0.69 0.26 0.92 0.36 0.95
20 % DisBG 0.96 0.80 0.40 0.96 0.40 0.96
10 % DisBG 0.90 0.77 0.18 0.90 0.20 0.91
5 % DisBG 0.91 0.77 0.17 0.83 0.26 0.93
2.5 % DisBG 0.89 0.80 0.16 0.80 0.29 0.93
0 % DisBG 0.89 0.79 0.14 0.63 0.60 0.95
Table 8.3 shows the average technical efficiency at each step of the removal 
of the demands in residential and commercial sector of British Gas and Os­
aka Gas^. In general, it can be observed that the pseudo companies—both 
BG(I) and OSK(I)—are estimated to be more technically efficient compared 
to their actual companies. On average, the pseudo British Gas is estimated 
to perform more technically efficient than the actual British Gas around 6 
percent; whereas the pseudo Osaka Gas is estimated to perform relatively 
better than its actual company for around 8 percent. This implies that the 
companies might have performed better if they focussed their markets on
0^ percent means that there would be no demand from the residential and commercial 
sector
®It is noted that counter-factual experiments for BG(1) and OSK(I) individually have 
also been undertaken; however since the qualitative results are the same, they are not 
reported in detail.
280
industrial customers, which confirmed the SFA result on the positive effect 
of concentration of gas market on technical efficiency. Figure 8.6 shows the 
trend of the difference between the technical efficiency of the pseudo and 
that of their actual companies, as the market was assumed to become more 
concentrated. It can be seen that at the beginning, the pseudo companies are 
estimated to be slightly more technical efficient than the original companies. 
However, as the markets were assumed to be more and more concentrated, 
the differences between the technical efficiency of the pseudo companies and 
their actual companies are estimated to be bigger. Particularly, when it is 
assumed that there was no demand from the residential and commercial sec­
tor (0% in the figure), the technical efficiency of the pseudo companies are 
estimated to be 32 percent for British Gas and 45 percent for Osaka Gas.
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Figure 8.6: The differences between technical efficiency of the pseudo and 
their actual companies and between technical efficiency of the pseudo British 
Gas and PTT
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In addition, comparing the technical efficiency of these pseudo compa­
nies with P T T ’s is expected to provide more reahstic information on how 
technically efficient PTT was relatively with British Gas and Osaka Gas. As 
in this experiment, the demand in the residential and commercial of British 
Gas and Osaka Gas are removed, that means PTT  can be compared to these 
companies when the advantages on the concentration of the gas utihsation 
are reduced and finally removed. Focussing on the technical efficiency of 
the pseudo British Gas and PTT, The results suggest that at the beginning 
both PTT and the pseudo British Gas are estimated to be equally techni­
cally efficient; even though from Figure 8.6, it seems that there are some 
fluctuations in the curve. The fluctuations might be a result of the quan­
titative differences in the estimated production frontiers at each step of the 
reduced demand. Nonetheless, in general as the market was assumed to be 
more concentrated, the results suggest that the pseudo British Gas would 
have been more technically efficient than PTT. Particularly, when finally it 
is assumed no demand in residential and commercial sector for British Gas, 
which makes the market of the pseudo British Gas similar to P T T ’s gas 
market, the result indicated that the pseudo British Gas would have been 
more technically efficient than PTT for more than 6 percent. This implies 
that there is a possibility that PTT becomes less technically efficient than 
it appeared in the analyses in previous chapters, if it is compared with the 
other gas companies facing similar type of gas market (very concentrated gas 
market).
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8.5 Sum m ary and C onclusion
From the first analysis— measuring the change in productivity. Malmquist 
Productivity Index (MPI), measured by the SFA-like technique is adopted. 
The results suggest that over the estimation period, all companies experi­
enced the growth in productivity, although at varying rates. Moreover, the 
results suggest that for all companies except for Petronas, the improvements 
in productivity were driven primarily by the technical change effect, whereas 
for Petronas, the efficiency change and the scale effects play more significant 
roles. Focussing on PTT, the results suggest a steady growth in productivity 
during 1984/85-1995/96 mainly driven by technological progress. Nonethe­
less, there was a dramatic fall in productivity in the last two years mainly 
influenced by the scale and efficiency change effects.
In addition, the counter-factual experiments are used to examine the ef­
fect of the concentration of the gas market on P T T ’s technical efficiency. The 
first experiment assumed that the gas demand in residential and commercial 
sector, in Thailand, increased by 20, 30, . . . ,  110 percent of the original total 
gas sold by PTT during 1984-1996. As a result, the concentration of the gas 
market would becomes less, as the proportion of gas sold in the residential 
and commercial is assumed to be larger. Two scenarios with a number of sim­
ulations have been undertaken The first scenario (Scenario A.) is assumed 
that in response to the new demand, PTT would only have expanded its 
distribution pipeline, while its number of employees would have been fixed. 
In contrast, in Scenario B, PTT would have expanded both its number of 
employees and distribution pipeline in response to the new demand. The
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preferred model of the outpnt-oriented SFA presented in Chapter 6 was cho­
sen to examine the difference between the technical efficiency of the pseudo 
company and that of the original PTT as the concentration of the gas market 
changes.
From Scenario A, the results suggest that if the market became less con­
centrated, PTT would have been required to invest on the new distribution 
pipeline. However, the company might be able to remain technically efficient, 
by not increasing its number of employees. Nonetheless, from Scenario B it 
can be implied that if the company decided to invest more on both employed 
labour and capital (number of employees and distribution pipeline), it could 
be expected that its technical efficiency would worsen compared with its tech­
nical efficiency when there is no gas sold in the residential and commercial 
sector.
In consequence, it can be concluded that the result of this counter-factual 
experiments confirms the SFA results found in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, 
suggesting the positive effect of highly concentrated market on technical ef­
ficiency provides PTT an advantage over the other companies like British 
Gas and Osaka Gas^°. By assuming that PTT would have faced less concen­
trated market, it is estimated that its technical efficiency would worsen both 
under Scenario A and Scenario B. Particularly Scenario B, if PTT increased 
its distribution pipeline and employees in respond to the new demand in the 
residential and commercial sector, the average efficiency scores of the pseudo 
company would have been down to only around 40 to 50 percent compared
®^See Section 4.2.3, Chapter 4 for the discussion on the effect of concentration of gas 
market on technical efficiency of gas companies
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with the around 90 percent of the original PTT.
On the other hand, the second counter-factual experiment, instead of 
expanding the demand for PTT, gradually removed the demand in the resi­
dential and commercial sector of British Gas and Osaka Gas. That means in 
the experiment the gas markets of British Gas and Osaka Gas are assumed 
to move toward the PT T ’s gas market. The amount of distribution pipeline 
and number of employees are assumed to be proportionately reduced accor­
dance with the decrease in the sectoral demand (Scenario C). The results 
again confirmed the SFA result on the effect of concentration of gas market 
on technical efficiency as both the pseudo British Gas and the pseudo Os­
aka Gas were estimated to perform relatively more technically efficient than 
their actual companies. Besides, comparing PTT with pseudo British Gas, 
the results suggested PTT was not as technically efficient as it appeared in 
the previous analyses in the previous chapters, as here when it was compared 
with another technically efficient company with similar type of gas market 
(BG(I)), PTT became less technically efficient.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
This thesis has assessed the technical efficiency and the change in productiv­
ity of PTT—the state-owned integrated gas monopoly in Thailand against 
another three integrated gas monopolies: Petronas (operating in Malaysia), 
Osaka Gas (operating in Japan) and British Gas (operating in the UK) over 
the thirteen-year period (1984/85 thru 1996/97). It is assumed that these 
companies used two inputs (number of employees and length of pipeline) 
to produce single output (total gas sold) with three possible environmental 
variable, which can affect the companies’ technical efficiency. They are the 
time trend, the concentration of the gas market and the ownership of the 
companies.
In this thesis, comparative technical efficiency of the four gas companies 
has been measured using two well-known techniques: Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA) and Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). In addition, both 
techniques were undertaken by the output-oriented approach (Chapter 6) and 
the input-oriented approach (Chapter 7). As for the change in productivity
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of the four companies over the sample period, the Malmquist Productivity 
Index (MPI) was used to capture the change. The MPI was estimated by 
the parametric technique. In addition to these analyses, counter-factual ex­
periments were carried out aiming to examine the effect of pattern of gas 
utilisation in Thailand (the concentration of gas market) on P T T ’s techni­
cal efficiency. The results of these analyses are summarised in the following 
section.
9.1 Sum m ary o f th e  Em pirical R esu lts
Firstly, in Chapter 6, given their monopoly status, it was assumed that the 
gas companies had a control over their output. Both the output-oriented SFA 
and the output-oriented DEA were applied on the balanced panel data for 
the four gas companies over the period 1984/85 thru 1996/97. The output- 
oriented empirical results from both the SFA and the DEA were quanti­
tatively robust; although the technical efficiency scores obtained from the 
DEA were slightly higher than the SFA scores. These results were consistent 
with the results from the bootstrapping—sensitivity analysis—applied to the 
DEA, which suggested that there were some uncertainties in the original DEA 
that led to slightly overestimated DEA efficiency scores. However, on aver­
age, both SFA and DEA found that out of the four companies, PTT was the 
second most technical efficient after British Gas, followed by Petronas and 
Osaka Gas, respectively. Furthermore, they also commonly found that the 
movement of British Gas’s efficiency was more stable compared to P T T ’s. As 
a result, when comparing the result from the two output-oriented techniques,
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neither was clearly preferable for measuring technical efficiency of these four 
gas companies since both provided similar quantitative results. Besides there 
is no clear statistical way to judge one against the other. In addition, the 
SFA estimates also showed that the firms’ concentration of gas utilisation had 
a positive effect on their technical efficiency, which was particular relevant 
to PTT given the high proportion of gas consumed for power generation in 
Thailand.
On the contrary, in Chapter 7, it was assumed that the companies were 
cost minimising, therefore they had the control over their inputs. The input- 
oriented SFA and DEA techniques were applied on the same data set. Unhke 
the output-oriented, the input-oriented SFA and the input-oriented DEA re­
sults were not so consistent. As shown in Table 7.5 in Chapter 7, the input- 
oriented DEA technical efficiency scores were weakly correlated with those of 
the input-oriented SFA. Nonetheless, the results of the input-oriented DEA 
were strongly correlated with the technical efficiency scores of the output- 
oriented SFA and the output-oriented DEA. The shapes of the curves of 
technical efficiency for each company were similar to those obtained from 
the output-oriented SFA and DEA approaches; even though on average, the 
technical efficiency scores of the input-oriented DEA were lower than those 
of the output-oriented techniques. Furthermore, the results of the bootstrap­
ping approach indicated that the input-oriented DEA, similar to the output- 
oriented results, provided overestimated technical efficiency scores for PTT. 
However, the bootstrapping results suggested the accurate results for British 
Gas and Osaka Gas were obtained by the input-oriented DEA. In conse-
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quence, with regard to preferred techniques, the chapter concluded that in 
the case of input-orientation, the DEA was more preferable for measuring 
technical efficiency for these four gas companies due to its consistency with 
respect to the results of those output-oriented analysis and a support from 
bootstrapping on its accuracy.
In addition, extending from the technical efficiency analysis, the result of 
the analysis on the change in productivity presented in Chapter 8 suggested 
that during 1984/85-1996/97 all companies experienced a growth in produc­
tivity, although at varying rates. Moreover, the results indicated for all of 
them except for Petronas, the growths were primarily driven by technological 
progress, whereas Petronas’s productivity growth was more affected by the 
scale effect and efficiency change effect. Focussing on PTT, as mentioned ear­
lier, the improvement in P T T ’s productivity was steady driven by technical 
change. Until during 1995/96-1996/97, the results suggested the company 
suffered from the decline in productivity mainly due to the scale effect and 
the drop in efficiency.
Finally, following from the results of the output-oriented SFA, two counter- 
factual experiments were constructed to examine the impact of the concen­
tration of the gas market on PT T ’s technical efficiency. The first experiment 
assumed that the pattern of the gas utilisation in Thailand was less concen­
trated, with proportionally more gas consumed in the residential and com­
mercial sector. This experiment was conducted under two scenarios. In the 
first Scenario (Scenario A), it was assumed that PTT would have responded 
to this change by expanding its distribution pipeline, but would have not
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increased its number of employees. On the contrary, in the second scenario 
(Scenario B), it supposed that PTT would have responded to the new de­
mand in the residential and commercial sectors by both expanding its length 
of distribution pipeline and its number of employees. From Scenario A, the 
results suggested that as the demand in the residential and commercial sec­
tor assumed to increase, at the beginning technical efficiency of the pseudo 
PTT would have been slightly worse compared with the efficiency of the orig­
inal PTT. However, if the proportion of the demand in the residential and 
commercial sector became larger, technical efficiency of the pseudo company 
would have started to pick up and finally would have become more technical 
efficient than the result of the actual company indicated. On the other hand, 
the results from Scenario B suggested that the pseudo company would have 
been much less technically efficient compared with the actual PTT, through­
out the simulations. In addition, the results suggested that as the proportion 
of the gas consumed in the residential and commercial sector became larger 
(the market became less concentrated), pseudo PTT would have been more 
less technically efficiency compared with the technical efficiency of the actual 
PTT.
Contrary to the first experiment, in the second experiment, instead of 
moving PTT toward the less concentrated market, assumptions have been 
made to move British Gas and Osaka Gas toward the highly concentrated 
market (Scenario C). It was therefore assumed that the demand in the resi­
dential and commercial sector of British Gas and Osaka Gas was gradually 
removed. In addition, given that there was no demand in this sector, it was
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assumed that the amount of distribution pipeline and some employees were 
also contracted. The results suggested that when British Gas was assumed to 
face the industrialised gas market, as PTT actually did, the company would 
appear to be more technically efficient than its actual company as well as 
PTT. In other words, PTT could have been less technically efficient than 
it actually appeared to be, if the company were compared with the other 
companies facing the similar type of market.
9.2 R esearch Q uestion and P olicy  Im plica­
tions
Based on the results from all analyses undertaken in this thesis, the research 
question, outlined in Chapter 1, can now be answered. In terms of technical 
efficiency, the results from all analyses suggested that generally, PTT was 
relatively technically efficient over the estimation period. As it can be ob­
served in Table 9.1, the results from three out of the four techniques adopted 
in this thesis indicated that PTT was the second most relatively technically 
efficiency after British Gas, followed by Petronas and Osaka Gas.
In addition, regarding the change in productivity, the result from the Malmquist 
Productivity Index suggested that PTT experienced improvement in produc­
tivity over the estimation period. Furthermore, they also indicated that most 
of the progress in productivity was driven by a advance in technology not by 
the improvement in efficiency, as shown in Figure 8.1 in Chapter 8.
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Table 9.1: Summary of average technical efficiency (%)
Gas Company PTT Petronas Osaka Gas British Gas
SFA-O-NS 90.89 79.58 18.03 91.57
DEA-NIRS-O-NS 92.98 83.63 39.20 95.78
SFA-I-NS 93.02 87.31 37.33 45.72
DEA-NIRS-I-NS 81.01 80.33 14.40 88.72
In summary, in terms of the policy implication, focussing on PTT, the 
results suggested that the company performed relatively well, even before the 
proposed liberalisation by the Thai government in 1997. However, the results 
of both counter-factual experiments in Chapter 8, provided some pertinent 
cautions for PTT, as they suggest that the result of high level of technical 
efficiency in PTT was partially driven by its highly concentrated gas market. 
As shown in the results of Scenario C, when it was assumed that British 
Gas faced the highly concentrated market and the advantage of PTT arising 
from its given pattern of gas utilisation was assumed to be removed, PTT  is 
estimated to be less technically efficient relative to the pseudo British Gas 
than it appeared to be when compared with the actual British Gas.
Similarly, from the results of the first experiment, by assuming that the 
company faced a less concentrated gas market, it is estimated that the tech­
nical efficiency of PTT would have worsened. However, there might have 
been some possibilities for PTT to remain technically efficient, even though 
the company faced less concentrated market. Following the results from Sce­
nario A, it can be observed that by trying to conserve the amount of inputs 
used—in this case unchanging number of employees—in response to the new
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demand in the residential and commercial sector, PTT could have retained its 
high technical efficiency. In addition, by continuing to conserve the amount 
of inputs (i.e number of employees), as the demand from the residential and 
commercial sector grew, the level of the pseudo P T T ’s technical efficiency 
could have been even more higher that of the actual PTT.
In consequence of the results, at the present circumstances with highly 
concentrated market, it is likely that PTT would want to continue focussing 
on expanding its gas market on those large consumers, like power plants 
and large industrial customers, instead of encouraging the use of gas in the 
residential and commercial sector. It is because, in spite of the attem pt to 
conserve some inputs—like the employees in Scenario A—at the beginning, 
it is estimated that P T T ’s technical efficiency would have been depressed. 
This would have been until the market in the residential and commercial 
sector grew (the market became much less concentrated) before the technical 
efficiency of PTT could have been recovered.
Nonetheless, if unavoidably there is a demand for natural gas from the 
residential and commercial sector in the future, PTT might want to re­
spond to the new demand carefully—trying to conserve the amount of inputs 
used where possible in order to ease the problem regarding its technical ef­
ficiency. Alternatively, its level of technical efficiency might be promoted 
by de-integrating the pipeline operating business from its supply service. By 
doing this, the burden of the investment on the pipeline will no longer belong 
to PTT, which is likely to have a positive impact on the company’s techni­
cal efficiency. In addition, the de-integration or unbundling as discussed in
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the Section 3.3.3 in Chapter 3 should also be beneficial to the liberalisation 
policy introduced by the government and hence the long-term promotion for 
efficiency in the Thai Gas Industry.
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A ppendix A
Bootstrapping procedures
Following the notation in Chapter 5, the Simar and Wilson’s suggested boot­
strapping procedures, as presented in Simar and Wilson (2004), for the 
output-oriented DEA efficiency can be summarised as follows.
S tep  1. Estimate DEA efficiency scores: for each (xi,yi) e  Sn , apply one 
of the distance function model (i.e Equation 5.24 and Equation5.25), 
here assuming it is Equation 5.25, to obtain the estimate of distance 
function, D{xi, yi\P), i = l , . . . , N .
After the DEA efficiency scores are constructed, they are bootstrapped 
following the procedures suggested by Simar and Wilson (1998, 2004).They 
suggested that pseudo data set (D*) should be drawn from a kernel esti­
mate to smooth the bootstrap under the assumption that the distribution 
of inefficiencies is homogenous and does not depend upon location within 
the production set P. Kernel density estimates of the density g{z), when 
Zi,i = 1 ,.. .  ,N  axe values on the real number line, can be expressed as,
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= (A.1)N h ^   ^ h
i = l
where, k(') is a kernel function and h is a bandwidth parameter. Both are to 
be chosen. Simar and Wilson (1998) suggested the reflection method about 
the unity for kernel function. It involves reflecting each of the n  original esti­
mates D{xi, yi\P) about the boundary at unity [by computing l  — D{xi,yi\P)  
for each D(xi, yi\P), i =  1 , . . . ,  iV] to obtain 2n points. Furthermore, for the 
bandwidth parameter h, Silverman (1986) suggested that it can be chosen 
using least-square cross-validation approach. Therefore,
S tep  2. Reflect the N  estimates D{xi, yi\P) about the unity, and determine 
the bandwidth parameter h by least-square cross-validation. However, 
here set h equals to 0.014, since following Silverman (1986), it is sug­
gested to be the optimal value of h.
Instead of evaluating the kernel density function in A .l to draw ran­
dom values, Silverman (1986) provided a computational shortcut to draw the 
bootstrap values (D*), when the kernel function AT(-) is a regular probability 
density function. Suppose is a set of n  iid  draws from the probability
density function used to deflned the kernel function, is a set of values
drawn independently, uniformly and with the replacement from the set of 
reflected distance function estimates, R  =  {D{Xi,yi\P),2  -  D (xi,yi\P}. Let 
d = N~'^ Z)iv=i Then compute.
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— d +  (1 +  +  hsi — d) (A. 2)
where, is the sample variance of the value =  d% +  hsi and by convolution 
theorem, Vi ÿ(-), which is the kernel estimate of density of the original 
distance function estimates and their reflections in R. The mean and variance 
of the d | for i can be expressed as.
E{d*\R) =  1 (A.3)
and.
VAR{d;\R)=s^{l + j^^E_) (A.4)
Reflecting the d* about unity can be done by computing, for each i = 
1 NJ. J . • • 5 i  Y J
= (A.5)
2 — dj, otherwise.
Finally, fold the right half of the symmetric (about 1) estimate g(-) to 
the left of so that d | <  1; Vi Therefore,
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step 3. Use Equation A.2 to draw N  bootstrap values D*,i =
from the kernel density estimate of the efficiency estimates from Step 
1. and their reflected values from Step 2, and then,
S tep  4. Construct a pseudo data set 6'^ with elements {x*,y*) given by 
y* = D lyi/D {xi, yi\P) and x \  =  x.
Rewritten Equation 5.27 in Chapter 5,
[D{xo,yo\P*)] = max{(f)\(l)yo < Y*X,xq > X*X,iX = l , X e  R+}
where Y* = [yl. . .  y%], X* =  [xi . . .  x ’^ ] , (rr|, y*) €  5*^
S tep  5. Use Equation 5.27 to compute the bootstrap estimate D*{xq, yo\P*), 
where P* denotes the convex hull of the free disposal hull of the boot­
strap sample S'j .^
S tep  6. Repeat Step 3-5 B  times to obtain a set of B  bootstrap estimates:
S tep  7. To calculate confldence interval: D{xQ,yQ\P), use Equation 5.30 to 
determine and 6^. Then use Equation 5.32 together with the original 
estimate D*{xQ,yQ\P*) obtained from Step 1.
All these seven step bootstrapping procedures are written in Visual Basic 
codes for Excel, as shown in Figure A.I. These codes are used for bootstrap­
ping DEA efficiency scores through out this thesis.
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SubBootO
Declare DMUNo as integer. This DMUNo represents the DMU under
'eveluatioa In th's exati^e, DMUNo goes from 1 To 52
Dim N As Integer
Dim i As Integer
Dim DNflJNo As Weger
Dim RDMLWo As Integer
Dim Eps(52), cfl(5^, di%)H(52), dStar(52) As Single 
DimH, d0ar,s2 As Single
H=RargeCk2")
•-----------Parting the 5 bootstrappng toops--------------------
N = RangeCD64")
Fori = 1 ToN 
RangeCE64")=i
'------Randomly Sampling 52 new TE and Place them in MZM53-------
Range('N2N533.Select
SelectioaCieerCorterts
'------Global sampTmg---------------------------------------------
ApplicationT^un "ATPVBABM XLASample", ActiveSheeLRanger$C$2$C$53"). ActiveSheelJîangeC5N$2$l\®53"), 'R“, 52, False
 Yeerly sampling--------------------------------------------
ApplicationFtun "ATPVBAENXLAJSampie", AcliveSheet J?angeC$C$2$C$5"). AdiveSheet jRangeC$N$2$N$53. "R". 4. False 
Applicationftun "ATPVBAEN J<LAlSarrple“. AdiveSheet J?ange(”fC$e$C$9“X AdiveShed FtangeC$W:$N$93, ”R“, 4, False 
/SpplicatiGnKun"ATPVBAev|.XLajSample", AdiveShedJtangeCfC$1QfC$130. AdiveSheetJ?angeC$N$1Q$N$13"). "R", 4, False 
/SppllcationKun"ATPVBABIJ{LAlSanple", AdiveShed j(ange("$C$14:$C$173. AdiveShedFtangeC$Nf14:$N|17“), “R*. 4. False 
Application Jîun"ATPV8AENJ{LA!Sarrple“, AdiveShed JtangeC’$C$ia?C$21"), AdiveShed TRanger$N$18$N$21 "3, "R", 4, False 
Application J!un "ATPVBAEN JfLAISample", AdiveShedFtange("$C$22$C$233, AdiveShedJRangeC'$N$22$N$25"), "R". 4, False 
Appncation JRun "ATPVBAEN JtLAiSarrple", AdiveShedFtange("$C$26$C$293, AdiveShedBange("$N$2G$N$29''X "R", 4. False 
AppBcationJRun "ATPVBABI XUAISampte". AdiveShedTRange("$C$3a$C$33'), AdiveShed KangerW$3Q$N$33"X ”R", 4. False 
Application J%un "ATPVBAEN jtUASanple", AdiveShed JtangenC$34$C$37"), AdiveShedTRange("$N$34$N$37"). "R", 4. False 
AppficationJîun"ATPVBAEN.XLAJSarrple", AdiveShed JîangeC'$C$3a$C$41"), AdiveShed JîaiTgeC$N$3a$N?41”). "R", 4. False 
Application JRun "ATPVBAEN XLAISarrple", AdiveShed Jîange("$C$42|C$45'), AdiveShed JtangenN$42$N$45"), "R". 4. False 
Applicafionftun"ATPVBAEN3{LA!SanpIe", AdiveShedFtangeC$C$4a$C$493, AdiveShedfîange("$N$4efNf49"). "R”, 4, False 
ApplicationKun”ATPVBAENXLA!Satrple", AdiveShed.Range("$C$5QfCf53'). AdiveShedFtangeC$N$5Q$N$53"), "R". 4, False
 Sampling based on firm------------------------------------
Application TRun "ATPVBAEN XLAISample", AdiveShed.Range("$C$2$C$14'3, AdiveShed Range("JN$2$N514"),"R". 13, False 
Application.Run "ATPVBAENXLAISample", AdiveShedFtange("$C$1S$C$27'), AotiveShedFtange("$N$1 S$N$27"), *R", 13, False 
ApplicationBun "ATPVBAEN j(LASample", AdiveShed.Range("$C$2a$C$40'), AdiveShedFtange("$N$2a$N$40"), "R", 13, False 
ApplicationBun "ATPVBAEN.XLA!Sarnple", AdiveShedFRange("$C$41:$C$533, AcfiveShedftange("$N$41:$N$53"), "R”, 13, False
 Calculating factors for bootstrapping----------------------
Eps =Epseron
di = radomly sampled reflected TE
dEpH=di-eps*H
dbar = averaged di
S2 = varience of original TE
dStar= d* in the Simar & Wilson (2004)
Nded thd D* is calculated in the sheet, as well as modified SALE
For DMUNo = 1 To 52 
Eps(DMLNo) = Application .WorksheetRjnctioaNormSlnv(RncO 
di(DMUNo)=RangeCN" & DMUNo +1 ) 
diEpKDMUNo) = di(DMUNo) + (Eps(DMUNo) *H) 
dBar=RangeCP2") 
s2=RangeC'02‘)
dStanpMUNo) = dBar + (1 + ( ( ^ 2 )  /s2) *(0.5)) * (diEpH(DMUNo) - dBar)
Range(“Q" & DMUNo +1 ) = dStar(DMUNo)
Next DMUNo
-Running DE/
Rin the Solver model. The UserFirish is s d  to True so thd 
the Solver Results dialog box will not be shown
Nded thd the orignal SALE is replaced by modified SALE
For DMUNo = 1 To 52 
RangeC"E55“) = DMUNo 
SolverSolve UserFinish=True 
Place the efficiency into column T 
Range("T" & DMUNo +1 ) = Range("F56")
RangeCD" & DMUNo +1 ) = 1 /  Range("F56“)
Next DMUNo
 Copy Efficiency to store at the rows starting from 69—
RangeCU2U53')Select
SelectioaCopy
Range(Celis(68 + i, "B"), Cells(68+ i, "AZ')).Select 
SelectionPasleSpecial Paste:=xPasteValues, Transpose:=True
Nexti 
End Sub
Figure A .l:  Visual Basic Code for Bootstrapping
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